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WALTER FARRELL, O. P.; *APUD POSTEROS SACER*

WHEN St. Thomas received his degree in theology at the University of Paris, he preached his first public sermon. We have a record of the notes that he used on the occasion; and I could not help but recall his inspiring tribute to the role of the *Master in Sacred Theology*, in the economy of the Church's life, when I learned of the death of my dear friend, Father Walter Farrell.

After some reflection, Aquinas chooses a passage from the *Psalms* to express his thoughts. "Thou waterest the hills from thy upper rooms: the earth shall be filled with the fruits of thy works."[1] Then he explains. Just as the hills soar above the rest of the earth, so the Master should strive for that level of perfection where he is completely occupied with the things

[1] *Psalm* 103:13.

of God. Moreover, the hills are the first to receive the light of the rising sun, and to be washed by the fertile rains of heaven. So the Master must first be enlightened by the radiance of God's knowledge, and bathed in the waters of His love, before he can bring wisdom to bear efficaciously on the souls of others. Finally, the hills of a country are a natural defense against its enemies. So the Master is marked out by Providence to be a bulwark against those who attack the precious possession of the faith.[2]

Wisdom, then, mothered by charity and savoring of the ineffable goodness of God, must be the main concern of the Master: the kind of wisdom that is not obtained by study so much as by penance, prayer, and acts of loving contemplation. Shortly after he was made a Master, I received a letter from Father Walter. In it, he made it abundantly clear that he would take his new obligations with all the seriousness of his generous soul; and I know that he prayed constantly for that divine wisdom which is at once the earmark of the apostle and the Holy Ghost's special gift to those who love Him without reserve.

It is not possible here to recount all of Father Walter's priestly achievements; but I should like to comment briefly on his apostolate of the pen, and the good effects that it secured for those who fell under his influence. He was largely responsible for the founding of THE THOMIST; and, by the admission of everyone, was the guiding genius in the first critical years of its existence. Now, it is safe to say that what he had in mind, in shaping its policies, was the realization of the Dominican ideal wherein the truths of our faith, and their theological exposition, are rendered more beautiful and more conducive to the Christian way of life by their emergence from the fulness of a divine contemplation.

[2] St. Thomas' sermon notes are entitled: *De Commendatione Sacrae Scripturae.* The text on which he bases his discourse is applied to "Doctors of Sacred Scripture"; that is, to those whose duty it is to be well read in the sacred sciences. Such, of course, are the Masters in Sacred Theology. See *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Varia.* Edited by P. Mandonnet, O.P. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927), tome iv, opusculum xl.

Father Walter will be best remembered, however, as the author of the *Companion to the Summa.* It was the result of the contemplative principle, operating in the secret chambers of his own heart, before its fruits were fully revealed in the classroom and on the lecture platform. Like the *Summa* of St. Thomas, it came to be the very raison d'être of his being. One of Martin Luther's public acts was to burn the great theological masterpiece of the Angelic Doctor—as though anything so futile as the destruction of a book could undermine the foundations of the Church or rend the fabric of her divine teaching. The rock will always remain more enduring than the pen—even the pen of so brilliant a genius as Aquinas. Yet the fact remains that the *Summa* has been declared by Peter himself as solid and substantial doctrine, and always a safe norm to follow in matters of faith and morals. For this reason, Father Walter could not have selected a more important text on which to fix his splendid energies of mind and heart. He was a natural choice for such a work. All his instincts and training were on the theological side. He had no great taste for science, although he was always sympathetic to its claims. In this respect, his gifts were closer akin to those of St. Thomas than to St. Albert's. Nothing could distract him from his theological preoccupations; so that he saw art, science, and all secular learning always within the framework of their theological implications. His *Companion to the Summa* has the marks of a great piece of work in theology, even if it shows some of the minor weaknesses of a theologian who was neither a scientist nor a professional student of literature.

At the end of his life, St. Thomas had formed a rather low estimate of his own writings. His *Summa,* for example, he looked at as so much chaff—beside the golden vision of God's inner life that had been granted him. Still, he was willing to let it stand until something better should come along. Nothing, however, has ever replaced it Now I think that Father Walter had much the same humble attitude towards his *Companion.* In his own eyes, it was only a sketchy set of notes for lectures that he gave to layfolk. Yet, like the original on which it was

founded, it is becoming indispensable to many teachers; and as a work of reference for English-speaking students, it has worked its way into our Catholic system of theological instruction. It has its shortcomings. It is not written with the polish of a James or a Santayana. It violates the rules of metaphors. It mixes its imagery. Its allusions to scientific findings are not made with the assurance of a savant. But its appeal is inescapable! And Father Walter, I daresay, was not unconscious of its defects, when matters of infinitely greater price were at stake—the illuminating of intellects with the truths of salvation, and the disposing of the wills of sinners for the reception of grace. Like the man in the Gospel, he knocked importunately on the doors of men's consciousness; and each burning metaphor that rose from his imagination, each figure of speech and modern instance that scintillated from his pen, was a blow that, by some curious circumstance of personal equation, might remove a barrier that separated him from his prey: the soul desperately in need of light and understanding. His *Companion* must be judged as an organism that lives in the same way as the *Summa* lives, representing the total force and beauty of the Church's teaching. Because of its practical aims, I believe that those who come to it without theological prejudices, and even without theological learning, are sometimes better judges of its intensely real purpose than the " masters in Israel " themselves; and the record of assuagement, deepened insights, and conversions that have followed from its study are a complete vindication of its existence. For, God would seem to have given it the unction of a gratuitous grace.

The simplicity of Father Walter's character is distilled into all his writings. As some of the psychologists of the spiritual life point out, notably Father Faber,[3] simplicity often manifests itself in a disconcerting quality of boldness—disconcerting, that is, to those who have lost their singleness of view in a world full of intrigue. The frank and straightforward manner in which Father Walter expounds his thought, looking fearlessly at life

[3] For example, in *Bethlehem* (New York: Murphy, 25th American edition), p. 177 ff.

and death and all their shuddering implications, is much the same bold manner as one finds in the writings of St. Thomas. As Chesterton says, it is not only a grasp but also a grip of Christian realities. " It is the perfect example of the iron hand in the velvet glove." [4] This sort of courageousness in calling a spade by its proper name may jar on our sensibilities; but if it moves us to more resolute Christian living, then its existence, too, is justified as a tool of our spiritual renovation.

But Father Walter was not content to write his *Companion.* He felt the urge to spread abroad its message of faith and good will. From this, undoubtedly, arose his ceaseless efforts to establish schools of theology for layfolk. He built his apostolate on two solid propositions: first, that deeper knowledge of God is a need in the modern world; secondly, that lay people have a clear title to such knowledge. It is not a question of pampering them with luxurious tidbits, but of feeding them the strong and well-balanced food by which they can grow " unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ." [5] If life around us is secular; if its gaze is fixed on earthly things as though these were our last end; if it presents the aspect of a picture puzzle that has fallen to pieces; then only an enlightened Christian layfolk can help restore order, by putting together again the fragments of our scattered Christian inheritance.

In a recent article for *The Priest,*[6] I delineated the kind of teacher who should lead such theological discussions for our laity. " The man I have in mind is well-read in the sacred sciences. He is familiar with history in its major trends. He does not smile down his nostrils at the weaknesses of modern pagans, just because they are modern and pagan. He remembers that St. Paul also dealt kindly with dilettantes of his day—people who dabbled in religion and raised a monument 'to the unknown God.' He has a clear grasp of the position of Catholic layfolk in the world today. He has counseling

[4] *St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933), p. 233.
[5] *Ephesians,* 4:13.
[6] July, 1950, p. 503 ff.

skill for their problems, the power of healing the wounds of their souls, of shedding light on the dark corners of life, of giving himself without stint to the needs of his fellow creatures. Perhaps I can best sum it up by saying that the ideal master, like St. Thomas, lives by a strong interior spirit which makes all that he says to flow from the wells of divine contemplation." It is scarcely necessary to add that the picture I painted here was drawn from the living image of Father Walter.[7]

In all his writing (and he contributed a wide range of articles to magazines, and carried on an important correspondence with the souls whom he was directing in the way of perfection) Father Walter always showed himself a true follower of St. Thomas. He had grasped the meaning of our Christian philosophy: as something always new, with the appeal of perpetual youth in its freshness and vitality; and, as having practical as well as theoretic implications for the round of daily duties. For him, as for the Angelic Doctor, it was not only an *idea* of reality, conceived by a mind that was purified by the truths of revelation; but also an *ideal*, seized on by an eager heart, and transformed into Christian action by a charity that is patient, kind, and free of ambition, that " rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." [8] As part of this divine love, Father Walter was convinced that he must write and preach in terms of the needs of our own day and age. From the beginning of his public ministry, therefore, he set himself to consider the intellectual and moral problems of the moderns whose way of life presently seems to have brought on a new crisis among the effects of original sin. And always, his diagnosis of each folly and fallacy is made with the same balanced temper of thought, the same superabounding love, that distinguished St. Thomas in his dealings with his contemporaries.

[7] In line with this movement to provide more ample instruction for our layfolk, Father Walter was instrumental in setting up several chairs of theology for religious sisters so that they, too, through the medium of the classroom, might have a share in the apostolate. He also defined the goal and set a standard of clear exposition for the pamphlet series of the Holy Name Society: *Theology for the Layman.*

[8] I *Corinthians*, 13 : 4-6.

Father Walter was admirably equipped to accomplish his task. No man I have ever known was more thoroughly sympathetic with the modern outlook and its peculiarities; no one was more spiritually allergic to its errors and weaknesses. At the same time, no one was more fearless in meeting its challenge. Hence he did not hesitate to apply the lancet of his keen insights to the suppurating wounds of society; and then, with a Christ-like gesture, to spread the balm of charity over the opened and drained infection. Only men of his wisdom and charity, in fact, can understand the ignorances and waywardness of the moderns and discuss their problems with profit. For these are the marks of a living Christian philosophy: when it enriches the mind with a theocentric conception of reality; when it casts out error and strengthens the soul against the regrettable mistakes of the past; when it gives an earnest of peaceful and harmonious living for the future. And when knowledge such as this is lifted up and employed on a theological plane, when it is motivated by a goal that is supernatural, it takes on at once a quality of diffusiveness that will not be satisfied until every nook and corner of society is permeated with its goodness. By such a Christian outlook, we are automatically protected against the selfish inversions that shut us off from communion with our fellowmen. To teach and preach and make others sharers of our precious treasures then becomes a passion; and to this passion, Father Walter was wholly subject in his Master, Christ.

Towards the end of his life, Father Walter turned his energies towards a special study of that part of the *Summa* which deals with the life and death of our Savior.[9] In a sense, this was

[9] Father Walter was always greatly attached to the *Christology* of St. Thomas; and to its lovely theological counterpart, the *Mariology*. For him, these two parts of the *Summa* held a very special place in hagiographic literature: they were lives of Our Lord and His Blessed Mother, written by a theologian who was a saint, for the instruction and edification of other theologians. In a popular work called *The Looking Glass*, Father Walter unfolds the thesis that Mary is the mirror of all virtue. The psychology of the book is essentially feminine, depicting the spiritual beauties of God's Mother for the beauty-conscious soul of the modern woman.

inevitable, since it represents the most practical theological focus for a scholar who wants to be holy, and the supreme law of perfection for all who would be true Christians: absorption in Jesus Christ, whose Godhead is our final happiness, and whose earthly life, in its smallest detail, is the model on which our own conduct must be founded. As Grabmann points out, in his delicate little study, this was also a basic element in the character of the Angelic Doctor.[10] *Nonnisi Te, Domine* was the demand of a divine rashness, asking an exchange of the infinite for the finite. The Creator surrendered Himself to His creature; and straightway, with the assurance of our Lord's interior presence in his soul, St. Thomas went on to write that part of his *Summa* which treats of the Christology.

Now, all this was not lost on the soul of Father Walter. He, too, crowned his efforts with the plan of a life of Christ. But his moment came before the plan was fully realized; and we are certain that the resolve was accepted by his Master in all its fullness. He had contemplated his God; and in Him he had found " all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." [11] He was utterly convinced, like St. Thomas, that true wisdom is to be sought only in Christ. For, what do the efforts of the world's greatest thinkers amount to when laid beside the articles of faith revealed to us by God! And Father Walter often used the example cited by St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Apostles' Creed*: " With all their learning, no philosophers before Christ could have known as much about God and the truths needed for salvation as an unlettered woman now knows by the gift of faith." [12] The human nature of Christ is the sacrament of sacraments, and the road by which we come to the Divinity, being ourselves made divine in the process.

[10] *The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Trans. by N. Ashenbrener, O.P. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951), part III.

[11] *Colossians,* 2:3.

[12] See, *The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Trans. by J. B. Collins, S. S. (New York: Wagner, 1939), p. 4. (The instructions are made up of five of St. Thomas's opuscula. *The Commentary on the Apostles' Creed* is opusculum lxvi, in the catalogue prepared for the canonization process.)

All of Father Walter's knowledge was preparing him for a deeper understanding of the supernatural psychology of Christ; and because he saw the absence of such a psychology in the lives of men today, he was dedicating the last strokes of his apostolic pen to a portrait of the *Only Son* of God—all to the end that what men learn by Revelation, they may also earn by actual imitation of Christ, whose every word and deed was meant to be a lesson to us.[13]

At this stage of his life, Father Walter had already estimated the perishable goods of earth at their proper value; and he had rejected those that did not lead him to Christ. It was the moment when life dealt its last blow—with what pangs of suffering we can only surmise! It was also the moment in which God bestowed His final grace.[14] From the human point of view, it would seem that he died too young; but this is a deception. The hour of our passing is fixed from all eternity. It is not a matter of chance; or if some accident is involved, it is completely subject to the will of God. Howsoever untimely his death appeared to men, therefore—when life was reaching its absolute maturity and the ripest fruits of his wisdom might be expected—the truth is that Christ called Father Walter at precisely the instant of time when He knew, with infinite certainty, that the destiny of His servant had been fulfilled. He had arrived at that moral stature which was intended for him from the beginning. He had realized the pattern of earthly existence that had been eternally conceived in the mind of God. His pilgrimage was done; and there was not a single loose string among the bonds that attached his soul to Christ. All that remained was the mystery of judgment.[15]

[13] There is still the possibility of Father Walter's book being completed from his notes; in which case it will appear as a Sheed & Ward publication.

[14] Here I have borrowed some of the consoling thoughts of Père Sertillanges in his meditations on death. See, *Recollection*. Translated by the Dominican Nuns of Menlo Park. (New York: McMullen, 1950), pp. 215 ff.

[15] It is not unlikely that Father Walter was aware of this impending judgment. Certainly, he was resigned to it, without fear. He had written: " The thought of death is the nourishing food savored by the Christian from infancy to old age "; and in the November issue of *The Sign* (the month in which he died): " The

By human standards, St. Thomas also left his work incomplete. But he had seen a vision; and he was ready to die. Perhaps Father Walter, too, was given some intimation of God's special pleasure with his pains and labors. The *Summa* and the *Companion to the Summa* belong to the order of human creations which is an order of imperfection. What Father Walter now enjoys, we pray, is the perfect vision of God. And part of that vision, one can feel very sure, is a soul companionship with the man who, when he lived on earth, was a unique example of the Dominican ideal: the matchless scholar, the scholarly saint, Thomas Aquinas.

ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN, O.P.

St. Mary of the Springs
Columbus, Ohio

Christian, in common with the young, sees the truth of death's meaning. Life is for death, and death is for unending life."

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

"EVERY day makes more evident the fact that two strong essentially incompatible ways of life will divide the loyalties of men and nations in the political world of tomorrow. They are genuine democracy and Marxian totalitarianism." [1] It is noteworthy that the American Bishops who issued the statement containing these two sentences make no reference to that false liberalism which is likewise opposed to genuine democracy, though at the opposite extreme from totalitarianism. The omission is doubtless due to the fact that nineteenth-century liberalism is a dying creed, where it has not already passed away, in this day of increasing concentration of power in the absolute State. There is little need to warn the world against so thoroughly discredited a doctrine. There is great need, on the other hand, to beware of twentieth-century absolutism, the most serious actual threat to society and one more detrimental to souls than liberalism ever was.

Liberalism is the political consequence of Naturalism, a philosophical doctrine which repudiates the supernatural order and all revealed teaching, and holds that the human reason is the supreme principle, source, and judge of truth.[2] Totalitarianism

[1] From a statement by the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, April 14, 1945.

[2] "What *Naturalists* or *Rationalists* aim at in philosophy, that the supporters of *Liberalism*, carrying out the principles laid down by Naturalism, are attempting in the domain of morality and politics. The fundamental doctrine of *Rationalism* is the supremacy of the human reason, which, refusing due submission to the divine and eternal reason, proclaims its own independence, and constitutes itself the supreme principle and source and judge of truth. Hence these followers of Liberalism deny the existence of any divine authority to which obedience is due and proclaim that every man is the law to himself. So arises that ethical system which they style *independent* morality, and which, under the guize of liberty, exonerates man from any obedience to the commands of God, and substitutes a boundless licence . . . It follows . . . that the authority in the State is then taken to come from the people only; and that, just as every man's individual

is the political consequence of Liberalism, as an extreme reaction to the excessive liberty and defiance of authority which the error of the Liberals created. It is therefore a grandchild of Naturalism and Rationalism, though often so unnatural and irrational that the family resemblance is hardly perceptible; the ancestor was clearly eccentric but the descendant is maniacal.

In the pages that follow we shall try to show that the Supernaturalism of the Catholic Church's teaching is the only effective answer to the Naturalism which bred Liberalism first, then Totalitarianism. Emphasis will be laid therefore on the *theological* aspects of the modern political problem created by the friction between a dying Liberalism and the growth of Totalitarianism. Specifically we shall concentrate upon the problem of liberty, which is not only a political, but even more fundamentally, a theological problem. And our main concern in dealing with this point will be to show the relevance of the Christian theology of human liberty to politics. As far as possible we intend to rely on the social teachings of recent Pontiffs, especially Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII, as well as on the theological doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Since liberty is of the essence of genuine democracy, a proper understanding of its meaning is vital to the success of a democratic order. That understanding will never be complete without a theology of liberty. The widespread decline of civil and political liberty in the twentieth century is due as much to ignorance of the nature of freedom as it is to any other cause. And the nature of freedom is never more unknown, never more mysterious, than when the light of revelation and the theological science of revelation are not admitted as pertinent to the mystery.

Liberalism and Totalitarianism are not only political errors; they are also theological errors, heresies. As such, they must be dealt the strongest blow by orthodoxy on the theological level.

reason is his only rule of life, so the collective reason of the community should be the supreme guide in the management of all public affairs. Hence the doctrine of the supremacy of the greater number, and that all right and all duty reside in the majority." Leo XIII, *Libertas* (June 20, 1888).

Though both are very vulnerable also on philosophical grounds, it is at least a tactical error to limit opposition to them to the lower plane. And once it is understood that both Liberalism and Totalitarianism are creeds as well as philosophies, whose appeal is as much to the religious as to the political instincts of men, the neglect of a theological resistance is seen to be unwise and short-sighted. Liberals or totalitarians may claim that their "isms" are grounded on a purely rational and scientific approach to human problems, but the claim will not stand up under investigation. Their disavowal of religious intent does not make them less religious in fact. Liberalism's deification of the individual and Totalitarianism's apotheosis of the state are the first principles of systems political in intention and religious in execution. Their harnessing for political ends of a zeal and devotion worthy of better causes is a diversion of religious drives in the nature of man which must be utilized in the service of an idol if they are not turned to the true God.

These heresies must be opposed and drained of their attraction on a theological plane. No merely philosophical attack will succeed in unsettling the faith of their adherents. If the liberals and totalitarians were not believers, holding to dogmas they accept on the authority of men who have deceived them or have themselves been deceived, logic alone might be more effective in stripping the mask of plausibility from their errors. As it is, only the logic of events has thus far succeeded in leading multitudes of liberals to abandon their heresy, and there is danger that time alone will convince the devotees of absolutism of their errors, as the fruits of their fallacy ripen. Only a faith, and a far more reasonable faith, can successfuly challenge the attractiveness of superstitions whose grip on the will is much more steady than its seat in the mind.[3]

The crisis of the modern world is no merely political or economic struggle; it is essentially a moral and religious crisis.

[3] "Every living culture must possess some spiritual dynamic . . . Normally this dynamic is supplied by a religion, but in exceptional circumstances the religious impulse may disguise itself under philosophical or political forms." C. Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (New York, 1938), p. viii.

It has been justly described as not so much a struggle between Right and Left as between Above and Below. It is a battle to the death between a Naturalism that has plunged in recent years into a veritable denial of nature itself, and the Supernaturalism of Christianity; between the divinely planned City of God, and the humanly planned City of Man. In its depths it is a battle between Christ and Satan, with the souls of men as the prize of victory.

Knowledge of the devil and of his influence upon human affairs is only one of the many illuminating contributions theology makes to a complete political theory. The philosopher may tell us much of God's dominion over mankind, but only the theologian can speak with authority of Satan's potent influence upon history. This point alone should make it evident that philosophy can never deal adequately with all social problems and of itself light the road to a solution of social disorders, no matter how true be its principles or how legitimate its conclusions. For philosophy, *qua* philosophy, has no knowledge of diabolical pressures upon mankind, no assurance even of the existence of the angelic order, and certainly no consciousness of the sole remedy for demonic interference in society, that is, the Passion of Christ and the grace merited by His Death. There is great wisdom in the words of de Rougemont, " What democracies in general, and America in particular most lack is belief in the Devil." [4]

Though theology has in modern times been dethroned, outside the Church, from the royal position of queen of the sciences, there have not been lacking eminent witnesses to its importance in the field of politics. Proudhon, atheist and anarchist, wrote one hundred years ago, " It is surprising that at the bottom of our politics we always find theology." [5] More recently, General Douglas MacArthur, speaking of the world's

[4] D. deRougemont, *The Devil's Share* (tr. Haakon Chevalier) (New York, 1945), p. 11.

[5] Quoted from *Les confessions d'un Revolutionnaire* (Paris, 1849), p. 61, by G. Briefs, " Philosophy of the Democratic State," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1939 (Washington, 1940), p. 36.

vain efforts for peace, declared, " The problem is basically theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advance in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit, if we are to save the flesh."

The very titles of recent writings on the democratic and liberal tradition indicate a new awareness and a new attitude regarding the relationship of Christianity and theology to political questions. Even outside the Church there is an increasing realization that the brotherhood of mankind which everyone postulates as a condition of social order cannot be had without divine help, as the Catholic Church has never ceased to proclaim; and that the chief error of the liberal and secular approach to human problems has been the neglect of the God who makes true fraternity possible.[6]

Within the Church the doctrine most highly recommended for the solution of social and political disorders is the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Leo XIII wrote:

> Domestic and civil society, which is so sadly imperilled by the curse of pernicious opinions, would subsist much more securely and peacefully if the doctrines inculcated in the academies and schools were sounder and more accordant with the authoritative teaching of the Church, such as the works of St. Thomas contain. For the opinions of St. Thomas respecting the true nature of liberty now running into licence, respecting the divine origin of every form of authority, respecting laws and their binding force, respecting the paternal and just dominion of sovereigns, respecting obedience to the higher powers, and mutual charity to all, have very great and indeed irresistible power for the overthrowing of those

[6] Recent writings of this type include: N. Nicklem, *The Theology of Politics* (Oxford, 1941); W. Orton, *The Liberal Tradition* (Yale University Press, 1945), a work subtitled " A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom "; R. B. Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944); D. Runes, *Bible for the Liberal* (New York, 1946); " Needed: A Spiritual Basis for Democracy," *N. Y. Times Magazine*, May 27, 1945; " The Spiritual Basis of Democracy," *Science, Philosophy and Religion* (New York, 1942), and " The Religious Background of Democracy," *ibid.*

novel principles of legislation which are plainly seen to be perilous to a peaceful state of things and the public weal.[7]

Pius XI renewed this recommendation:

> Since [St. Thomas] is so clearly perfect in his theology, he gives secure reasons and precepts not only for the direction of man's individual life, but likewise for domestic and civil society. Thus he is our source for economic and political science. In the second part of his *Summa Theologica* he deals with paternal authority and family life, with the lawful authority in state or nation, with the law of nature and international law, with peace and war, justice and property, with laws and allegiance, with our duties to private individuals and the common good, and that in the natural as well as the supernatural order. If in private, in public, and in international relations all these things that Thomas lays down were kept holy and inviolate, nothing more would be needed to reconcile man to the 'peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ' which the whole world so greatly desires.[8]

What has been said regarding the supreme importance and indispensability of a theological viewpoint on these matters provides an *apologia*, if one is needed, for what follows in these pages. Pope Pius XII has said, "Thank God, one may believe the time has passed when the claim that moral and Gospel principles should guide the life of States and peoples was disdainfully thrust aside as unreal. The events of these war years have amply confuted the scorners of those principles in a harder way than one could ever have imagined."[9] If much of what is said here seems platitudinous or proverbial, it will not follow that these things go without saying. For these fundamental human and Christian truths have been long forgotten, or ignored, in a large part of the modern world, in practice at least if not always in theory. Our chief intention is to emphasize the essential and indivisible relationship between Christianity and a just social order, between Christian liberty and social and political liberties, between true democracy and the

[7] *Aeterni Patris* (August 4, 1879).
[8] *Studiorum Ducem* (June 29, 1923).
[9] *Christmas Message*, 1944.

spiritual side of man's nature. For the restoration of order and the preservation of freedom is " essentially a spiritual task which demands the spiritual vision that is faith and the spiritual will that is charity." [10]

I. Nature of Christian Liberty

1. Liberty in General.

" Of all the loose terms in the world liberty is the most indefinite." [11] So wrote Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century. Two centuries later we find the same indefiniteness in the use of this word. Burke's complaint was followed by a definition: " The liberty I mean is *social* freedom. It is that state of things in which liberty is secured by equality of restraint . . . This kind of liberty is, indeed, but another name for justice . . ." [12] But the laxer intellectual standards of our day do not compel modern statesmen to exercise the same care. Definition of terms is carelessly (or even, in some instances, carefully) disregarded; the resulting semantic confusion has actually become one of the chief modern implements of tyranny. In the process of becoming a catchword, " liberty " has almost ceased to be a concept.

Before attempting anything else, then, we must try to disentangle the network of meanings, true, half true, or false, which are twined round the word. Etymologically, liberty stems from the Latin adjective *liber* and the corresponding noun *libertas*, meaning respectively, " free from slavery, of free birth," and " freedom, as opposed to slavery." [13] As far as modern English is concerned, " liberty " and " freedom " are practically synono-

[10] C. Dawson, *The Judgment of the Nations* (New York, 1942), p. 221.

[11] Quoted from *Correspondence*, I, 312, in J. A. Ryan, and M. F. X. Millar, *The State and the Church* (New York, 1922), p. 146.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] The Greek equivalents of *liber* and *libertas* are *eleutheros* and *eleutheria*. In the New Testament these words have in some contexts a special meaning, i. e., freedom not to practice the Mosaic law; freedom from the yoke of Jewish rituals. Cf. *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, IV, 237-B.

mous. Though shades of meaning are suggested in dictionaries and elsewhere, we shall use the two words interchangeably.[14]

The philology of "liberty" and "freedom" presents no problem. It is freedom as a reality and ideal which so often evades precise definition and creates confusion. Since liberty is predicated of the Creator and of creatures, of spiritual and of material things, of internal as well as external actions, of supernatural as well as natural life and activity, of powers as well as of acts and habits, of evil as well as of good actions, the need of the broadest possible viewpoint in studying the nature of the reality designated by the terms "liberty" and "freedom" is obvious.

Theologian and philosopher agree that the most general implication, the common denominator, in the idea of freedom, wherever it may be applied, is "immunity or exemption from something."[15] The antonyms of freedom are "slavery" and "subjection."[16] As a privation, each species of liberty will have to be defined in terms of the type of subjection or servitude to which it is opposed.[17]

Before proceeding to distinguish on this basis the various kinds of freedom, however, it may be well to call attention here to the chief defect in many, if not most, definitions of freedom. That defect lies in isolating one type or aspect of liberty and attributing to it the universality of the genus. The concept of liberty itself thus lives in bondage, imprisoned in the limits of philosophies too narrow to embrace the whole of its reality. Civil and political freedoms are often regarded, especially in modern times, as the principal, or even the only, types of freedom, and freedom is then defined, for example, as "liberty from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a sovereign

[14] *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, 1942, fifth ed.), p. 399. Cf. also Ross Hoffman, *Tradition and Progress* (Milwaukee, 1938), pp. 103-104; Fulton Sheen, *Freedom under God* (Milwaukee, 1940), p. 252.

[15] Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae* (Paris), "De Actibus Humanis," Diss. II, art, I, no. 1 (p. 225 ff); Hugon, *Metaphysica* (Paris, 1907), I, 160.

[16] Billuart, *loc. cit.*

[17] *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 5, a. 5, corp.

government to any of its own subjects "; [18] or as " the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." [19]

Sorokin has justly pointed out that this emphasis on a particular type of freedom, to the exclusion of other, and more important, kinds, " is the most common mistake of all the works on history and the progress of civil and other liberties written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." And he adds, ". . . They imply that liberty appeared in human history only with the ' Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens,' or the like. For their authors, there was hardly any freedom or liberty in the history of the Oriental and other countries, or in medieval Europe." [20] With good reason then does he hold that " it is superficial to discuss freedom generally, without specifying the type involved." [21] We shall try to avoid this mistake by qualifying the terms liberty or freedom wherever the context does not make clear which of the many types of liberty is under discussion.

[18] Austin's definition, quoted by Ryan-Millar, *op. cit.*, p. 146, from *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, edited by R. Campbell, p. 159. Cf. Ryan-Millar, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 ff. for other definitions and a criticism of them.

[19] Lord Acton's definition, quoted *ibid.*, from his *History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1909), p. 3. Lord Acton knew at least two hundred definitions of freedom, only twelve of which he could accept. Few appear in his writings. (Cf. F. E. Lally, *As Lord Acton Says* (Newport, R. I., 1942), pp. 134-135). For other definitions cf. also J. Clayton, " Where is Freedom? ", *Blackfriars*, XII (June, 1940), pp. 347-352.

[20] P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, III (New York, 1937), 163. In *God in Economic Life* (New York, Paulist Press, 1943), p. 22, Wilfred S. Parsons, S. J., brings out the same point: " It has grown to be a custom among uninformed popular writers to speak of liberty and equality as if they were an invention or discovery of the revolutionists in America and France in the eighteenth century. This is simply because they are ignorant of history. But because these popular writers talk this way, Catholics often have an uneasy suspicion that there is something heretical about liberty and equality. Nothing could be more untrue. The Fathers of the Church and the Medieval writers, in talking about the state, constantly spoke of liberty and equality, and held that it was in fact Christianity which introduced these two concepts into Western civilization."

[21] *Ibid.*

2. Kinds of Liberty.

A. Uncreated Liberty

Freedom, understood as immunity or exemption from subjection or bondage of one kind or another, is predicated of God as well as of creatures. The first distinction to be made, therefore, is between uncreated and created liberty. Like other perfections discoverable in creation and predicated of the Creator, freedom is to be attributed to God analogically, not univocally, for in Him the mode of freedom differs infinitely from the manner in which creatures may share it.[22] Liberty is found in God *formally*, like being, truth, goodness, and other perfections in whose formal concept no imperfection is implied. It is a *perfectio simpliciter simplex*, like intelligence and life; not a *perfectio mixta*, like reason or sensory life. In other words, liberty is a perfection which can be attributed to God without reservation and in a formal sense, once our minds have stripped the concept of the limitations and imperfections associated with freedom in finite and created entities. In God freedom is absolute, without limitation of any kind; in creatures it is relative, according to the various limited modalities of the natures which participate in it.[23]

God's liberty is a perfection of His will.[24] It consists in a supreme independence of all things apart from Himself, a complete immunity from subjection or necessity of any kind, except the essential necessity of knowing and loving Himself in an eternal unchanging act that is identical with His nature. Creation is a product of this infinite freedom,[25] and God's independence in relation to all His creatures is as absolute after as it is before they are brought into being.

[22] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 5; also R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *God: His Existence and His Nature*, I (St. Louis, 1934), pp. 205 ff., concerning analogy; also II (St. Louis, 1936), pp. 203 ff.

[23] Y. Simon, "Liberty and Authority," in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1940, pp. 86 ff.

[24] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 3; *I Cont. Gent.*, 88; *de Ver.*, q. 24, a. 3.

[25] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg, 1937), 374; 706; etc. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 3; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, II, 341 ff.

Since there is no real division or distinction of any sort in God, we can say that God *is* liberty, just as we say God *is* love or truth. All true freedom outside of Him is a reflection of this limitless liberty whereby the divine will is immune from necessitation and coercion and is unchangeably fixed in infinite goodness. In God there is liberty *per essentiam*; in creatures, *per participationem*.

B. Angelic Liberty.

This distinction leads us logically to a consideration of the varied types of created participation in the absolute freedom of God. Here the broadest differentiation is between angelic and human freedom.[26] In both the angelic and the human order the basic liberty is the natural freedom of choice which is proper to intellectual essences.[27] This is clearly distinguished from the supernatural liberty of grace and glory by which the freedom of angels and men is most truly fulfilled. In other words, we must distinguish on both the angelic and the human levels between the natural liberty of the created will and the supernatural liberty which perfects the wills of creatures in union with God.

As imperishable and indestructible as the spiritual substances in which it is rooted, the natural freedom of choice in the angels is an immunity in the intellectual appetite from inner necessitation and outer violence; it gives the angels dominion over their activity. They have both liberty of contradiction, i. e. liberty of exercise, by which their wills are free to act or not

[26] Though "freedom" is often predicated of irrational creatures, or even of inanimate natures, this is an extension of the use of the term; more accurately, the activity of creatures lower than man should be called "spontaneous" rather than "free." Spontaneity implies an absence of external restraint, whereas freedom or liberty mean an absence of any inner necessitation or determination. The former is freedom only from exterior compulsion; the latter, immunity from interior necessity. Rational creatures can have both; lower creation, only immunity from outer coercion. Cf. Billuart, *loc. cit.*, p. 225.

[27] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 59, a. 3; corp.: "Wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man." Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 83.

to act; and liberty of specification, by which their wills, in the act of deliberate choice, may choose any of several possible objects presented to the will by the intellect. As a natural property of the created will, it is found intact in the fallen angels as well as in those who persevered in grace.[28] For not only the blessed angels in heaven but the reprobate also in hell and this is true also of human spirits in either place—are free to choose this or that object, free to use the power of choice or not to use it, even though their wills are unchangeably fixed in their last ends.[29] Immutability in the final possession of the last end is no hindrance to all exercise of liberty, for the act of election is the proper act of the free will, and election is not concerned with a choice of ends. The impossibility of a change or choice in relation to the final end of the will does not eliminate the power to choose among goods that are *ad finem*. For freedom of choice, in angels as well as in men, is definable in terms of means rather than ends: "the faculty of choosing means fitted to the end proposed." [30]

But it was not for this freedom that the angels were created, though it is the basic liberty from which every other kind of freedom must flow. Freedom of the will is a power to be perfected, not the perfection of freedom. And the angels' natural freedom of choice is perfected by the infusion of the supernatural freedom of grace and glory. This freedom the rebel angels lost when they fell from grace. They are condemned to an eternity of sinfulness and undeveloped freedom in suffering that loss of God which is the essential penalty of their sin.

It may be noted here that the beatified angels have in their supernaturalized wills that freedom through charity to which Christian men are taught to aspire, but that freedom in them,

[28] Though the freedom of the angels is not a defined doctrine of the Church, it is a teaching which clearly pertains to faith. In the Scriptures the angels are described as creatures whose good or evil use of freedom is rewarded or punished; with regard to the fallen angels the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) says: "Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali." (Denz. 428)

[29] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.

[30] Leo XIII, *Libertas*. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 3; III, q. 18, a. 4.

though supernatural, is not *Christian* freedom. The reason is that the human Christ is not the channel for the infusion of supernatural life into the angels, but into men.[31]

C. Human Liberty.

We have pointed out above that the distinction between natural and supernatural freedom must be applied to the liberty of men as well as of angels. In the natural freedom of the human will a twofold distinction must be made, between freedom from coaction and freedom from necessitation. The former, also termed freedom of spontaneity, is immunity from external determination or violence; the latter, freedom from both external and internal determination. In this second type of liberty we have natural freedom of choice properly so called. The first, freedom of spontaneity, is found in all activity that proceeds from some intrinsic principle, and is absent only from things done by force or extrinsic impulse against natural inclination.[32] Freedom of spontaneity is rather freedom of action than freedom of volition.

There are three aspects to the will's freedom from necessitation: freedom of contradiction, of specification, and of contrariety. The first is the will's liberty of exercise with regard to its act; the phrase, " freedom of contradiction," denotes the power to will or not will. The second is the will's freedom with regard to particular objects which are means to the end; " freedom of specification " signifies that the will can elect this or that object to specify its act, as and when it chooses. The third is the will's freedom in relation to its last end; " freedom of contrariety " is had when the will is at liberty, physically, though not morally, to choose evil as well as good. This last, sometimes termed moral liberty, is not essentially different from freedom of specification; except for the fact that liberty of contrariety deals with a choice of ends rather than means to an end, it is identical with freedom of specification.[33]

[31] *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 2.
[32] E. Hugon, O.P., *Metaphysica* (Paris, 1907), I, 160 ff.; 179.
[33] Cf. H. Merkelbach, O.P., *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris, 1938), I, 87.

The first of the above types of natural liberty is of the essence of human freedom; the second pertains to the perfection of freedom; the third is a defect found in the liberty of those creatures who are imperfect by reason of not being finally confirmed in good.[34] The choosing of evil may be regarded as a sign of liberty, as sickness is a proof of life. But to will evil is not liberty or a part of liberty.[35] If the power to choose evil were of the essence or of the perfection of freedom, God Himself would not be free, nor would Christ and the blessed in heaven. Sin is in a real sense more truly slavery than an expression of freedom; freedom is most perfectly developed where sin is an impossibility.[36]

What was said of the natural liberty of Angels is true also of free will in man: man was not created for this liberty alone. The free will is a faculty to be developed, not the perfection of human freedom. The fulness of development comes to it not from nature alone, but from the supernatural life of grace, which perfects nature. Without grace the will and its freedom remain, but survive undeveloped, cursed with an inborn deficiency in the pursuit of true good. For the will has been vitiated by the sin of Adam; since the fall, man is inclined to choose evil, even though the will is never forced, against the original drive of its nature, to make an evil choice. Man lost the fulness of liberty in Eden, his original freedom from fault and unhappiness; [37] in its place is a moral bondage from which no power or effort exclusively his own can release him. The primitive misuse of freedom by the father of the race has infected our wills, and the other faculties of the soul also, to such an extent that they cannot be without sin, as they could

[34] Merkelbach, *ibid.*; *Dict. Theol. Cath.*, IX, 659 ff.; *de Ver.* q. 22, a. 6.

[35] *De Ver., loc. cit.*

[36] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3: "It belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for as to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin."

[37] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 2, ad 3.

before the fall.[38] The will's bias towards evil cannot be rectified by any natural means; free will must be emancipated by divine grace, or it is the tool of man's self-destruction.[39] Grace alone makes a free will a good will.

The supernatural life of divine grace is then the only source of full spiritual freedom for intellectual creatures, a freedom which means union with God and emancipation from the bondage of sin. There are two stages in this supernatural freedom: the freedom of grace in this life; the freedom of glory in the next. This is the freedom, shared in varying degrees but essentially the same in all, possessed by all the just on earth and all the angels and saints in heaven: on earth imperfect and incomplete, in heaven perfect and full.[40] On earth the degrees of this liberty correspond to the degrees of charity in the soul, or the three stages of development in the supernatural life: of beginners, of the proficient, and of the perfect.[41]

As it is in men, this freedom of grace and glory is essentially *Christian* freedom, because it was won for men, and is given to them, by Christ. In the angels, however, as we have pointed out above, this same liberty is supernatural without being at the same time Christian, since Christ did not redeem the angels but only mankind. He is their Head, but He is not their Liberator, because grace was given to them independently of Christ's influence when they were created, and glory also was the reward of those who persevered, without the mediation of the God-Man. Christian freedom is, therefore, a specifically human freedom, though the supernatural liberty of the angels is generically the same life of grace and glory.

We shall return later to a fuller treatment of Christian freedom. Here we must continue to distinguish various other types of freedom, all of which are related in some manner to the supernatural freedom of grace and glory. Up to this point we have been dealing entirely with the internal and spiritual

[38] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 4, ad 6. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 3.
[39] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 1.
[40] *In Joann.*, cap. 8, lect. 4.
[41] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 4.

freedoms of intellectual creatures. Man, however, as a composite of spirit and matter, needs for his perfection both as a man and as a Christian, external liberty. The first distinction to be placed, therefore, is between man's natural freedom and his supernatural freedom; the second, between internal and external freedom in both the natural and the supernatural order.[42]

Man's internal freedom in the natural order is the freedom

[42] The divisions of liberty we have indicated up to now are outlined in the following schema:



We may observe here that we are not assigning a place in our division of liberty to the perverse freedom of actual sin, except to the extent that it is implied, as act is implied in potentiality, in "freedom of contrariety." St. Thomas declares that this so-called freedom "is truly slavery, and liberty only according to opinion." (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 4) Elsewhere he has specified whose opinion he means: "that a man be not checked by the rein of reason from following concupiscence is liberty in the opinion of one who conceives of that pursuit as the *summum bonum*." (*In Rom.*, cap. 6, lect. 4)

In his commentary on the second book of *Sentences*, after enumerating freedom of choice, freedom from sin by grace, and freedom from unhappiness by glory as the three types of true liberty *simpliciter*, St. Thomas adds that the freedom of sin, in St. Paul's terminology "freedom from justice," is freedom only *secundum quid*, and therefore merits no place among the principal species of liberty. He admits, however, that it is similar to the freedom from sin by grace "by reason of likeness in mode, for just as sin *per se* retards one from good after the manner of a habit or a disposition, so also does justice retard one from evil." (*II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2; ad 3)

of choice we have treated above. His external natural liberty is of two main types: freedom for man as an individual; freedom for men as members of society. We shall use the terms *individual* and *societal* to designate these two kinds of external freedom.

As an individual, every man has certain rights flowing from the natural law itself, which he must have exterior liberty to exercise. Nature itself is the basis for each man's right to life, to property, to growth in knowledge and virtue, to divine worship according to the dictates of a right conscience. Pius XII has enumerated the following as "fundamental personal rights":

> the right to maintain and develop one's corporal, intellectual and moral life and especially the right to religious formation and education; the right to worship God in private and public and to carry on religious works of charity; the right to marry and to achieve the aim of married life; the right to conjugal and domestic society; the right to work as the indispensable means towards the maintenance of family life; the right to free choice of a state of life, and hence, too, of the priesthood or religious life; the right to the use of material goods, in keeping with one's duties and social limitations.[43]

Even apart from whatever liberty the infusion of supernatural life may bring to men, these rights are essential to human nature and its normal development. From this liberty of the individual based on the natural moral law are to be clearly distinguished what are now usually termed "liberties," which flow from positive law and human agreements. These "liberties" may be further distinguished as either civil or political; the most important difference between the two is that civil rights have as their immediate end the welfare of the individual, while political rights are primarily directed to a public purpose.[44]

Civil rights are those which the individual has as a member of the community, "conferred by the State for the promotion

[43] *Christmas Message*, 1942.

[44] Ryan-Millar, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-281, "The Rights of the Citizen."

of the common good and the welfare of the individual." [45] Among the rights guaranteed by positive legislation are usually found many already due to men as natural rights; these rights can then be termed " civil liberties " as well as natural rights. Already man's inalienable possession as gifts of God, these rights cannot be granted by the State; but the State can guarantee them. Civil rights properly so called, however, are those guaranteed in human law which are not already granted in the law of nature. The right to a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions is, in the United States, a civil right or liberty in this sense, inasmuch as it is not a right contained in the natural moral law. In the same manner, the political rights of the citizen, which " have to do mainly with voting and holding office " [46] are guarantees of positive rather than natural law.

Without prejudice to the natural law civil liberties may be, through constitutional processes, increased, restricted, or abrogated. The nullification of the right to vote, for example, " does not amount to a violation of any natural right. The elective franchise is not among the natural rights of the individual. It is created by the State for a civil purpose which might conceivably be attained, and in several countries has been attained, without universal suffrage." [47]

[45] J. A. Ryan, *The Catholic Church and the Citizen* (New York, 1928), p. 86.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[47] *Ibid.* Cf. also *Declining Liberty and Other Papers* (New York, 1927), by the same author. On pp. 3-4 of this work he writes: " Modern public liberty is of three principal kinds: civil, economic, and political. The first affects the individual in the ordinary activities of life. It includes freedom of worship and expression, freedom to move about, to engage in a lawful occupation, to join with one's fellows in various forms of association, to make contracts, and to enjoy due process of law. Economic liberty falls under the head of civil liberty in so far as it concerns the right to labor, to follow a business, to acquire property. As economic opportunity, however, it constitutes a special and very important kind of liberty. In this sense, it means not merely absence of arbitrary restraint. It denotes the presence of effectual and reasonable opportunity. Obviously this is considerably more than mere freedom to enter economic contracts. For these may or may not be adequate to a reasonable kind of life. Finally, political liberty denotes the legal power of the citizen to take part in the processes of representative government. It covers chiefly membership in political associations, exercise of the electoral franchise, and holding public office." Cf. also Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* (New York, 1943).

This distinction between the external personal freedom which is of natural right and the liberties granted the individual by human law is most clearly evidenced in regimes where slavery was a legally recognized institution. For slaves, even though they may not be in possession of the civil and political rights of citizens, have natural rights anterior to positive law which may not be denied. Human slavery is of the body, not of the soul.[48] No master may compel an obedience which would be sinful, or make demands contrary to fundamental human rights in matters that pertain to the nature of the body.[49] Slave or free, every man enjoys all the fundamental rights that spring from the principles of his human nature: " the right to life, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means of existence; the right to tend towards his ultimate goal in the path marked out for him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property." [50]

As organized in society, and especially in the natural societies into which they are born, men have by natural right other indestructible freedoms. The family, imperfect society of the natural order, must have its own societal liberty to exercise all the rights due it by the natural law. The family is " a society limited indeed in numbers, but a true society, anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth . . . governed by a power within itself, that is to say by the father." [51]

[48] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 1.

[49] *Ibid.*, a. 5, corp.

[50] Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris.*

In the Declaration of Independence, the terms "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" include the rights spoken of above. "Happily for the United States, the doctrine of natural rights has a definite place in American political principles. It is specifically and strikingly recognized in the Declaration of Independence . . . Life and liberty include a very large part of the province of natural rights, while the pursuit of happiness implies the right to marry, to possess property and to enjoy some measure of economic opportunity. Liberty is a term of very wide comprehension comprising, in addition to freedom of movement and immunity from political oppression, freedom of education, religion, speech, and writing. The right to life includes immunity from all forms of arbitrary physical assault." Ryan, *The Catholic Church and the Citizen*, pp. 85-86.

[51] Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum.*

No regime can be just where the natural rights of domestic society are ignored or denied.[52] The right to marry, to beget children, and to educate them in accordance with divine law cannot be destroyed or interfered with; no government may subvert the natural rights of the family by intruding into the life of the home in such a way as to prevent the exercise of God-given liberties.[53] The free family must be at the base of any truly just, free, and fully human social order.

A second great societal freedom belongs to men collectively as members of the social order: the freedom of the State. As the perfect society in the natural order, the State has strict rights to liberty in its own sphere of action. It has an autonomy, due it by the natural moral law, which no other State can justly impede, and which the Church too must respect. Within the limits of its own legitimate activity, it is free and independent.[54]

[52] "Provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty. We say, at least equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State, if the families, on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after." *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[53] "The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must intervene to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here." *Ibid.*

[54] Cf. the Encyclical *Immortale Dei* of Leo XIII (Nov. 1, 1885) for a summary of the Church's teaching on the State and the relationship between Church and State. The twentieth century finds the Church defending the rights of the State in such statements as the following from Pius XII:

"A fundamental condition of a just and honorable peace is to assure the right

D. The Aristotelian notion of liberty.

Before turning to a discussion of Christian freedom, a brief treatment here of another approach to the nature of freedom will be helpful. We have already distinguished many types of liberty on the basis of the general notion of freedom as "immunity or exemption from servitude or subjection." For our purposes this mode of defining and dividing is an adequate method of arriving at fundamental concepts and of relating the freedom which is specifically Christian to other species of freedom. But this is a negative approach, as the very words "immunity" and "exemption" imply. There is another, and a more positive method, which should not be passed over, since it provides a complementary view of the concept of freedom. It is found in the Aristotelian definition of the free man as *causa sui*, "the man who exists for his own sake and not for another's." [55] St. Thomas has adopted the formula and uses it frequently.[56] "A slave differs from a free man in that the latter *has the disposal of himself*, as is stated in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, whereas the slave is ordered to another. . . . That man is master of another as his slave when he assigns the one, whose master he is, to his own—namely, the master's use." [57] The definition of a slave given in this

to life and independence of all nations, large and small, strong and weak. One nation's will to live must never be tantamount to a death sentence for another." *Christmas Message*, 1939.

"Within the limits of a new order founded on moral principles there is no room for the violation of the freedom, integrity, and security of other States; no matter what may be their territorial extension or their capacity for defense. If it is inevitable that the powerful States should, by reason of their greater potentialities and their power, play leading roles in the formation of economic groups comprising not only themselves but also smaller and weaker States as well, it is, nevertheless, indispensable that in the interests of the common good they, as all others, respect the rights of those smaller States to political freedom, to economic development and to the adequate protection, in the case of conflicts between nations, of that neutrality which is theirs according to the natural as well as international law." *Christmas Message*, 1941.

[55] *I Metaphysica*, c. 2.

[56] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 4; *IV Cont. Gent.*, 22; *In Gal.*, cap. 5, lect. 3; etc.

[57] *Summa Theol.* I, q. 96, a. 4.

text corresponds to another Aristotelian concept, which terms a slave an *instrumentum animatum*, a living tool for the master's use and for his purposes.[58] Both liberty and slavery are thus described in terms of causality, slavery being inferior because it implies an inferiority in causality.

Though Aristotle's definition is given of a species of freedom, i. e., civil freedom, the universal applicability of the concept *causa sui* is evident. Self-causality or self-causation should be discoverable in some degree in all types of freedom.

St. Thomas has further elaborated this notion by pointing out that the free man is his own cause in two orders of causality; efficient and final.[59] (This is to be understood, of course, in the light of the general Thomistic doctrine concerning the divine causality as the first efficient cause of all free as well as necessary actions.) That man is free who acts as he himself chooses and for his own ends, rather than under the impulse of another's choice and for another's purpose.

This concept of freedom, properly understood and with the necessary qualifications that arise from the analogical character of such predication, is verified in the absolute and uncreated freedom of God Himself, Who acts as He wills, without interior or exterior constraint, and Who freely wills Himself as the first object of His activity. The divine aseity is an infinite freedom which means supreme independence of all causation in the order of efficient and final causality. As uncaused, God is infinitely *causa sui*, uninfluenced in the exercise of His power or the direction of His activity by anything save His own wisdom and goodness.

The concept of freedom as self-dominion or self-causation may be applied to each of the members of the division of liberty given above. The dominion over personal activity is greater in the angelic order than in the human, because the natural powers of causality in angels are greater than those in men. When the natural powers of intellectual creatures are elevated by the influx of grace and the supernatural life, the increase

[58] I *Politica*, 2.

[59] *In V Pol.*, lect. 7; in *VI Pol.*, lect. 2; *in Gal.*, cap. 5, lect. 3.

in the powers of causation implies a corresponding development in the freedom and self-dominion of the creature. In other words, men and angels enjoy freedom, naturally and supernaturally, to the extent and degree they can act, under God, of themselves and for themselves. The perfection of their liberty varies, according to the degree of causative power they receive. In men, the actualizing of spiritual powers by *good* habits (the intellectual, moral, and especially the theological virtues), by increasing causal power in intellect and will, enlarges the self-possession and self-mastery which are identical with human freedom. Every supernatural or natural influx of causal power, habitual or transient, means growth in freedom. The greater the creature's participation in God's infinite causality, the greater its freedom.

There is an analogy for this truth in the development of corporeal perfection. Just as the natural perfecting of the body in strength, health, and maturity makes the adult far freer than the child physically, by reason of the increase in exterior self-possession and self-dominion, so also a development of perfections that are specifically human, i. e., virtues of the intellect and the will, bring an intellectual and moral maturity which involves fuller interior freedom. Such perfections mean an increased sharing in the divine *aseitas*, God's absolute liberty and independence of all things outside Himself; they mean a growth in inwardness, self-possession, and autonomy, which tends to the perfect freedom of the sons of God.

Inasmuch as true freedom must be a reflection of the divine independence and perfection, error, which means intellectual imperfection, and sin, which means deficiency in the will, are excluded from any place in real freedom. Evil is in no sense a God-like perfection; as a privation of being, evil in itself is nothingness; in itself it has no being, no existence, no causality. To the extent that any creature is deficient and evil, it is not *causa sui*, since evil cannot be a cause except *per accidens*, i. e., through the good in which evil if found.[60] *Per se*, therefore, error and sin, the evils of the intellect and the will, are devoid

[60] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 3.

of reality, and obstacles to causality and the freedom which flows from causality; in man they are impediments to action "according to intellect and reason, and towards one's personal good according to intellect and reason"; thus they stand in the way of freedom since "man is said to be free especially when he acts according to intellect and reason, and towards a good of his own according to intellect and reason." [61]

Only perfections, therefore, can contribute to the essential inner freedom of intellectual creatures; only development in the orders of truth and of goodness can make the creature increasingly *causa sui*. In the hierarchy of these perfections, natural and supernatural, grace and charity stand in the highest place as the closest approximation to the divine *aseitas* of the inner life of the Holy Trinity; for grace and charity beget in the soul a voluntariness in the fulfillment of God's law through an affective union of the human will with the divine. The supernatural life of the soul gives men a supernatural self-dominion, in which the concept of the free man as *causa sui* is perfectly verified.

3. Christian Liberty.

A. Essence of Christian Liberty.

We have already indicated the need of distinguishing between man's liberty in the natural order and his supernatural liberty by grace. To both members of that distinction we must add the further sub-distinction between internal and external freedom. For the nature of man as a composite of matter and spirit demands an extension of liberty, be it the freedom of nature or of grace, into the external life of mankind.

The interior perfecting of the human soul, mind, and will by habitual grace and its accompanying virtues and gifts is the essential Christian freedom. It is

> not the creation of human power and will, but the birthright of the Christian as child of God, reborn in Christ and vivified by the Spirit. It is therefore a much more fundamental thing than what we commonly understand by religious freedom. In modern times

[61] *In V Pol., lect.* 7.

Christian freedom has usually been considered in reference either to the freedom of the individual conscience against external compulsion or to the freedom of the Christian community—the Church —against the State. But the first freedom from which these are derivative and dependent is the freedom of the spirit—the new creation which changes man's nature and liberates him from the state of psychological and moral bondage to the world and the forces that rule the world.[62]

The purpose of that freedom is the sanctification and eventual salvation of the human person, accomplished by the elevation of man to a state of divine sonship through the infusion of a supernatural life which is a created participation in the divine nature. There are two stages in this life of supernatural liberty: the first, the life of grace on earth; the second, the life of glory in Heaven.

St. Augustine describes the unfolding of this higher freedom:

The first stage of liberty is to be free from crimes . . . When a man has begun to be free from these (and every Christian ought to be so), he begins to raise his head to liberty; but that is liberty begun, not completed . . . In part liberty, in part bondage; not yet pure, not yet full liberty, because not yet eternity . . . In what measure we serve God we are free; in what measure we serve the law of sin, we are still in bondage. . . . When shall it be a full and perfect liberty? When enmities are no more; when death, the last enemy, shall be destroyed.[63]

In his commentary on the same verses in St. John's Gospel which inspired the above statement of St. Augustine, St. Thomas systematizes, with characteristic precision, the Augustinian teaching, and amplifies it:

To be a disciple of Christ is a privilege of great dignity . . . Yet to know the truth is still greater, since that is the goal of a disciple. This too the Lord gives believers: therefore does He say: *You shall know the truth*, namely (a) of the doctrine I teach; . . . (b) of the grace I impart; . . . (c) of the eternity in which I abide . . . But the greatest [privilege] of all is the gaining of that liberty

[62] C. Dawson, "Christian Freedom," *The Dublin Review*, CVI (July 1942), pp. 5-6.

[63] *Super Joannem*, tract 41.

which the knowledge of the truth begets in those who believe; therefore He says: *And the truth shall make you free* . . . And this freedom is from three things: for the truth of Christ's doctrine will free us from the error of falsehood; . . . the truth of His grace, from the bondage of sin; . . . the truth of His eternity, from corruption . . . True and spiritual liberty . . . is the liberty of grace, which is 'to be free from crimes.' This is imperfect . . . The liberty of glory is perfect and full . . . because there will be nothing inclining us to evil, nothing oppressing us, for there will be freedom from sin and from punishment.[64]

It is evident from these descriptions of Christian liberty that there are involved in it two elements: a deliverance from sin and all sin implies, and a movement towards God. As sin itself implies an aversion from God as well as a conversion to creatures, so the spiritual liberation of the Christian soul involves a retreat from evil and an advance to good; an escape from sin's dominion and a flight to God's.

The reality of the sinner's slavery is affirmed in the words of Christ: "Every one who commits sin is a slave of sin."[65] The soul in this bondage serves also whatever incites to sin, that is, the world, the devil, and the flesh. But the world and the devil make use principally of the flesh and its desires to tempt men and deepen their slavery. Before the reign of grace in the soul the flesh rules the spirit, the disorderly inclinations of the sensual appetite impelling the soul to act contrary to the rule of reason.[66] Only when strengthened by grace can the soul assert its due dominion over the body. For the disorder arises from the loss of grace by the sin of Adam, and only the grace of the new Adam can restore the primitive order in the appetites of men.

This liberation from the dominion of sin includes also deliverance from subjection to the devil. By original sin and grave personal sin men become slaves of the devil. Satan is an invisible master to whose despotism men condemn themselves by mortal sin[67] but from whom they cannot in like manner

[64] *In Joann.*, cap. 8, lect. 4.
[65] John, 8:24.
[66] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 6.
[67] *Ibid.*, q. 80, a. 4, ad 2.

voluntarily release themselves. The price of ransom from the double slavery to sin and the devil was paid for mankind in the Passion of Christ, Who alone can apply the grace of freedom to the enslaved. No purely human power can aid them.[68]

Satan can lord it over sinners only because God in His justice permits him to do so.[69] It is for this reason that the devil is termed by St. Paul "the god of this world," [70] God's wisdom and justice allowing worldlings to serve him.[71] As Christ is actually head of all those justified by His grace, so Satan is head of all in the state of sin; [72] sinners are the devil's sons, as the just are the sons of God.[73]

Thus it is clear that man is always in subjection, whether he enjoys the true freedom of the sons of God, or the freedom from justice of followers of Satan. Human liberty must necessarily bow under one yoke or the other; there is no escaping the subordinate condition of our nature.

Negatively, then, the interior freedom of the Christian soul means liberation from the bondage of sin and Satan. Positively, it means freedom to be a child of God and a citizen of heaven, and opportunity to grow in that sonship and citizenship. The

[68] C. Dawson, "Christian Freedom," p. 2: "The Gospel of Christ was essentially the good news of the coming of the Kingdom, but at the same time it raised the whole idea of redemption and deliverance to a new plane. It was no longer a question of national deliverance by the establishment of a social or political theocracy. It was the reversal of a universal cosmic process which had reduced the whole human race to a state of slavery. It was a moral deliverance, but it was also much more than that. We are so accustomed to the traditional Christian terminology of sin and redemption that we are apt to forget what these words meant to the early Christians. For to them sin was not simply unethical behaviour, it was a real state of slavery to powers outside humanity and stronger than man, the spiritual forces of evil which were the rulers of this dark age. Modern writers . . . have described almost precisely the same conceptions and the same psychological attitude among converts from paganism today."

[69] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 4, ad 2.

[70] II Cor. 4:4.

[71] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 65, a. 1.

[72] *Ibid.*, III, q. 8, a. 1; a. 7. It should be noted, however, that the devil's influence upon sinners is exterior only, and not interior like the influence of Christ the Head upon His Mystical Body.

[73] *Ibid.*, I, q. 114, a. 3, ad 2.

infusion of habitual grace begins a divine life in the soul and initiates the restoration of the original harmony and liberty that reigned in Adam before the fall.

Habitual grace generates in the soul the status of Christian freedom; it is the *esse* of spiritual liberty. This life of freedom bursts into action through the virtues and gifts which flow into the powers of the soul from grace, but especially through the virtue of charity which is rooted in the will, the power where natural liberty resides. It is charity above all which gives the soul the *agere* of Christian freedom. Thus the infusion of grace means the birth of supernatural liberty; the infusion of charity, its growth and perfection.

Charity gives the will a spontaneity and pleasure in virtuous activity which no natural perfection can impart to the powers of man. "No virtue has so great an inclination to its act as charity, nor does any operate with such delight."[74] This freedom of charity is transmitted to all the other powers of the soul whose acts is commands; it circulates in the whole man. By fixing the will upon its true last end, charity leaves freedom of choice unimpeded in the selection of those objects which are *ad finem*. Thus it gives adequate direction, not from outside the will but from within, to the act of election which is the proper act of free will.[75] More than that, it is a stimulus to activity which will bring about the growth of love and supernatural liberty. For the degrees of charity are the degrees of Christian freedom.

B. Degrees of Christian Liberty.

Though the natural freedom of the human will does not admit, *per se*, of degrees, there are gradations in the perfection of supernatural liberty.[76] "Free will, as freedom from compulsion,

[74] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 2, corp.

[75] "The free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself. Hence, charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will." *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 3.

[76] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 59, a. 3, ad 3.

does not admit of the more and the less; but when freedom from sin and from unhappiness are taken into account, it is said to be freer in one state than in another." [77] In this life the degrees of Christian freedom are the degrees of charity. Progress in the love of God and neighbor brings an increase in freedom from sin in this life, and the degree of charity possessed at death determines the degree of perfection in the liberty of glory. The three stages of Christian perfection: the purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways, are stages in the development here on earth of the liberty of the Christian soul.[78] In this life no limit can be set to the increase of spiritual liberty.[79]

Thus there is no uniform level of spiritual liberty among Christians in the state of grace. Freedom in the pursuit of goodness and the search for God will not be identical for the prodigal newly restored to friendship with God, and for the saint who has never lost his baptismal innocence. Among sinners too, there is a corresponding lack of uniformity in the measure of their spiritual enslavement; since there is variation in degree in vice as well as in virtue, there are depths of bondage to which not every evildoer will descend, just as there are heights of liberty none but saints will scale.[80] The stronger the disposition to sin, the deeper the soul's enslavement; yet no such impulse, no matter how deeply rooted, will destroy the will's innate freedom of choice, or of itself eliminate the soul's responsibility for sinful action.[81]

[77] *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 10, ad 7.

[78] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 4, corp.; cf. also *ibid.*, ad 1; *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4.

[79] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 7.

[80] *II Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4: "The free will is so called from the fact that it cannot be forced. But force . . . is of two kinds: one compelling, and the other, inducing or impelling. Now it is natural to, and of the essence of, the free will, not to be completely (*sufficienter*) constrained by any compelling force, and this belongs to it whatever be its state; accordingly, such liberty as this is not increased or lessened *per se*, but only *per accidens*. . . . But that liberty which is from impulses or dispositive causes which incline the will in one direction rather than another, is increased and lessened, acquired and lost; this type of liberty, then, is also enlarged or diminished *per se* in man according to the different states in which he is found."

[81] *Ibid.*, ad 4.

C. Extent of Christian Liberty.

Though the supernatural Christian freedom of which we have been speaking is essentially interior, rooted in the soul and its faculties, its influence is not limited to the interior life and activity of man. Man, as we have noted, is a unit composed of matter and spirit, and it is the whole composite that is sanctified by divine grace; it is the whole man who is freed by grace from the bondage of sin. Consequently, this liberty of grace must be externalized in the visible and earthly life of the Christian; it must overflow into his contact with men and society.

The natural liberty of free choice does not remain locked in the human heart in such a way as to have no exterior manifestation and influence; so also the supernatural freedom of the Christian soul must have its proper externalization. Perhaps a better place to find an analogy to the external Christian freedom is in the supernatural term of Christian liberty, the life of glory, rather than in the natural freedom of the will which it perfects. In the life of glory, the perfect happiness and complete liberty of the sons of God will, after the general Resurrection, overflow into their bodies, *per redundantiam*, as St. Thomas says.[82] Since the life of grace and faith on earth is the seed of the life of glory, we should expect a redundance here on earth also of their inner blessedness and freedom in the outer life of Christians, to whatever extent that overflow of the invisible into the visible may be possible. Does not the same Apostle who wrote " Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom," tell us also that the bodies of true Christians are the temples of the Holy Spirit? [83]

In any case, even apart from these considerations, it is clear that the influence of the body upon the soul demands that certain essential external requirements be provided to help guarantee the survival and development of the inner Christian liberty. From either point of view, i. e., the soul's influence upon the body, or the body's upon the soul, the necessity for

[82] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 5; a. 6. [83] II Cor., 3 : 17; I Cor., 6 : 19.

an outward realization of Christian freedom is evident.[84] We may speak of these external manifestations of Christian freedom as Christian liberty *per redundantiam vel per participationem*, the internal emancipation by grace from the slavery of sin constituting Christian freedom *per essentiam*. These outward expressions of the inward Christian life are not necessary, absolutely speaking, *ad esse* but *ad bene esse* of the Christian soul and the liberty of the sons of God.

What external liberty or liberties flow from the inner Christian liberty as its normal expression, or as an essential condition for its existence and enrichment? In general, the answer will be: every exterior freedom needed to be and to live as a Christian.[85] Specifically, those external liberties will include all that freedom outlined above which belongs to all men by natural right either as individuals or as organized in society. In a word, all the natural freedoms due to men individually and collectively are due them *a fortiori* as Christians; the inner "freedom wherewith Christ has made us free"[86] gives supernatural rights to any outer expression the legitimate exercise of Christian freedom demands. Not that Christians must necessarily have *more* external rights and freedoms than non-Christians, but rather that Christians have more reason for the same rights, i. e., they have the same natural rights as all others *a fortiori*. In other words, the freedoms guaranteed the race by the natural law have been christened by the Liberator of mankind, and consecrated to the fulfillment of higher duties than the natural law imposes. The natural freedoms thus baptized may rightly be called Christian, for when the sons of

[84] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 5-8, for St. Thomas's doctrine on the relationship between body and soul in the development of the life of grace, as well as a discussion of the need of external goods and of association with other men in the pursuit of interior perfection.

[85] "For Christian life to develop it must have recourse to external and sensible means; . . . the Church, being a society of men, cannot exist or develop if it does not enjoy liberty of action, and . . . its members have the right to find in civil society the possibility of living according to their conscience." Pius XI, *Firmissimam Constantiam* (*Nos es Muy*) Apostolic Letter on the Religious Situation in Mexico.

[86] Gal., 4:31.

Adam achieve by grace the nobler status of sons of God, both the interior freedom of choice and the exterior liberties due the free creature are elevated to a higher plane, perfected by becoming Christian.[87]

The chief external manifestation of the Christian's freedom is a true freedom of conscience which Leo XIII has expressly termed " Christian liberty." It is a liberty of conscience which means that

> every man in the State may follow the will of God and, from a consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle, obey His commands. This, indeed, is true liberty, a liberty worthy of the sons of God, which nobly maintains the dignity of man, and is stronger than all violence or wrong—a liberty which the Church has always desired and held most dear. This is the kind of liberty the Apostles claimed for themselves with intrepid constancy, which the Apologists of Christianity confirmed by their writings, and which the martyrs in vast numbers consecrated by their blood. And deservedly so; for this Christian liberty bears witness to the absolute and most just dominion of God over man, and to the chief and supreme duty of man towards God.[88]

Thus the freedom of conscience which is man's right by natural law is christianized in the freedom of the baptized to follow Christ without let or hindrance from others. In rendering to God what is God's according to the dictates of a Christion conscience, he is not to be deterred by the secular authority of the State or by any other institution. " The believer has an inalienable right to profess his faith and put it into practice in the manner suited to him. . . . Laws that suppress or make this profession and practice difficult contradict the natural law." [89]

[87] Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris*: " Man has a spiritual and immortal soul. He is a person, marvelously endowed by his Creator with gifts of body and mind. . . . God alone is his last end, in this life and the next. By sanctifying grace He is raised to the dignity of a son of God, and incorporated into the Kingdom of God in the Mystical Body of Christ. In consequence he has been endowed with many and varied prerogatives: the right to life, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means of existence; the right to tend to his ultimate goal in the path marked out for him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property."

[88] *Libertas Praestantissimum.*

[89] Pius XI, *Mit brennender Sorge.*

It is to be noted here, however, that in the exercise of her authority the Church cannot violate the Christian liberty of her members, since her judgments and commands cannot fail to be a protection and guide for Christian freedom. In other words, the State can interfere with the exercise of Christian liberty; the Church cannot, either by her doctrinal guidance of the human mind, or by her disciplinary measures.[90]

Freedom to become and to remain a Christian, to receive a Christian education, to profess the Christian faith in private and in public without fear of penalty—all these rights are implied in true liberty of conscience.[91] This basic freedom of

[90] The eighteenth proposition of the Synod of Pistoia was condemned by Pius VI as "false, temerarious, scandalous, pernicious, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the Church and to the Spirit of God, by which she is governed, at least erroneous," because the doctrine it sets forth "subjects to scrutiny the discipline established and approved by the Church, as if the Church could establish a useless discipline or one which would be too onerous for Christian liberty to bear." (Denz. 1578)

After referring to this condemnation in *Testem Benevolentiae* (to Cardinal Gibbons, Jan. 22, 1899), Leo XIII protests against those who "judge that a certain liberty ought to be introduced into the Church, so that, limiting the exercise and vigilance of its powers, each one of the faithful may act more freely in pursuance of his own natural bent and capacity. They affirm, namely, that this is called for in order to imitate that liberty which, though quite recently introduced, is now the law and foundation of almost every civil community. On that point we have spoken very much at length [in the Encyclical *Immortale Dei*] . . . We have also shown the difference between the Church, which is of divine right, and all other associations, which subsist by the free will of men. It is of importance, therefore, to note particularly an opinion which is adduced as a sort of argument to urge the granting of such liberty to Catholics. For they say, in speaking of the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff, that after the solemn decision formulated in the Vatican Council, there is no more need of solicitude in that regard, and, because of its now being out of dispute, a wider field of thought and action is thrown open to individuals. A preposterous method of arguing, surely. For if anything is suggested by the infallible teaching of the Church, it is certainly that no one should wish to withdraw from it; nay, that all should strive to be thoroughly imbued with and be guided by its spirit, so as to be the more easily preserved from any private error whatsoever."

[91] The religious freedom of the Christian implies also "the right to a reasonable liberty in the choice of a state of life and fulfillment of a true vocation; a personal right, this last, if there ever was one, belonging to the spirit and sublime when the higher imprescriptible rights of God and the Church meet, as in the choice and fulfillment of the priestly and religious vocations." Pius XII, in his Pentecost Radio Broadcast, June 1, 1941.

the Christian, which can appeal to a higher law in the face of every secular attempt to impede or destroy the supernatural liberty of the soul, becomes a safeguard of other fundamental human freedoms. Leo XIII has pointed out that obedience to God rather than men in cases where human power exceeds itself by demanding what is contrary to the eternal law of God, results in the erection of an effective defense against tyranny. "The authority in the State will not have all its own way, but the interests and rights of all will be safeguarded—the rights of individuals, of domestic society, and of all the members of the commonwealth. All are thus free to live according to law and right reason; and in this . . . true liberty really consists." [92]

Is man's natural right to freedom of conscience the only human freedom which is christened by dedication to the service of Christ? Or may we rightly extend the term Christian also to other rights and liberties Christians possess? It seems clear from the Church's use of the term Christian liberty that we need not restrict the phrase either to the inner freedom of the soul by grace or to the freedom of conscience treated above. Leo XIII, for example, uses it to designate civil freedom when he says: "Wherever Christian morality and laws are in high repute, wherever religion has so developed men that they observe justice and hold human dignity in honor, wherever there has spread far and wide the spirit of fraternal love which Christ has taught us, there neither slavery nor cruelty nor barbarism can remain; but there a high morality flourishes, and a Christian liberty held high in civil esteem." [93] In a prayer for the Roman Emperor in the Missal, unused since 1804, the Church employed the term to designate the external freedom of the Christian people: "Accept, O Lord, the prayers and offerings of Thy Church for the safety of Thy suppliant servant; and for the protection of faithful nations work the ancient marvels of Thy power; that, the enemies of peace overcome, Christian liberty may serve Thee in security." [94] Elsewhere we

[92] *Libertas Praestantissimum.*

[93] Leo XIII, Letter *Ecclesiae Catholicae* (Nov. 20, 1890), to Cardinal Lavigerie. *Lettres Apostoliques de S. S. Leon XIII*, II, 298-303.

[94] *Orationes diversae*, 5.

find the equivalent phrase "evangelical liberty" designating external freedom in the political order.[95]

It is safe to assert then that in the mind of the Church Christian liberty, though principally and primarily a freedom of the spirit, must also be in its fulness a freedom of the flesh; there must be an exterior Christian liberty flowing forth from the intangible inner life of supernatural freedom.

The economic liberty due to man as a natural right, so ably defended by Leo XIII and Pius XI in their social encyclicals, is a truly Christian freedom in a social order where property is dedicated to Christian aims and its use is regulated by Christian ideals. The false teachings which would concentrate wealth under the control of the State or of a powerful faction within the State are as opposed to revealed doctrine as they are to reason. In other words, not only man's natural dignity and development in the human order but his supernatural dignity and development as well require economic security and freedom, security and freedom which we may justly term Christian.[96]

Any social structure which defrauds men of their human and Christian rights to property is evil, since it can thus "lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." [97]

[95] Leo XIII, *In Plurimis* (May 5, 1888): "Towards the end of the fifteenth century . . . the base stain of slavery had been nearly blotted out from among Christian nations, and states were anxious to stand firmly in evangelical liberty."

[96] We have been unable to find any official statement of the Church which speaks directly of *economic* liberty as Christian liberty (though it may be obliquely referred to in the citations given above from Leo XIII). We can see no reason why the economic freedom which belongs to man as man cannot be regarded as a Christian freedom when elevated by dedication to a supernatural end. Recognition of the Christian character of economic freedom is to be found in the stress laid by the Popes of recent years on the need of a just and *Christian* social order to enable men to fulfill their obligations as Christians. The Church's defense of property as an essential human liberty is based on fundamental Christian teaching concerning the nature of man, society, and material goods. The Church proclaims as a divine demand that society be so organized as to provide every man with such external means as will facilitate the practice of Christian virtue. If the natural right to serve God according to His will is for Christians in the professing of their faith *Christian liberty*, so also the natural right to the use of private possessions is deserving of the name Christian when the right is exercised for Christian aims.

[97] Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*.

In the mind of the Church an equitable distribution of the world's wealth must be a necessary externalization of mankind's free service of Christ, as well as a necessary condition for the inner life of Christian freedom.[98]

While it is true that religious freedom and an economic liberty essential to the practice of virtue are the primary external requisites for the full inner life of Christian freedom, it remains true also that the survival and enlargement of supernatural life do not require civil or political liberty as a *sine qua non*. It is entirely possible for Christians to lead lives of high sanctity in the condition of civil servitude, and the history of the progress of Christianity among the slaves of the Roman Empire is concrete proof of that possibility. Yet it belongs to Christians to be free externally, and it is solidly established that

[98] "Our immortal predecessor Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, has already established the principle that for every honest economic and social order there must be laid down as its basic foundation the right to private property . . . This private property is in a special manner the natural fruit of labor, the produce of an intense activity on the part of the man who acquires it, through his active will, to ensure and improve his own person, his own living conditions and those of his family, to create for himself and for those dear to him a field in which they may rightly enjoy not only economic freedom but also political, cultural, and religious freedom. The Christian conscience cannot admit as just a social order which either denies in principle or renders impossible or nugatory in practice the natural right to property. . . .

"On the one side we see immense riches dominating public and private economic life, and often even civic life; and on the other, the countless numbers of those who, deprived of every direct or indirect security of livelihood, take no proper interest in the true and higher value of the spirit, abandon their aspirations to genuine freedom, and throw themselves at the feet of any political party, slaves to whomsoever promises them in some way bread and security. Experience shows what tyranny, under such circumstances, human nature is capable of even in our own time.

"In defending, therefore, the principle of private property, the Church pursues a high ethico-social purpose . . . The Church aims . . . at securing that the institution of private property be such as it should be according to the designs of God's wisdom and the disposition of the elements in the social order—a necessary presupposition to human initiative, an incentive to work to the advantage of life's purpose here and hereafter, and *an instrument of the liberty and dignity of man*, created in the likeness of God, Who from the beginning assigned to him for his benefit dominion over material things." Pius XII, Radio Message on the Fifth Anniversary of World War II, Sept. 1, 1944, in *Bishops' Statement on International Order* (Washington, 1944, N. C. W. C.) pp. 28-29. (Italics ours.)

civil and political liberty have always been furthered wherever the Church's influence has penetrated. Leo XIII had no hesitation in saying, "The powerful influence of the Church has ever been manifested in the custody and protection of the civil and political liberty of the people . . . It is sufficient to recall the fact that slavery, that old reproach of the heathen nations, was mainly abolished by the beneficent efforts of the Church." [99]

The Christian religion was not created to bring men the temporal blessings of civil and political freedom, but a spiritual emancipation so far superior that St. Thomas speaks of lesser liberties as "vain" in comparison.[100] But the overflow of that deliverance from the bondage of sin by Christian doctrine and discipline must normally result in a true exteriorization of Christian freedom in civil and political life.[101]

The liberating grace of Christ sanctifies not only the individual life of man but also his societal life. Just as man's natural personal freedoms are "christianized" and elevated by the influence of the supernatural, so are the race's societal liberties consecrated, in a Christian social order, to divine service. The freedoms of both the family and the State become Christian when they serve Christian purposes.

[99] *Libertas Praestantissimum.* Cf. Acton, *op. cit.*, p. 203: "The Church has succeeded in producing the kind of liberty she exacts for her children only in those States which she has herself created or transformed. Real freedom has been known in no State that did not pass through her medieval action. The history of the Middle Ages is the history of the gradual emancipation of man from every species of servitude, in proportion as the influence of religion became more penetrating and more universal. The Church could never abandon that principle of liberty by which she conquered pagan Rome. The history of the last three centuries exhibits the gradual revival of declining slavery, which appears under new forms of oppression as the authority of religion has decreased. The efforts of deliverance have been violent and reactionary, the progress of dependence sure and inevitable." Cf. also J. Balmes, *European Civilization* (New York, 1850) pp. 90-115.

[100] *In Joann.*, cap. 8, lect. 4. St. Thomas is not condemning temporal freedom from the condition of slavery as he condemns sinful freedom, terming it "perverse"; civil freedom is not evil, but rather, unimportant, especially when viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* and compared to the spiritual liberty of grace and glory.

[101] E. Quinn, "Free Will in the Modern World," *Blackfriars*, XXI (Aug., 1940), pp. 459-464.

As far as the family is concerned, this elevation of natural rights and consecration of natural liberties has been accomplished by Christ Himself directly through His institution of the Sacrament of Matrimony. Here, in directly christianizing the natural contract of matrimony, Christ sacramentalizes the whole social structure of which the Christian family is the cell. For the sacramental nature of Christian marriage benefits not only the family itself and the Church, but the State as well. The State participates in the supernatural influences that perfect the natural elements of civil society when Christ's power penetrates and permeates the political order through the family. For the spiritual emancipation of the Christian home as well as of the individuals who form the family cannot fail to have a spiritual influence upon the body politic and contribute to the advancement of purely secular freedoms.

The Church, likewise, has of divine right an inalienable liberty: freedom to exist, to preach the Gospel, to administer the Sacraments, to rule her members with executive, legislative, and judicial power. As the State is supreme and independent, by natural right, in temporal affairs, so also the Church is supreme and independent in matters that concern men's spiritual life, and is subject to no authority but that of God Himself. "The Church, founded by Christ as a perfect society, has a natural and inalienable right to perfect freedom and immunity from the power of the state; . . . in fulfilling the task committed to her of teaching, ruling, and guiding to eternal bliss those who belong to the Kingdom of Christ, she cannot be subject to any external power." [102] From the very first days of her existence, the Church has always claimed that freedom and boldly exercised it to the fullest possible extent despite every attempt at suppression and persecution.

DAVID A. O'CONNELL, O.P.

(To be continued)

Providence College
Providence, R.I.

[102] Pius XI, *Quas Primas* (Encyclical on the Kingship of Christ, Dec. 11, 1925).

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

GOD'S creative covenant demands perfection of all reality. The eternal hills or the grass, which is today and tomorrow is no more, have all known the mandate to perfection promulgated in their natures. To men, whose compliance must be conscious, the command was repeated: "I am the Almighty God: walk before Me and be perfect." [1] In a restless heart or in a revolving cosmos the pattern of perfection is much the same: to fulfill oneself is to find God. Each creature, then, in striving for its own perfection is seeking something of the divine likeness.

Nowhere is that likeness more fully realized than in the supernatural sonship of Christian perfection. Infinite as the formal equivalent of divine life, adoptive sonship is at the same time imitative. A completeness above human needs, it in no way contradicts human nature. As in His own Person divinity and humanity are subsistently united, so through Christ's merits the heights and the depths are contactually one. The Infinite freely shares His life that nothing may be lacking to the finite. "A new creature" for whom "all things are made new" [2]—especially his motives and movements toward perfection—has come to be through rebirth in water and the Holy Ghost. His perspective of perfection is supernatural and his possibility of attaining it secure, since "grace and truth came through Jesus Christ." [3] At once promissory and mandatory, then, are Christ's words: "You, therefore, are to be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect." [4]

In the vocabulary of Christ and his followers, however, the notion of perfection—even with its unequivocal demand for an infinite norm—lost none of the calculated latitude it had had with the philosophers. The germinal idea of perfection re-

[1] *Genesis* 17:1.
[2] II *Cornithians* 5:17.
[3] *John* 1:17.
[4] *Matthew* 5:48.

mained " that to which nothing of the elements proper to it is lacking." [5] Nor are its analogical usages abandoned.[6] Although in a Christian context completeness, i. e. " perfection," in evil merely illustrates perfection in good, this latter meaning has several senses. Perfection may signify the absolute realization of the notion in boundless divine goodness, or it may have any number of relative meanings amidst the partial perfections of creatures. When these latter meanings are ordered hierarchically they form a Jacob's ladder of perfections from the least to the limitless.

At the summit and beyond any hierarchy of perfections is God's ineffable self-possession. With absolutely nothing lacking in His own loveableness or in His act of love, His perfection is complete and comprehensive.[7] Immobilely active, infinite in its intensity and eternal in its constancy, God's perfection is identified with Himself. Such completeness in simplicity is beyond the piecemeal understanding of any creature, yet upon the authority of Him Who descended from heaven it is the objective and the norm of any progress in the incomparably inferior degrees of created supernatural perfection.

The dependent degrees of perfection in Christ's grace are as variegated as cells in His mystical body. Yet each is relatively complete. Classification of these various perfections has distinguished them first by state of nature and then by stage of development. In the blessed state of heaven the human soul will know a perfection almost unimaginable upon earth. Since his intellect and will are in immediate contact with God, in Whom neither sufficiency nor satisfaction are lacking, a human being functions to the full capacity of his unimpeded soul. Nothing possible to his nature is then lacking to him; grace has brought him to the maximum perfection his nature will allow.[8] In this life, however, the intensity and continuity of even a man's most perfect act is perforce impeded and inter-

[5] V. *Metaphysics*, c. 16.
[6] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1 and *De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis*, c. 1.
[7] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 2.
[8] *Ibid.*

rupted. Because he walks in Faith and because his way is long, a wayfarer's completeness in Christ cannot be measured by heavenly norms but only by those proper to his present state. He cannot be expected to have at all times or even for a moment an activity equal to the total capacity of his nature, but only such as his pilgrim status will permit.[9]

A Christian's pilgrimage in perfection lies between two polar conditions. One is that indispensable minimum of divine life which excludes everything contrary to itself—the presence of sanctifying grace, the virtues and gifts.[10] The other is that fullness of supernatural activity through which the soul eliminates whatever might impede its progress toward " full stature in Christ." Each of these stages is a true perfection. In the first, nothing is lacking in supernatural capacity; " the seed of glory " has been implanted in the soul. In the second, the divine dynamism of actual grace leaves nothing wanting to providential progress toward that eternal happiness in which ultimate human perfection consists.

Just as human happiness involves an aggregate of ordered goods, so Christian perfection in all its various states and stages is a complexity of integrated factors. Simple in its source, Christian perfection is intricate in its proximate principles. No single faculty, no simple act of the human composite is sufficient for perfection of the whole. Harmony among several elements is required for supernatural completeness. In each stage of its development and throughout an individual's entire career in grace, Christian perfection demands more than a single virtue and more than a uniform pattern of activity. Complexity in either virtue or activity need not be confusion, however, since many factors can cooperate in a single organic hierarchy. Then, just as all human and relative perfections are compared to the perfection of God, so all lesser virtues will stand in relation to one God-like virtue. In that virtue Christian perfection will be radically constituted even if not completely realized.

[9] *Ibid.* [10] *Ibid.*

Most frequently and most authoritatively identified as the dominative and constitutive virtue in Christian perfection is the divine virtue of charity. Other virtues have been nominated to charity's regnancy, but they have received only half-hearted or heretical sponsorship. Ancient Gnostics and enlightened Modernists have considered perfection as a prerogative of an intellectual aristocracy.[11] Extraordinary gifts and sanctity were one in the mind of the Montanists, and many sincere but ill-guided Christians thought of holiness as identical with extraordinary penances.[12] For the Quietists passivity exaggerated even to the detriment of the act of loving God was the supreme accomplishment of Christian living.[13] None of these substitutes for the " bond of perfection," however, has ever possessed the inner consistency or the extrinsic authority to make it catholic among Christians. Charity, on the other hand, has not only within itself all the qualities for regency among the virtues but in addition it has been anointed with scholastic, patristic, apostolic and even divine approbation.

Among the various testimonies to charity's place in the divine plan is Christ's own preceptive summary of supernatural dogma.[14] Cited as a command known to all who know the true God, Christ's covenant is, however, new. The measure of charity is not the whole of a human heart's love, but the love of Christ Himself. The end of the commandment for Christ and for Christians is not prosperity but perfection.[15]

Apostolic understanding has continued the explanation and exemplification of Christ's covenant. St. John found in charity not only the cohesive force binding all virtues together but the adhesive principle of the soul's union with God.[16] St. Paul has

[11] *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, ed. D'Arles (Paris, 1911), III, 1000.

[12] G. Bardy, "Montanisme," *Dictionnaire de la théologie catholique* (Paris, 1929), X, 2355-2370, and J. de Guibert, *Documenta Ecclesiastica Christianae Perfectionis* (Rome, 1931), nn. 32-38.

[13] *D. T. C.* (1937), XIII, 1537-1581.

[14] *Matthew* 22:35-40; *Mark* 12:28-31.

[15] *John* 17:12 and 13:34-35.

[16] *John* 4:16.

a classic hymn to charity and many other passages to show that the entire law was comprised in love.[17]

Patristic testimonies to charity's place in Christian perfection are abundant and forthright. St. Irenaeus reiterated St. Paul's preference of charity to charisms.[18] St. Gregory of Nyssa considered the way of charity toward salvation most perfect and happiest.[19] For St. Augustine, Christian perfection and charity were indissoluble.[20] St. Gregory continued the tradition that charity draws to itself the other virtues and confirms them.[21]

Among the scholastics there is no doubt of the intimate relationship of charity and Christian perfection. St. Bernard and Richard of St. Victor give degrees of charity and degrees of perfection as a single reality.[22] With St. Thomas the consistent Christian tradition was formulated in such a way that since his time there has been little deviation from his canonized usage.[23]

Neither the usage of St. Thomas nor that of the tradition he recapitulates gives warrant, however, for making of the one virtue of charity the whole of Christian perfection. Charity dominates other virtues, it does not destroy them. Constituting the basis of perfection, charity always requires other virtues as its complement. St. Paul, in giving praise to charity, mentions an entourage of lesser virtues, and his list is by no means complete.[24] St. Thomas in giving the principal place to charity not only implies but expressly states that there are other secondary virtues in the totality that perfection involves.[25] The very existence of the supernatural entity depends upon charity,

[17] F. Prat, S. J., *The Theology of St. Paul* (1939), II, p. 333.

[18] *Adversus Haereses*, IV, 33, 8-9, *PG*, VII, 1079.

[19] *In Canticum canticorum homilia* I, *PG*, XLIV, 765.

[20] *De Natura et gratia*, 70, *PL*, XLIV, 290; *Enchiridion*, 117, *PL*, XL, 286.

[21] *Homilia in Evangelium* 27, 1, *PL*, LXXVI, 1205.

[22] *De Diligendo Deo*, 12-15, *PL*, CLXXXII, 994; *De Gradibus Charitatis*, *PL*, CLXXXVI, 1195, ss.

[23] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 1.

[24] I *Corinthians* 13 : 4-7.

[25] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, aa. 1 and 3.

but charity can neither live nor grow unattended by other virtues. Absolute as its control over the other virtues may be, therefore, charity is not autonomous.

1. The analogical description of the relationship of charity and the other virtues.

The precise relationship between charity and the other virtues has been variously described. Charity has been compared to a root, inasmuch as through it other virtues are nourished.[26] " Mother of all virtues " is another title accorded to charity since, in conceiving its own end, it produces those of the other virtues.[27] Besides these metaphorical references to charity as the origin of other virtues, charity has been called the end of all virtues.[28] Whatever may be the explanatory phrase used to show the relationship of charity and the other virtues, it is certain that Christian perfection consists " especially " and " in an absolute sense " in charity and " secondarily " and " in a relative sense " in the other virtues.[29] In such terminology the various factors in perfection are described in terms of one another. To explain their meaning more fully an analogous situation must be found through which the relationship between charity and the other virtues may be judged.

One such analogy is realized in the relationship of substance to accidents. Although this relationship may seem intricate and

[26] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2.

[27] *QQ. Disp., De Caritate*, a. 3.

[28] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 3.

[29] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 1, and *ibid.* ad 2. Neither textual criticism, as is evident from the Leonine edition, nor philosophical principles, would seem to justify Cajetans's remark (*in loco*) that the text of St. Thomas should be corrected. Cajetan would argue that the *substantialiter* of the reply to the second objection should be substituted for the *specialiter* of the body of the article. Cajetan's substitution would eliminate from the words of St. Thomas the basis for a dynamic analogy between charity and the notion of principal causality, which would be contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 4. Moreover, Thomists teach that perfection consists formally not in the habit of charity but in its activity. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Les Trois Ages de la Vie Intérieure*, vol. I. p. 213. For the contrary opinion see Suarez, *de Religione*, III, l. 1, c. 4, n. 10.

philosophical, it has been established as the classic basis of comparison.[30] It is justifiably introduced, not because of its appeal to the imagination, but because of its intelligibility for the human understanding. It has at least a certainty and clarity for the human intelligence that is not easily realized in moral matters because of their contingent character. Moreover, the comparison of charity and the virtues in terms of substance and accidents is not a metaphor but a proper analogy, based upon formalities proportionately realized in each. Within the order of Christian perfection, charity has the same relationship to the other virtues as substance has to its accidents in the order of predicamental realities. Just as being is realized in substance in an absolute sense and in accidents as they are related to substance, so in perfection the very being of supernatural living is in charity absolutely, and in the other virtues only relatively. For other comparisons compensations have to be made, since they are of the corporeal order, but in the case of the relationship between substance and accidents there is no such limitation. As an analogue, then, the concept of substance and its accidents is sufficiently abstract and universal to allow it to be used to parallel the various states and stages in the activity of charity in Christian perfection.

This single analogue, apt and expressive as constant usage has always found it, however, is not identical with the notion expressed in the words " principally " as applied to charity and " secondarily " as applied to the other virtues.[31] The relationship of charity and the other virtues goes beyond the static one of substance and accidents. At any given stage in the development of charity and the other virtues the comparison is exact. No account, however, is given of the movement from one stage to another, or the passage from one state to another. The process of increase in charity and the other virtues deserves an explanation. Formally, substances do not admit of increase;

[30] Cf. Cajetan *In Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 1, ad 2. and J. de Guibert, *op. cit.* n. 266.

[31] P. Passerini, O. P., *De Hominum Statibus et Officiis* (Lucca, 1732), in II-II, q. 184, a. 1.

they do not operate efficiently.[32] Nothing, therefore, that is predicated substantially of another, as is charity in Christian perfection, is predicated as increasing.[33] Charity cannot be called more of the substance of Christian perfection as it develops.[34] Nor precisely as a substance can it be said to merit.[35] For the aspect of the relationship between charity and the other virtues in Christian perfection involving meritorious movement and increase another analogy must be established. Without going beyond the scope of the words " principally " and " secondarily " a dynamic comparison may be found to better illustrate and adequately parallel the causality of charity in Christian perfection.

The causality of charity in Christian perfection must itself be briefly sketched before a clarifying analogy can be meaningful. The causality of charity is a notion formally distinct from the notion of the activity of charity. Charity is active for eternity; only in this life is charity a cause. The causality of charity is in the order of merit which ceases with this life. During this life, however, each activity of charity is a causal activity. Each contributes in some way to progress toward Christian perfection and toward an eternal reward.

As a meritorious rather than a physical cause of Christian perfection, charity is itself subordinate to a higher cause. The primary principle of perfection is not in man but in God. His will fixes the limits of perfection for each individual, not only for all eternity but at each moment in time. Because, therefore, His ". . . grace is not given to all in a uniform way nor equally, but according to the measure of Christ's gift . . .",[36] no rigid measure may be established either for a final accomplishment nor gradual progress. Rather each individual has the task of working out his own perfection. Although heavenly mansions may be allotted to children who die without meritorious action,

[32] Cajetan, *In Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, c. 5, ed. Laurent (Rome, 1939), p. 79 and John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus* (Rome, 1933), vol. II, p. 261.
[33] *QQ. Disp., De Virtutibus*, a. 11.
[34] *Ibid.* ad 4.
[35] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 54, a. 3. and II-II, q. 24, a. 4.
[36] St. Thomas, *In ad Ephesios*, cap. 4, lect. 4.

Christian perfection in this life is gained only by volitional acts informed by charity. Perfection, then, is the gradual maturing of a soul in human and divine life.

Living a life of loving God does not entail a development as in growth, or even in knowledge, that involves the addition of more and more objects. Maturity is rather in the intensity and consequent effectiveness of the act.[37] The effectiveness of charity's act in the activity of the other virtues is a consequence of the intensity of love of God. It is a sign of perfection, since the causal activity of charity in Christian perfection is not that of a separated soul which functions without interruption and without hazard and hostility. Meritorious causality is not always serene and without obstacles. In the human composite, limited, weakened by the effects of sin and impeded by exterior forces, charity must struggle to survive and progress unless it is aided by ancillary virtues. It must not only elicit acts of affection but command other acts as well. Subordinate to God's will, charity then becomes a cause of progress not only through its own acts but by subordinating the acts of other virtues to itself. In it Christian perfection consists " principally " and for its causality a dynamic analogy must be found. The causality of charity in Christian perfection is progressive and productive. In its production of effects it involves other causes subordinate to itself. The analogy of human growth fails, therefore, since although it indicates progress, it does not imply subordinate causes in the production of a common effect. Local motion likewise fails to illustrate any subordination in causes. There is, however, a single analogy in the order of causality which adequately parallels charity in its relation to the other virtues in Christian perfection. Although hitherto never employed or delineated as an analogy of dynamic progress in Christian perfection, it forms a fitting complement to the static analogy of substance and accidents commonly given.

The analogy adequate to the dynamic task is found in the relationship of principal and instrumental causality. The notion of instrumental causality, like that of substance and accidents,

[37] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 52, a. 2.

is admittedly intricate and involved in philosophical difficulties and distinctions.[38] Once appreciated, however, it affords a single, universally applicable key to the still more obscure interrelation of charity and the other virtues in the dynamic progress of Christian perfection. A communion of several causes in the production of a common effect—all subordinated to a single dominant principle—cannot otherwise be explained than through the notions of principal and instrumental causes. Because of the involved nature of the notion of instrumental causality its fundamental aspects must be disentangled before it can be applied in the context of Christian perfection.

2. The foundations and functions in a principal-instrumental causal relationship.

Fundamental to the notion of principal and instrumental causes is the fact that they involve a relationship primarily in the order of acting—not in the order of being, as do substance and accidents.[39] The intellect, for example, while it is more excellent in being, is related to the will as a subordinate cause in the production of human acts. In the order of acting the principal-instrumental relationship is strictly within the scope of fulfillment or the execution of the act, not in the realm of intention.[40] Thus motives are of little moment in this relationship. What is done rather than why it is done is the basis of the union of causes called a principal-instrumental relationship.

The combination of causes of which one is instrumental to another is distinguished from every other type of efficient causality involving the conspiracy of two causes. In the production of a single effect, two causes may concur as equal; two men may pull a canal barge. The two causes may also be unequal, one subordinate to the other—and this latter situa-

[38] ". . . tractatus iste (on instrumental causality) provectioribus convenientior est quam tironibus." John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.* p. 270.

[39] *Summa Theol.*, q. 17, a. 4; *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qua. 1.

[40] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 18, a. 3.

tion is found in two ways. In the first, the effect may be attributed in an absolute sense to both the causes, one as primary the other as secondary; each is complete within its own order.[41] Thus God is the cause of an act of love and a man with the virtue of charity is likewise. Secondly, the effect may be attributed in an absolute sense to only one of the two or several causes and to all the others only relatively. In this last instance, the unique principal-instrumental relationship is realized.[42]

The principal cause and its instrument do not cooperate as a matter of chance. They are related in the production of a common effect, and their order to one another in that production is essential to both principal and instrumental causes.[43] It may be accidental for a principal cause to use this or that instrument, or a whole series of numerically distinct instruments, e. g., a carpenter may use several hammers to produce a chair. Yet whatever a principal cause does use to produce an effect is truly an instrument and a *per se cause* of all or part of what is done.

The effect produced is, however, similar to the principal cause rather than to the instrument.[44] The artifact is a representation of the art of the artist, not of the instruments he uses. In the production of the effect, moreover, both causes are necessary in joint action. The instrument shares the action of the principal agent and the principal agent uses the action of the instrument.[45] From this mutually beneficial communion of causes a common effect is produced, and the principal-instrumental relationship in causality is discoverable.

Besides the conditions which must be present for the principal-instrumental relationship in causality there are qualifications which must be found in each of the members of the partnership. The principal cause has properties that distinguish

[41] *Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 4 and *III Cont. Gent.*, 67.
[42] *IV Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, ad 1.
[43] *III Cont. Gent.*, 70.
[44] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1.; *IV Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, qua. 1.
[45] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 19, a. 1.

it from other causes and from its instruments. The instruments, for their part, have features that are not to be found in a principal cause.

The notion of a principal cause is, first of all, clearly distinguished from that of a proper cause. The former implies the use of instruments, the latter does not. One and the same cause may be both, but not under the same aspect. God, for example, can produce grace as a proper cause without the use of instruments, but he is not said to be the principal cause of such grace unless he employs subordinate causes such as the sacraments.

In contrast with its instruments, the principal cause has a unique prerogative. It possesses its causality in a complete and permanent way.[46] Artistry, for example, is an enduring quality in the soul of the artist, although it is a passing impulse in his arm or brush. Since it has its causality as a property of its being, the principal cause is capable of transferring that form to instruments. In fact, it impresses its form of causality upon each of the instruments ordained to its effect. In so doing it does not dissipate its causality because all instruments subordinated to the same effect are one by a unity of order.[47] Under the principal cause the instruments are so ordered that they share the impress of its form in a piecemeal fashion. No one of them is capable of producing the effect without the others. In the arm of the artist, for example, artistry is useless without a brush.[48] Finally, unlike the instrumental cause, the principal cause cannot be considered a sign of the effect, even though it might be more manifest.[49] God is not a sign of the presence of Faith in a soul, although the administration of the sacrament of Baptism may be.

Among principal causes there is a fundamental division to be observed. Not only as a being, but as a principal cause, God must be distinguished from all other causes called principal. As the primary principle of all being and all causality,

[46] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 4.
[47] *Ibid.*, ad 3.
[48] *IV Sent.*, d. 8, a. 3, ad 9; a. 4, ad 5.
[49] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1.

God may use whatever He chooses as His instrument. His very act of employing it fashions it to His purpose. Lesser principal causes, however, have no such control. They must have, already prepared for their use, instruments apt to their purposes. An artist, for example, cannot use a chisel in painting or a brush in carving. He, as every secondary principal cause, picks up his tools for a higher work than they could do of themselves, but they for their part must be prepared. The instruments must be qualified to function in conjunction with the principal cause.

Contrary yet complementary to those of a principal cause are the qualifications for instruments. In the instrument the form of the principal cause which is later reproduced in the effect is transient and incomplete.[50] God's power of cleansing from sin, for example, is in the Baptismal water only at the moment of actual washing. Incomplete and transient as it is, the form of the principal cause shared by the instrument is in the latter an intrinsic reality.[51] It is not merely an extrinsic assistance or an innate obediential potency, much less is it a mere intention of the agent or observer. As something incomplete and ordered to a further term, the motion within an instrument may be described as intentional. It is not, however, intentional in the sense of being merely a projection of intention from a principal cause. Rather it is a form, a physical reality superimposed upon the already existing form and activity of the instrument.[52] A real transmission of motion takes place in the principal-instrumental relationship and there is involved an actual sharing in efficiency.

This transmission of motion, so vital to instrumental cooperation, is felt first in the instrument and then in the effect. Even if there is no observable sequence in time, at least by an order of nature, the principal cause first elevates its instrument and

[50] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 4; *IV Sent.*, q. 1, a. 4, qua. 2; *QQ. Disp., De Veritate*, q. 27, a. 4, ad 6.; ad 7.

[51] John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, p. 513 ss.

[52] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, a. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

then applies it to its act, the production of a higher effect than it would natively be capable of producing.[53]

Presupposed to any influx from the principal cause, however, is the presence and activity of a form proper to the instrument.[54] The functioning of a pen, for example, is presupposed to the writing of intelligible signs. Consequently, within the one motion toward producing an effect there is a twofold formality. One formality belongs to the instrument as a being; the other belongs to the instrument precisely as such, as sharing in the activity of the principal agent.[55] This latter action is directly efficacious in producing the effect. The former—that of the instrument as being—contributes to the effect only indirectly. It causes a disposition in either the effect produced or the mode in which the principal cause operates.[56] If a saw did not have the proper action of cutting it would not be useful in making furniture; and if a saw is dull or misshapen, it will condition both the wood and the manner in which it is used. As with the saw, so in all instruments there is a proper action that is somewhat independent of the action of the principal cause. That proper action must be present or the principal cause cannot elevate the instrument to the production of higher effects. These effects higher than that appropriate to the native energies of the instrument, however, need not be on the same plane as the effect of the principal cause.[57] Nor need the instrument be more elevated than the effect produced, since the effect is likened to the principal cause and not the instrument.[58]

These complementary conditions on the part of the instrument and principal cause make possible a communion of action that is something more than cooperation. Subordinated rather than coordinated, instrumental causes are truly secondary to the principal cause in which causality is found in an absolute sense. Possessing causality as a property, on the other hand, the principal cause shares it with its subordinates that it might

[53] *III Contra Gent.*, 48; 149; *de Ver.*, q. 27, a. 4.
[54] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2.
[55] *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 1, ad. 2.
[56] *Ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 5.
[57] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.
[58] *Ibid.*, *qua.* 1, ad 3.

better produce its own effects and raise them to a communion of causality of which they would otherwise be incapable. The Humanity of Christ and His sacraments have a causality that is best explained through the doctrine of the principal-instrumental relationship. These same principles may be applied to the relationship in dynamic progress of charity and the other virtues in Christian perfection.

3. The principal-instrumental relationship as applied to charity and the other virtues.

The application of the principal-instrumental relationship to charity and the other virtues is taxing but rewarding. First of all, the conjunction of causes must be outlined and the common effect designated. Then the conditions for both the principal cause and the instrumental causes must be carefully applied to charity and the other virtues.

The conjunction of causes in a common effect is obviously realized in the relationship between charity and the other virtues. Neither charity nor the other virtues are causes in the sense of being subsistent principles which produce effects. Rather they are principles by which a man acts. Nevertheless, within the order of such principles—*principia quo*—charity and the other virtues have a definite relationship in causality. Just as charity and the other virtues—all accidents—may be compared as substance and accidents in Christian perfection, so in the same context they may be likened to principal and instrumental causes. The application is analogous but proper and precise.[59]

The precision of the analogy is more apparent with each factor in the relationship to which it is applied. The production of a common effect is certainly realized in the relationship of charity and the other virtues. The common effect is Christian

[59] *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 5. Charity is said to be the instrument of grace in only an improper sense. As an operative habit concerned with the ultimate end through a union of love, charity is the primary created principle of meritorious action. Cf. Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theologicus* (Paris, 1878), t. 12, p. 321.

perfection itself. That perfection, like the eternal reward toward which it is directed, is twofold. Just as the eternal reward has an essential element, the beatific vision, and an accidental, the *aureolae* and other accidental joys, so Christian perfection has its essence in charity and its accidents in other virtues.[60] For an increase in charity an act of that virtue alone is sufficient as a proper, although meritorious, cause. An affective act is sufficient for an augmentation in the essence of Christian perfection and even in the eternal reward. Likewise, an act of another virtue, fortitude, for example, is adequate as a proper cause in an increase in both the accidents of Christian perfection and those of heavenly life. When, however, the subordinate virtues function under charity, not in order to produce an accidental effect but to produce an effect in the essence of Christian perfection or the eternal reward, then they are operating as instruments of charity. The production of such a substantial increase in Christian perfection cannot otherwise be explained than through the analogy of the principal-instrumental causal relationship. The effect is common and the result of a communion of action; only the role of the members needs further explanation. Charity, then, is not only the substance of Christian perfection, it is the principal created cause of completeness in Christ.

Charity's claim to the title of principal cause in Christian perfection is well founded. In this " virtue of virtues " [61] are realized all the characteristics for hegemony among meritorious causes. There is no rival in rank of virtue or effective accomplishment in the whole realm of Christian living. An exposition of the characteristics of charity, therefore, is a sufficient defense of charity's right to be considered Christian perfection's principal cause.

In the meritorious production of a substantial increase in Christian perfection, which is identical with an increase in charity itself, charity does more than act as a proper or even an exemplary cause. It is a principal cause. As a proper cause

[60] *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 96, a. 1; *de Ver.*, q. 26, a. 6, ad 8.
[61] *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 5.

charity elicits acts of love sufficient of themselves for a merited increase in perfection. As an exemplary cause, charity gives the pattern of virtuous action for other virtues to approximate. Charity as a principal cause, however, gives something of its own power and purpose to other virtues, losing nothing of itself and destroying nothing in them. They fulfill their own functions, yet as instruments of charity, all the theological and moral virtues attain a higher effect, i. e. meriting an increase in the substance of Christian perfection itself.

The effect of the combined action of charity and the other virtues, a merited increase in perfection, is more like charity than any or all the other virtues. Merit depends upon two factors: divine ordination and human willingness.[62] In both of these charity is preeminent. Under the aspect of divine ordination charity excels all its rivals. As an infused virtue, it comes immediately from God in both its origin and its increase. As a theological virtue, it is ordered in the direction of the divine. Because it is in the will, it transcends the limitations of Faith as it goes out to God in Himself as the Supreme Good. Through charity, then, as through no other virtue, a man has a divine ordination fundamental to merit. This " rapture " of charity, however, is at the same time most human. No act is more willingly done than an act of love. Love has only to exist to be operative. Charity has for the " new creature " in grace a supernatural spontaneity unequaled by any virtue involving conceptual adjustments like faith or corporeal organs like fortitude. Moreover, while all the other virtues await the command of the will before they act, charity and the will are wedded into one principle of action. Most voluntary among men and most exalted before God, charity is more closely united with merit than is any other virtue.

The intimate association between charity and merit is more than a happy coincidence; it is a formal identity. Without charity there can be no merit, and with every act of that virtue some merit accrues to the soul. As an abiding quality

[62] *Summa Theol.*, q. 114, a. 4.

of charity's earthly activity, merit is a permanent form in its causality. Other virtues have merit as an essentially participated and passing modification of their proper acts, since the merit of even faith and hope depends upon their being formed by charity. Charity alone, therefore, possesses meritorious causality as a permanent form, and its consequent jurisdiction over merit is charity's first prerogative as the principal cause in Christian perfection.

Although charity is the husbandman of substantial merit among the virtues, it cannot prosper alone. For its own sake as well as for the benefit of lesser virtues, charity must engage in commerce of meritorious causality. In its various transactions, charity exchanges its own form, given in a transient way, for the meritorious ministry of other virtues. To a lesser degree all the virtues may assist one another. No one of them, however, can gain the profit in merit that charity accepts as its right. This dominative right is derived from the very object of charity, the ultimate end of human life, eternal happiness.[63] Because of this elevated objective toward which charity tends, it draws to itself all the other virtues, giving them at the same time finality and effectiveness in merit by imparting to them an instrumental form.[64]

The form with which charity endows the other virtues supplements rather than supplants their proper form. Virtues moved by charity remain essentially the same, but in their activity in perfection they assume at least for a time a new form from charity.[65] Transiently assumed, the instrumental form in the lesser virtues is effective in meriting an increase in the virtue of charity and the substance of Christian perfection. Imparting a form to other virtues in the efficient order which produces a substantial increase in perfection is another of the prerogatives of a principal cause, another of the unrivalled rights of charity among the virtues.

The right of charity to move other virtues to its end has a

[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *De Caritate*, a. 5, ad 1.
[65] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8.

parallel in the action of the will over the other faculties. Without destroying their own proper action, the will may move the other faculties.[66] Even the intellect, superior to the will in being, is subservient to it in motion. Like charity in the order of supernatural virtues, the will holds its privileged position among the faculties because of its object.[67] The will is not concerned with any particular good but with the universal good and end of human life. Since, then, the will and charity combine to form a single principle of supernatural operation, charity, like the will itself, has all the forcefulness and all the limitations of a secondary principal cause in Christian perfection.

The extent and effectiveness of the causality of charity depend upon both the aptness of its instruments and the intensity of charity's own act. Upon those virtuous actions adaptable to its purpose, charity imparts a meritorious form in proportion to the impulse of its own act. Because the form is in the order of causality and not merely an association in sanctifying grace, the modification imparted by charity binds the virtues in a more purposive union. The supernatural virtues of themselves have a sympathy of objects and a harmony of functions, because they are rooted in sanctifying grace. Because, however, they are subordinated to charity, they have a new driving force toward a single goal—meriting an increase in Christian perfection. The amount of contribution of each subordinate virtue depends not so much upon the perfection of the virtue or even the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul as upon the immediate impulse of charity in an act. A saintly person, for example, acting on occasion with a remiss charity, might preserve a virtue like temperance but he would not have prospered as he should in meriting an increase in perfection. A more perfect person performing a more perfect act, therefore, might not advance by that act as far as a less perfect person with an act of a lesser virtue but moved at the moment by a greater charity. The measure of merit is primarily the intention and the intensity of the act of charity.

[66] *Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3; q. 81, a. 3. [67] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1; II-II, q. 23, a. 8.

The intention required of charity in its influence over other virtues need not involve an actual intention. Since it is impossible for a human intellect in this life to keep God as the Supreme Good in the forefront of consciousness at all times, a constant actual intention is beyond human power.[68] A mere habitual intention, on the other hand is not enough. Such an intention once made and not retracted does not influence a current series of actions. Habitual charity has not the notion of principal cause about it, since no form of merit flows from it to influence independent actions. That meritorious form of charity is, however, transmitted through a virtual intention. Less than an actual intention psychologically, since it is lacking in conscious attention, the virtual intention is far more morally than a mere habitual intention. From the moral influence of a past act there perdures in a virtual intention a form sufficient for many subsequent acts. Just as upon all the foreseen consequences, malice spreads its venom through a virtual intention, through a similar moral reality the intended beneficent effects of charity feel the initial impulse of the charitable act. Through a virtual intention, therefore, as well as in actual attention charity may impose its form of merit upon an entire series of subsequent actions *per se* subordinate to its influence.[69] The length of the series and temporary deviations less than lethal to charity do not destroy the continued flow of its influence over all actions intended at the time of the original act of charity. If, then, a man ordains himself and all things to God by an act of charity, his subsequent acts share in the causality and effectiveness of charity in meriting an increase in Christian perfection.

The degree of intensity is not identical with the kind of intention in either charitable or voluntary acts. Under a virtual intention of charity an act may have more of the impulse of merit than under a remiss but actual intention. In an act of religion the presence of an influence from charity may be a matter of conscious effort, yet in the immediate resistance of

[68] *De Caritate*, a. 11, ad 1. [69] *De Ver.*, q. 25, a. 4.

a temptation the meritorious force of charity may be more intense. Intention and intensity, then, are distinct factors in charity's causality.

As either an actual or virtual intention, the influence of charity admits of degrees.[70] The rudimentary influence of charity is toward a common and confused choice of God as the ultimate end of all action. The commonness of such causality of charity is both in the scope of its influence and in the frequency with which such a choice is found in Christian living. Whenever charity comes to act for the first time, it involves a dedication of all to God. The life of grace that comes down from God rises upward again through acts of charity. The confusion in the common choice of God as end of all actions results from a lack in explicit experience in charity's meritorious causality. Yet in this weak beginning is the dynamic movement toward perfection. The movement toward perfection under a beginner's charity is slow and irregular. Because the influence of charity is tenuous and imperfect, other virtues scarcely seem subordinate to it. Each virtue is apparently concerned with its own proper act rather than with the effect it might produce in communion with charity. Beginners are more concerned with virtuously avoiding sin than with progressing in perfection. Yet with a modicum of influence of charity's causal form a minimum of merit is realized, and real progress becomes something more than a possibility.

Somewhat more substantial and precise than the rudimentary form is charity's second degree of influence. In it charity is, at least remotely, the reason that a thing is done rather than not done. When charity motivates a man to take the vows of religion, for example, it imposes its form of meritorious causality upon all subsequent acts which are *per se* connected with the vows. In the second degree of influence the chain of causality from charity to the work done has fewer and stronger links. The impelling power of charity leaves less to other

[70] Goudin, *Tractatus Theologicus*, ed. 1874, Vol. II, p. 415. These degrees of charity are found between the minimum and maximum possible in this life according to St. Thomas in *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 2.

impulses. Virtuous action is more unified. Since a man may be sure that in other than a counselled course of action he might save his soul, he follows a more difficult way because of a higher motive. His charity does not allow him to leave undone even what he need not do. In doing what is not of obligation by lesser norms, he gives evidence of a stronger influence of charity upon his actions than if he were merely doing what he must do to preserve his love for God. When the influence of charity is thus felt upon actions, progress in perfection is gathering momentum.

When in the movement toward perfection a quiet calm pervades every action, the influence of charity has reached its third degree. Then charity lives in each act and seems to accomplish of itself the tasks of the other virtues. Lesser motives are not scorned neither are they scrutinized. Whatever is done is done for the love of God. Actual attention cannot be given to labelling every minor act with the stamp of charity, but nothing escapes its formative influence in merit. With frequently renewed acts of charity the soul is capable of doing as much as it can in this life to make the meritorious influence of charity constant and complete.

Whatever may be its intensity and completeness, the scope of charity as a principal cause is limited by factors in Christian life which are above, beyond or beneath its control. Beneath the control of charity are those elements of human life over which a man has little or no dominion.[71] All his vegetative functions and some of his fundamental sense reactions are not under the control of his will and consequently escape the influence of charity. Because these actions of a man are less than human, charity cannot at the same time make them apt instruments and elevate them to its purpose. Unlike God who by an eternal and absolute power could raise up stones to praise Him, charity has a permanent but participated power. It is a secondary principal cause in meritorious action, and hence some actions in a man's life are not instruments for its purpose and are beneath its influence.

[71] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 1.

Beyond the influence of charity, yet within the control of the will, are all those truly human actions which are sinful. Such sinful human actions as cohabit the realms of perfection with charity are venial sins.[72] Between these sins and charity there is no commerce of causality. Venial sin has nothing to offer charity to assist it in its progress, yet charity can suffer no more than an interruption of its action because of the piracy of venial sin over the intention of the will. Charity, for its part, cannot lend its form to an action which is deformed however slightly. Deformity makes moral outlaws of even the most voluntary of actions.

Ordinarily the human will and charity form a single principle of action. At times, however, the naked and native will can hold charity and the other virtues in abeyance.[73] In their dignified but ineffectual presence, the will may commit itself to venial sins of injustice. The will can, moreover, relax its control over the feral tendencies of the lower appetites. These sense inclinations are of themselves sufficient to seek their own proper objects, and released from the control of the will their acts escape the influence of charity. Only when the will and the sense appetite have been held in check in their first-parental weakness for insubordination and led captive to charity, progress in Christian perfection is possible. Except by an extraordinary privilege, these interruptions to progress will not be eliminated, but the more complete the control of charity the more continuous is progress in perfection.[74]

Above the control of charity, yet free and meritorious, are some of a Christian's most perfect actions. These actions recognize no commanding power over them other than the Holy Ghost, since they are actions which flow from His Gifts. These Gifts of supernatural sanctification from the Holy Ghost are coeval and concomitant with charity, but they are not subordinate to even charity's human and deliberative standards.[75]

[72] *Ibid.*, q. 72, a. 5.
[73] *Ibid.*, q. 50, a. 1.
[74] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, n. 833.
[75] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

Instead of being instruments of charity as the secondary principal cause in merit, they are the instruments of the direct movement of the primary principal cause in perfection, the Holy Ghost Himself. Their contribution to Christian life is not a distinctive kind of work, but an inimitable workmanship.[76] What the will may do badly and the virtues well, the Gifts do best. While the virtues indicate the way and prepare for an advance in perfection, the Gifts sweep the soul to its accomplishment. There is certainly no conflict between charity and the Gifts, but rather a communion of an unusual kind. Charity cannot command the Gifts, but they do not impede its causality. Since an action of a Gift is frequently accompanied by an action of the appropriate virtue, charity can exercise its influence concomitantly with the instrumental action of the Gift of the Holy Ghost. Subordinate to a Higher Cause, the Gifts are never subversive of the activity of charity. They are coordinate with charity rather than subordinated to it in the meritorious process which is progress in Christian perfection.

Despite actions above, beyond and beneath charity, the best sign of charity is the scope of its influence. Charity itself, as a principal cause, cannot be the sign of the presence of other virtues. They, however, can indicate both its presence and its causality. Since they may receive a transient form of charity and pass it on to the effect, the virtues stand mid-way between the hidden principal cause and its effect. In all and each of the instruments of charity, then, is the form that will indicate their own instrumental action and the causality of the principal cause in Christian perfection.

4. The orderly effectiveness of charity as principal cause.

Charity is never chaotic. Neither the objects it loves nor the instruments it uses are in confusion. Both, on the contrary, are arranged in well-defined hierarchies. Just as the objects of charity have their own proper order, so the instruments of

[76] *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 1.

charity are disposed one after another according to their proximity to the principle of merit, charity itself. Furthermore, the objects of charity in this life have not one but two principles of their order. One is proximity to God; the other is closeness to the one loving.[77] Likewise, the instruments of charity, which exist as such only in this life, have a multiple principle of arrangement in their service to charity.

The primary basis for distinction among the instruments of charity lies in the difference between instruments which attain the full effect of charity through merit and those which do not. Even those factors of Christian life which do not reproduce the full effect of charity contribute materially to its reproduction and are in an extended sense its instruments in merit. Emotions and external goods, for example, as something less than human actions, cannot bear the title of merit except in a secondary sense.[78] Their contribution to merit is of a much lower order than that of virtuous actions, but under the impulse of charity they have an effect higher than one properly theirs. Without the material subministration of emotions and external goods many acts of the moral virtues and consequently of charity would be impossible. By a unity of order the very least factors in Christian life, external goods, can share in the instrumentality of the moral virtues under charity. They do not attain the full effect of the principal cause in any formal way, but they are as much a part of merit as the artist's brush is a contributing factor in his artistry. In their causality they remain subordinate to human and virtuous actions which attain the full effect of charity in merit.

Virtuous action itself does not attain the full effect of charity through meritorious causality in a single uniform way. Upon the diversity of manner in meriting under charity the second hierarchy of charity's instruments is founded. In this hierarchy the supernatural and infused virtues precede the natural and acquired. Among the infused virtues the theological virtues

[77] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 1; a. 7, ad 3.
[78] *De Ver.*, q. 26, a. 6.

hold first place and the moral virtues are secondary.[79] The former are of themselves more intimately associated in the work of Christian perfection than are the latter. Although any virtue may be meritorious under the impulse of charity, the theological virtues are most apt as instruments in attaining the end of charity. They themselves are concerned in a lesser way with the same object, God Himself. The more closely, therefore, a virtue is associated with the ultimate end of human life, the higher is its place in the hierarchy of virtuous instruments under charity.

The primacy of the supernatural virtues in the instrumental causality of charity cannot be questioned. They are of the common stock of graces infused with charity. Each infused virtue has an intrinsic independence, but for its perfection in tending to the common end of the Christian life each virtue depends upon charity. The theological virtue of faith, for example, can exist in a soul without charity, but it cannot reach its complete perfection as virtue without sharing a form from charity.[80] The infused moral virtues are completed by charity in much the same way. Charity does not make them what they are, but what they do is worthless in the way of salvation without the " virtue of virtues." In all the infused virtues, therefore, charity is intrinsic not to their natures but to their perfection even as virtues.

The natural virtues, on the other hand, have what they have of virtue and perfection even without charity. Their objective is limited but they have it of themselves. The imperfect perfection of the acquired virtues is, however, the lowest grade of instrumental aptness in charity's causality in Christian perfection. In a Christian soul, the acquired virtues function in and through the infused virtues,[81] and through these latter the acquired virtues obtain a share in the impulse of merit initiated by charity. In this way charity enters into the perfection of the act of the acquired virtue by raising it to the

[79] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 2.
[80] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 3.
[81] *De Virtutibus*, a. 10, ad 4.

supernatural order, but it does not enter into the perfection of virtue as such, as it does in the case of the infused virtues.

Among the infused virtues as instruments of charity the theological virtues hold first place. The theological virtues of faith and hope have as their proper function the immediate ordering of the soul to God. They prepare the soul for the supernatural friendship of charity, and they are the means of fostering a constant communication between God and the Christian soul.[82] This proper action they have and maintain of themselves. From charity they receive the instrumental function of effectively meriting an increase in the substance of Christian perfection itself.

The moral virtues hold a secondary place among the infused virtues because they perfect a soul relative to things other than God.[83] They are concerned with the needs and tendencies of the human composite. Temperance and fortitude give man possession of himself, so that he may give himself more completely to God. Justice establishes a right order among human actions, some of which are referred to God through the virtue of religion. The moral virtues, therefore, are related to divine friendship not as direct dispositions but as removing obstacles. In removing the obstacles to charity, the moral virtues under the impulse of that " virtue of virtues " merit not only an increase in their own proper perfection but in the substance of Christian perfection itself.

Christian perfection in its meritorious increase admits of a variety of instruments. Some of these instruments merely minister materially to other instruments which attain the full effect of the principal cause, others attain that effect directly. Among those instruments which attain the full effect of the principal cause there are natural instruments and supernatural. Of these latter some pertain directly to the relationship between the soul and God, others merely remove obstacles to that relationship. All these instruments function in a marvelous harmony under the " bond of perfection." They are

[82] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5. [83] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2; q. 63, a. 3, ad 2.

united together, and together unite the soul to God. In that unity of personal perfection and union with the Principle of perfection, charity is the cohesive force and principal cause. Charity does not, however, attain its full effect in composite human nature without a noteworthy contribution from each of its instruments, especially the moral and theological virtues.

Union with God is both an instrumental and a proper function of the theological virtues. Through faith the soul assents to God as the Primal Truth.[84] In hope He is the Almighty and Merciful Helper.[85] These proper actions of the virtues of faith and hope are presupposed to their instrumental function under charity. With charity faith and hope rise to an even higher type of union with God, a union through love.[86] In this union the soul attains God as He is in Himself, not as He is through some relationship to created reality. In thus uniting the soul and faith and hope with God, charity is both a proper and a principal cause.

As a proper cause charity establishes and fosters the union of love.[87] As a principal cause charity employs other virtues in increasing that same union.[88] The instruments share transiently in a form permanent in charity, which effects the union of love. Without destroying their proper mode of union with God, therefore, charity elevates even the theological virtues to the higher effect of a meritorious intensification of the union through love. In that union and in its relationship with charity, however, faith and hope have distinct proper activity dispositive to their common instrumental action under charity.

5. *The theological virtues as instruments of charity.*

In both its instrumental activity and its act as an instrument faith is related to charity. Faith retains its specific form independent of any association with charity, but by its specific form alone faith is not an apt instrument of charity.[89] Even in a soul

[84] *Ibid.*, II-II, a. 1, a. 1.
[85] *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 1.
[86] *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 6.
[87] *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 6, ad 1.
[88] *III Sent.*, d. 30, a. 5.
[89] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 4, ad 1; a. 5, ad 3.

in mortal sin the specific form of faith need not be destroyed. Yet such faith without the formation given to it by charity is not disposed to assist charity, since charity is no longer extant in the soul. The formed faith of a person in the state of grace, however, is suitable to the purpose of charity.[90] The formation of faith through charity, therefore, while it is not essential to the notion of faith as such, is essential to its function as an instrument producing its proper effect of a perfectly virtuous union with God.

Since a faith not formed by charity is totally incompatible with charity, faith must be first fashioned by the " virtue of virtues " as an apt instrument before it can be receptive to the instrumental form of meriting an increase in charity itself. Faith, then, receives a form from charity for two purposes; one is for assent, the other is for use.

Because of the formation from charity in assent faith itself is perfected. What would be merely a matter of free-will and an unformed supernatural virtue is a matter of merit when faith is formed in the very act of assent by charity. In its assent to revealed truths without intrinsic evidence faith differs from science, and its essential characteristic is established.[91] Yet a difference eventually more meaningful exists between a faith whose act is meritorious and one whose act is not—between an act whose assent is governed by a free-will motivated by charity and one which is not.

Besides the perfection given by charity to faith in the act of assent, there is another formation given to faith for its function in instrumental causality. This is the use to which charity orders faith. In the matter of use under charity, faith and science are similar.[92] In science the assent to truth is not subject to free-will, but the actual consideration of what a man knows may be. He may consider it or not as he chooses. If his soul is elevated to the supernatural level and his action of considering scientific truth is motivated by charity, that action is meritorious. Likewise, in the case of faith, charity, over and

[90] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1. [91] *Ibid.*, a. 9, ad 2. [92] *Ibid.*

above its formation in perfecting assent, commands acts of faith which will increase charity itself. Under the aspect of assent, therefore, charity gives a formation to faith that perfects faith, under the additional aspect of instrumental usage for the greater perfection of charity itself.

In faith, three so-called forms must be distinguished and ordered one to another. The primary and essential form of faith is independent of charity and belongs to the order of formal causality. In the order of final causality toward faith's own end, charity adds a form to assent that makes that assent meritorious. In the order of efficient causality, which is at the same time final causality for charity, the " virtue of virtues " adds a third instrumental form in a transient way. The third form is extant and effective just so long as charity under an actual or virtual intention moves the act of faith. The second form of faith remains so long as there is grace and the habit of charity in the soul. The primary form of faith is destroyed only by an action contrary to faith itself. These three formalities remain distinct but inseparable in any act of faith which is instrumental under charity in meriting an increase in the substance of Christian perfection.

When charity adds a third form to faith, already formed in its essence and fashioned to perfection, it is not merely ornamenting the act of faith with an extrinsic assistance. Rather it elevates the proper act of faith to a new effect. Extrinsic assistance would be merely an application of faith to its own act, whereas the third form given by charity raises faith to an instrumental contribution to a higher union with God. Nor is the third formation of faith merely an obediential potency, which indicates a non-repugnance to act but no actual functioning. Rather charity gives faith a form in the efficient order which is just as real as the form it imposes upon faith in the final order.

The reality and interrelation of the forms of faith given by charity may be illustrated by two examples.[93] A person who,

[93] Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae* (Paris, 1876), Vol. IV, n. 167.

with attrition, received the Sacrament of Penance would have had faith and by the Sacrament would receive the habit of charity, together with its habitual formation of faith. Should that person elicit an act of faith before an act of charity—a conceivable hypothesis—he would have merit of assent without merit of use. His act of faith would deserve a reward, but it would be an accidental reward, not the essential reward of the beatific vision. Should he die with only this one post-confessional act, he would receive the essential reward of heaven as an inheritance from the merits of Christ, not from his own personal activity. His act of faith would attain its proper effect of an accidental reward, but it would not have obtained for him the essence of heavenly life, the beatific vision. Unless an act of charity, and not merely the habit, were presupposed, which would be contrary to the hypothesis, the act of faith would lack the additional meritorious form by which it might be instrumental to charity.

In much the same way, but to a lesser degree, a person who acted from an intense and formed faith but moved by a remiss charity would give evidence of the distinction between the formation for assent and the formation for use. He would obtain a greater increase of faith than he would of charity. If, on the other hand, a person of weak faith were to act from the full fervor of his act of charity, he would gain the primary effect of his act in the union of charity and an increase of faith only as a consequence of the interrelation of the virtues.

The essence of faith is distinct from the meritorious assent of faith, and this latter from the instrumental use of faith, but in proportion to its perfection in its proper act, faith becomes more and more apt as an instrument of charity. The more intense and willing is the assent of faith, the more facilely can charity use it to gain an increase in the substance of perfection. The greater the extent of the objects to which faith gives explicit assent the more charity has an opportunity to turning these acts to its own profit.

If, in turn, faith uses subordinate instruments to extend the meaningfulness of its explicit acts and to intensify them, the

merit of faith is augmented rather than diminished.[94] Faith may use human reason and sense observations for probable or defensive arguments. Because these arguments are not antecedent but subsequent to the assent of faith they do not form faith but rather are informed by faith itself. When a person with charity uses both faith and human reason for a more fruitful understanding of faith, therefore, he does not diminish the merit of his faith but merits an increase in both faith and charity.

In its subordination to faith all reality may be the instrument of charity in meriting an increase in Christian perfection. Other virtues have a limited subject matter, but faith falls upon the testimony of the First Truth which it may corroborate with any number of created truths. The artistic arrangement of the universe impresses upon the intellect illumined by faith an appreciation of the wisdom of God. The volcanic and oceanic force in nature leaves no doubt of the power of God. Every goodness and thing of beauty gives evidence of the Font of all goodness. Every consideration of created reality may contribute to the aptness of faith as an instrument of charity. Knowing creatures, a man may know God more; loving God more, he may use creatures to increase that love through the causality of his charity and the instrumentality of his faith.

Like faith, hope is intimately united yet instrumentally subordinate to charity. Like faith, too, hope has its own specific supernatural chapter independent of charity. In the gradual realization or reestablishment of Divine Friendship a soul may hope before it loves.[95] Its hope, however, is helpless. Unless charity contribute its perfection of finality to hope, as it does to faith, hope is lacking in the perfection of virtue.[96] Hope which excludes charity operates on the basis of God's power and mercy, but hope which includes in its perfection a form from charity relies as well upon the justice of God and previous personal merits. In this latter case, God is a Friend inspiring

[94] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 10, ad 3.
[95] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4; II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
[96] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

confidence in His power and mercy. The self-regarding love of such a friendship is the proper act of formed hope. In that act, formed hope is an apt instrument of charity.

The proper act of hope as an instrument of charity depends upon another past or presupposed act of charity.[97] Just as the use of faith presupposes the assent of faith through charity, so the use of hope is consequent upon acts of charity formative of the perfection of hope. The merits of charity are the basis of a formed hope, just as the imperfect love of an unformed hope may have been the beginning of charity's perfect love. Charity is thus ordered to hope as one effect to another, while hope is ordered to charity as one motive to another, just as the state and the individual are alternatively ordered to one another. Hope, therefore, depends for the fullness of its proper act upon charity, since the latter must have produced its effect of merit, if the former is to have its proper act as a formed and apt instrument.

The instrumental act of hope in meriting an increase in charity itself is obviously dependent upon the exercise of the " virtue of virtues " in its dominion over hope. Charity gives in the efficient order a new form to hope by which it may merit an increase in the substance of Christian perfection. Charity is constrained to communicate its causality to hope if it wishes to increase its own perfection through an act of confidence in a helpful Divine Friend. Hope, therefore, has an instrumental action under charity by which it reaches to a higher effect than is properly its own. Hope in this way attains to the highest effect of virtue, a union with God through love.

Hope, however, is not so united with God either in its proper or instrumental action that it excludes every reliance upon men or temporal things as its instruments.[98] Hoping in the intercession of the saints, for example, strengthens confidence in God. Under the impulse of charity, this same act of hope is instrumental in meriting an increase in charity itself. Likewise, a fervent act of charity can impel a firm and formed hope to

[97] *Ibid.*, ad 3.

[98] *Ibid.*, a. 5.

use such a material object as a crucifix to increase both hope and charity. These material instruments are one with hope by a unity of order in their instrumentality under charity.

The instrumentality of faith and hope in Christian perfection is intimately and intricately joined with the principal causality of charity. As supernatural virtues tending to a supernatural end, faith and hope depend for their formation as instruments upon the perfecting power of charity. As theological virtues, they are the closest approximation of union with God through love. In faith and hope, therefore, charity finds closest at hand its most apt instrument in meriting an increase in the substance of perfection.

The substance of perfection however, is properly human as well as theologically ordered. Charity cannot be content to attempt a union with God through love, unless at the same time it unifies the various factors of the human composite and uses them to its purpose. Charity, therefore, can—and at times must—employ instruments other than the theological virtues in its advance to perfection. These instruments will have as the object of their proper act something other than God but they will be the means of removing the obstacles to the way toward God. The instruments which remove obstacles as their proper act and increase charity through an instrumental act are the moral virtues.

6. The moral virtues as instruments of charity.

The moral virtues are more than ornaments in Christian perfection. They are integral complements to its substance and instrumental in its increase. Because of the composite nature of human life, perfection in Christian living, which is properly human, cannot be attained by a single act or even by a series of the same kind of acts. Maturity for men in either the natural or the supernatural order demands a multiplicity of actions. Unlike the angels, who merited the beatific vision by a single act, men have a longer way to heaven.[99] Their

[99] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5.

meritorious progress is made and measured by all the actions proper to composite human nature.

In his progress toward perfection a man's personal and social activities are incalculable, and even the intrinsic principles of those actions are irreducibly many. From his intellect's practical judgment comes his command of what might best be done in each situation. Through acts of his will he establishes a relationship to others. By his concupiscible appetite he ingurgitates sense goods, and by his irascible appetite he wards off or conquers evils. All of these principles of action are operative almost constantly throughout any human life. When a man acts not from the naked power of doing one or another of the actions to be expected in human life but acts with a fixed modification toward moral good, then he not only lives as a human being but grows as a child of God. In that growth repeated acts of affection for God are not enough. In each of the potencies which are principles of human acts a man must have the modification of moral virtues. Without them the faculties of a man cannot be unified in action, and the man himself cannot attain union with God, especially the union of love.

The union of love, which is the effect of charity, demands that all the faculties of man be perfected with moral virtues, because charity as a principal cause must use those virtues as its instruments. If charity were perfect in itself and the potencies it used as instruments were not perfected by moral virtues, the causality of charity would be impeded.[101] Unless the instruments are well disposed by virtues, charity cannot use them to merit an increase in its own perfection. When, however, the various faculties of a man are disposed by the moral virtues, the way of charity is made easy and every human action can contribute to a meritorious increase in Christian perfection.

The ministry of the moral virtues to charity's causality in Christian perfection depends upon three cardinal points: their concurrence in a common effect with charity, their own presupposed proper and dispositive activity, and their reception

[100] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 1.

[101] *De Caritate*, a. 5.

of a new form from charity which elevates them and applies them to act toward a union of love.

That the moral virtues attain the same generic effect as charity is beyond cavil.[102] Their acts are assuredly meritorious. God rewards not only acts of love but other acts as well. The reward given, however, is distinct from the reward proper to charity.[103] In the distinctive reward of the moral virtues two factors are involved. One is proper to the act itself; the other is participated from charity. The ultimate heavenly reward for charity is the essential happiness of heaven, for the moral virtues an appropriate return is an accidental joy. The aureola of a martyr or a virgin, for example, is a tribute to an outstanding victory in the order of moral virtue; it is not a reward for the whole warfare of life. The accidental reward cannot exist without the essential reward, however, any more than the infused moral virtues can be present in the soul without charity. The virtues and their respective rewards are distinct but not separable.

Inseparably rooted in grace, charity and the moral virtues admit of a variety of differences in their activities and effects. One man might suffer martyrdom with a minimum of torture but a maximum of charity. Another might suffer great torture with a weak charity. The latter would gain a greater accidental reward for his martyrdom, because of the exercise of the virtue of fortitude. The former would not have such a lustrous aureola, but his appreciation of the beatific vision would be intensified.[104] In each case the causality of charity is present. In the case of the more severe martyrdom, however, charity has more the function of lending extrinsic assistance by applying a moral virtue to its proper act. In the less severe but more lovingly endured martyrdom charity is a principal cause employing the virtue of fortitude, as it might any other moral virtue, to merit an increase in charity itself. Among the various saints, therefore, rewards are distributed according to their virtuous

[102] *III Sent.*, d. 30, a. 5; Denzinger, *op. cit.*, n. 1405.
[103] *Summa Theol.*, Suppl. q. 96, a. 1.
[104] *De Ver.*, q. 26, a. 6, ad 8; *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 96, a. 13.

activity on earth. The least willing of martyrs may gain a greater accidental reward than the most devoted of confessors. The latter, however, may merit more of an essential reward. In him charity functions most perfectly as a principal cause, using the moral virtues to produce an effect that is not proper to any moral virtue but common to all virtues impelled by charity, an increase in the essential reward of heaven.

As it is in heaven so it is on earth in the matter of rewards for meritorious acts. An intensification of their own perfection is the proper effect of each of the moral virtues. All, however, contribute to the common effect of a meritorious increase in the substance of Christian perfection. Under the influence of at least a remote and virtual act of the love of God, the moral virtues attain an effect higher than anything they might accomplish of themselves. Patience, for example, is meritoriously self-perpetuating, but impelled by charity it contributes to the perfection of all Christian living. This effect the moral virtues have in common with charity and because of the influence of that " virtue of virtues." Charity, therefore, not only applies the moral virtues to their own act, it elevates them to a higher unity among themselves and even to a union with God.

In the production of a common effect under the causality of charity, the moral virtues, whether infused or acquired, lose nothing of their proper formalities or functions. On the contrary, the proper and dispositive activity of each of the moral virtues is presupposed to its being elevated to a higher ministry by charity. In addition the specific difference between the acquired and the infused virtues gives to each a distinctive function under the impulse of charity.

The acquired virtues have as their regulative norm the standards of natural reason. They are concerned with the good of human society. Nothing in excess or defect of the balance for individual or social living is compatible with the natural habits which make a man good and his work good also. The acquired virtue of temperance demands that nothing should be done which would impair the health of the body or impede the use of reason. Normality and equilibrium are the motives and

accomplishments of the acquired virtues. They are the shreds of decency of a man in mortal sin. Even for a person in the state of grace, the acquired virtues have a formally distinct function, inferior and subordinate to their correlative principles in the supernatural order.

In the order above nature God is no less provident than in the natural order. Each faculty and each morally distinct task has its appropriate virtue. Not only because they are given by God rather than acquired by repeated human acts, but because they have distinct objectives and norms, the infused moral virtues differ from the acquired virtues. In infused temperance, for example, a man is concerned with more than preserving his body from harmful excesses. He chastises his body and brings it into subjection for motives unintelligible to purely natural judgments. What is essential to an infused virtue is superfluous and supererogatory to the acquired. Materially they are the same, since each of the correlative virtues in either order deals with the same object. Yet formally they are quite different.[105] These differences distinguish their contribution to the causality of charity.

The formality of either the infused or the acquired virtues, upon which their ministry to charity is based, has each its relative importance.[106] The acquired virtues excel the infused under one aspect, and the infused virtues cannot be approximated by the acquired under another aspect. Control is the hall-mark of the acquired virtues, consistency of the infused. Because of the laborious process through which a man must go to acquire a moral virtue, once he has it, he has better control than if the attainment of virtue were easy. His acquired virtue, then, is capable of subduing unruly passions, of dominating the inclinations of concupiscence or of timidity. In this regard, the infused virtue may be somewhat deficient. God-given with the presence or return of charity, the infused virtues have little dominance over contrary dispositions on the part of the appetite. The ease and delight of action that are properties of

[105] *De Virtutibus*, a. 10, ad 8. [106] *Ibid.*, ad 14.

virtues may be minimized for the infused virtues because of the recalcitrance of the untamed appetites. In the consistency of their operation, however, the infused virtues are superior to the acquired. No single seriously sinful act is compatible with any of the infused virtues, but it may be with the acquired. Neither type of virtue can be the proper cause of sins contrary to its nature, but only the infused find sin so abhorrent that they cannot exist in the same soul. The acquired virtue of justice, for example, may continue to exist in a soul despite one or several lapses into serious injustices. In this compatibility with its contrary there is a certain inconsistency on the part of the acquired virtues which is not found in the infused. Both the control of the acquired virtues and the consistency of the infused are, however, valuable as proper dispositive effects of the instruments of charity.

The dispositive effect of an instrument which results from its own proper action is directed either to the objects or to the mode of operating. In the instrumentality of the moral virtues under the principal causality of charity in Christian perfection, the objects are the obstacles impeding the facile use of all of a man's faculties for the expression and increase of charity. The mode of operating is a supernatural concern for something other than God. When, therefore, charity's causality involves a supernatural concern for the obstacles to perfection, the moral virtues make a contribution to its effectiveness.

In warning charity that many moral actions are incompatible with the love of God, the infused moral virtues modify the causality of charity. They make of it a principal rather than merely a proper cause of perfection. Since they draw attention to their own objects as possible sources of perfecting the whole of composite human nature, they place before charity a concern for something other than affective acts toward God. Because they are themselves supernatural they condition the supernatural activity without straining it to artificial lengths. The contribution of the proper activity of the infused moral virtues, then, is to modify the activity of charity rather than place a disposition in the object.

For a disposition in the object—the obstacles to perfection—nothing more or less is effective than the acquired moral virtues. Their dominance and control over the faculties disposes even the most self-seeking of appetites to docile acceptance of the sweet yoke of charity. Faculties which as a result of original or personal sins might be obstacles to the causality of charity are, because of the proper act of the acquired moral virtues, fashioned into instruments. The acquired virtues, therefore, while they may not directly move charity to its effect, are dispositions to that effect inasmuch as they remove obstacles to its fulfillment.

Of the two dispositions, that of the infused virtues is more necessary than that of the acquired.[107] Without the intervention of the infused virtues the acts of the acquired virtues would be in no way meritorious and in no way tributary to the effect of charity. Without the acquired virtues, the infused virtues would still be instrumental to charity. The acquired virtue is of such an inferior order that it is not apt for the influence of charity, unless the superior instrumentality of the infused virtue intervene. The infused virtue is adequate to its task of channeling the causality of charity even if there are still indispositions remaining in the object because of the lack of the acquired virtues.[108]

When both the infused and the acquired moral virtues are present and operative in the soul, charity has apt instruments for its work. The action proper to its instruments is then presupposed, the new form of instrumental action is possible. This new form charity willingly and abundantly imparts. The instrumental form, however, is given to the moral virtues only transiently, that is, so long as they are moved by charity. Of themselves they are utterly impotent in directly meriting an intensification of the union of love between God and the soul. They attain this meritorious activity only when elevated and applied to act by charity, and they contribute to the increase in perfection in precisely the degree in which they are impelled

[107] *Ibid.*, ad 4.

[108] *Ibid.*; *de Caritate*, a. 5, ad 7; ad 9.

by charity. In the case of a man with the habit of charity but not acts of that virtue—through the Sacrament of Penance—an act of the moral virtues would gain an increase in the intensity of the particular moral virtue practised but there would be no intensification of charity itself. The impulse of charity effectively informing the acts of the moral virtues, therefore, elevates without destroying the moral virtues to acts which merit an increase in the substance of Christian perfection.

The moral virtues joined with the theological virtues are instruments of charity. Each and all of them have the qualifications required of instruments, just as charity possesses what is expected of a principal cause. Without the moral and theological virtues charity cannot fulfill its role as principal cause, and without charity the moral virtues are limited and the theological virtues lifeless. The common effect to be produced—a meritorious increase in Christian perfection—cannot be fully realized unless the subordinate virtues are present and aptly instrumental. Charity, however, is not ordered to the mere activation of moral or even theological virtues.[109] Charity is the end as well as the active principle of action, and it is not subordinated to its own instruments. They, on the other hand, are subordinated to charity for their own sublimation. In union with charity, the moral and theological virtues attain a new union with God. The moral virtues remove the obstacles to that union, and the theological virtues dispose directly to divine friendship. They are, therefore, apt instruments to charity's principal causality in meriting an increase of the substance of Christian perfection.

7. *Conclusion.*

Christian perfection as a growth to maturity in Christ involves both fixed stages and intermittent progress. In the classic parallel of the relationship of substance and accidents the static relationship of charity and the other integrating virtues finds sufficient and solid explanation. For the dynamic

[109] *II Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, ad 5.

interplay between charity and the theological and moral virtues, however, only the analogy of the relationship in principal-instrumental causality is adequate. The progress and the pauses in the development toward perfection depends primarily upon the ebb and flow of the vital fervor of charity. Secondarily, the conjoined ministry of the other virtues dynamically integrates all the subordinate factors in the human composite.

In the analysis of both of these analogies many adjacent considerations clamor for attention. They cannot be heard, however, until the fundamental appeal of the dynamic analogy between the relationship of principal-instrumental causality and the respective roles of charity and the other virtues in Christian perfection is recognized. Through the acceptance of a new dynamic analogy, as for so long through the classic static one, a theological candle may be lighted. A beginning may be made toward another understanding of St. Thomas's meaning in applying the word " principally " to charity and " secondarily " to the other virtues in Christian perfection.[110] Through St. Thomas then, another advance may be made toward an appreciation and realization of our Heavenly Father's covenant and Christ's command: " You, therefore, are to be perfect, even as your Heavenly Father is perfect.[111]

DOMINIC HUGHES, O.P.

Providence College
Providence, R.I.

[110] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 1.
[111] *Matthew* 5 : 48.

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY OF ORTHODOXY

I.

IT is only through the exercise of the intellect that we can be capable of moral responsibility. Unlike Socrates, a Christian or a Jew cannot say that knowledge itself will make him virtuous. But he can say that, without knowledge, he is incapable of virtue. Christopher Dawson, in a memorable passage, has put the matter succinctly:

> For St. Thomas . . . the active intelligence is the very essence of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty. 'For if,' he writes, 'the active intelligence is a substance outside man, the whole of man's activity depends on an extrinsic principle. Man then will not be a free agent but will be acted upon by another, and so he will not be the master of his own acts nor deserve praise or blame; and the whole of moral science and of social science will perish . . .'[1]

These are essential words for the orthodox position: "the active intelligence is the very essence of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty."

The nature of the opportunity that orthodoxy meets in the contemporary world is contained in these words, for orthodoxy has claimed to be the guardian of the active intelligence.

By orthodoxy we mean the tradition of the Universal Church, its principles and teachings. By tradition much more is meant than a Platonic archetype. Tradition is universal; but it is also individuated. It is existential and individuated in a concrete historic setting. The individual human person must often apply principles to unique situations on the basis of his conscience and judgment. In this sense, individual persons (St. Joan of Arc, St. Thomas More) are often historically ahead of

[1] *Medieval Religion* (New York, 1934), p. 78.

the pronouncements of the Church, and by their very lives help to unfold its dogma and make it explicit. Nothing is more opposed to orthodox tradition than the concept that reliance on authority absolves us from the incessant responsibility for the employment of the active intelligence.

The active intelligence is a paramount need in our historical setting, for we have a society in which activity is placed above contemplation, means above end. The pragmatic value degrades all values. Pragmatism makes us blind to being. We can no longer see, we can no longer love. We cannot even judge the things we make. We hate excellence, because excellence does not pay. Because it does not pay, it is no longer excellent. The *homme moyen*, the least common denominator of our economic society does not want excellence. He wants mediocrity; it gives him a greater sense of security. Finally, pragmatically, mediocrity becomes, *is*, excellence. Excellence in the true sense is alien, the foreigner; it is Kafka's stranger, T. S. Eliot's " An Unidentified Guest " in *The Cocktail Party*. If we live up to the responsibility of our intelligence today, the way of the cross is assured on that basis alone. Yet the increasing focus on those who see being and those who only see use makes orthodoxy seem not only much more dramatic (witness Merton's book) to the world, but much more real and valid.

I propose briefly to outline the opportunity that is presented to an actively intelligent orthodoxy; secondly, to outline what I believe are ideological influences, affecting the orthodox, and hindering the presentation of the orthodox position to the world; thirdly, to outline the powerful resources that orthodoxy possesses.

The opportunity for orthodoxy today is indirectly related to the loss of an adequate integrating principle in contemporary life, due to a series of intellectual divorces increasing in effect since the Middle Ages. In a disintegrating social picture, orthodoxy has an attractiveness as a polarity, viewed purely on the natural plane, even without reference to its supernatural claims. Orthodoxy, in this sense of a complex of moral and social values, embraces the main stream of the Judaic-Christian

tradition, and the spring that is its source—its theological foundations. In the more specific orthodoxy accepts Christian revelation as substantial historical truth.[2]

The opportunity of orthodoxy today is directly to be found in the fact that this is an age of revolutions, and, when not artificially frustrated, orthodoxy is a revolutionary doctrine. Christ in His life and teaching is as radical as the planets that swing in heaven, the surge of oceans, as love, as bread, as death; so lacking in class consciousness that He became human in a particularly helpless way in the Incarnation. Orthodoxy in its true nature is a dynamic, awakening force, positive, as full of life and flame as the Holy Ghost, intolerant of mediocrity, in love with sincerity and resistlessly passionate. It is the most revolutionary of forces. It is a personal revolution and a revolution of persons, rather than of slogans and simplified ideas, of impersonal mass social controls.

Space does not permit an analysis of the various causes that have led to the present era of revolutions.[3] But it might well be argued that contemporary revolutions have been distinguished by a singular negativism. They have not sprung from positive energy, from optimism about the nature of man and about the possibilities of justice, but rather from protest. There has been so long a historical process of dehumanization that there is blind insistence on security, even on bread and circuses, at the cost of certain transcendent motivations that inspired the great historical revolutions of the past. The Nazi and Communist Revolutions were rather different from the French

[2] It is well to think of the Church in the most inclusive sense as comprising all men of good will. A man of good will does not "become" a Catholic so much as he joins the "visible fellowship of the Church." He is already a Catholic in so far as he belongs to the "soul" of the Church. The "soul" of the Church is a reality, not a mere rhetorical expression.

[3] It is an unfortunate semantic practice to think of the Church as "conservative" rather than as "revolutionary." If one thinks of a "dynamic" conservatism—as of the effort to rewin and restate the universal truths in the concrete historical setting of one's time—then such conservatism is "revolutionary." As Donald Attwater says in *Modern Christian Revolutionaries* (New York, 1947), "there is nothing (except sin and error) profane to the Christian Revolution."

Revolution in this respect. Once men have been sufficiently ground down under iniquitous social conditions, they become subhuman, and their revolutions have a subhuman quality. Thus one character envisages modern revolution in Aldous Huxley's *Point-Counter-Point*:

> It's terrifying. It simply isn't human. Their humanity has all been squeezed out of them by civilized living, squeezed out by the weight of coal and iron. It won't be a rebellion of men. It'll be a revolution of elementals, monsters, pre-human monsters.

It is the condition of " subhuman irresponsibility " that Eric Gill so deplored in " The Creative Faculty in Man " where he reminds us that it is true that a man can remain a Christian in a factory but only insofar as he remains a man. Work, by its divorce from the creative faculty of man, by its divorce from human dignity therefore, has in many instances ceased to be spiritually free and has become psychologically slave. Mechanistic man finds little joy in work; frequently he can only tolerate it as a means to security. The unfortunate circumstances under which the industrial revolution took place, in an atmosphere of rationalism, romanticism, capitalism, haunt us very much now, poisoning the air we breathe, and in many instances helping to destroy the effectiveness of orthodoxy itself.

If the revolutions that have taken place in various ways, successful and unsuccessful, in Germany, Russia, China, Italy, have been distinguished by a good deal of barbarity, it is not surprising, because in every case man has not been considered a human person but a thing, an object manipulated by a force. This is an hour when a truly revolutionary orthodoxy can shout from the housetops that man is made to the image of God, the Creator of heaven and earth—that man, too, must be a creator and share as such in that goodness that endlessly diffuses itself without diminution; that man, made to the Image of God, shares in His immortality; has intelligence, free will, autonomy, and is the lord of that nature which God created for the use of all men.

Orthodoxy's main intellectual opportunity lies in reestablishing the meaning of man. Orthodoxy is, of course, primarily concerned with God. But in reference to the social picture of our times the most immediately effective concept to restore is that of the true nature of man. For great numbers of people today *God* is merely a word, a rhetorical expression. In Michelangelo's work in the Sistine Chapel, man was presented in the most universal meaning without parochialism or coyness —without that endless set of discriminations beloved by competitive society. As you regard the saved and the damned in Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* you don't know whether man, in his intrinsic manhood, is prince or peasant, pope or layman. Michelangelo's Man is truly universal. Man is there faced with a decisive cosmic struggle upon which his salvation depends, co-sharer in the democracy of death and in the democracy of the sacraments, a man of free will, yet dependent on God. Such a work is not at the moment possible, for modern man suffers not merely a split personality, but an atomized personality. A true Christian revolution of persons will first of all reassert personality.

But how well are the orthodox equipped to reassert human personality? For orthodox people themselves have suffered from unfortunate external influences. Certain specific ideological influences, such as those that are presented here—Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, Romanticism, Capitalism—to name some of the principal forces derived from ideas —have affected us in some degree as well as our neighbors. In these forces, and in their direct or indirect influence among the orthodox, some of the main reasons may be found for critical weaknesses in the presentation of the orthodox position to the world.

Each one of these forces implies a divorce of some kind, a further atomization of the human personality. Late Augustinianism implies a divorce of the soul from the body; Jansenism a divorce of the supernatural from the natural; Cartesianism, a divorce of religion from the intellect; Romanticism a divorce of man from his humaneness; Capitalism, with its historical

denouement in Marxism, a divorce of the economic order from justice and charity.

In order to understand the position of orthodoxy today some analysis of these forces is required. It is not the purpose of this paper to assess specifically how or when or where the orthodox have been affected by these forces. Inferences can be made on the basis of one's experience. All that need be done is to explain what the forces are. If a person has been fortunate enough to escape their influence, he still must know what these forces are in the concrete historical setting of our time if he is to make his own contribution to orthodoxy effective.

II.

The Late Augustinian position, which Etienne Gilson is careful to distinguish from authentic Augustinianism, that of St. Augustine himself, was one of theological pessimism and maintained that man's nature was essentially perverted through original sin; that his mind was so darkened and his will so weakened that it was really pointless to speak of man's contribution to his salvation; man could only be saved by grace alone; that man was under slavery to sin, and the state, representing the rod of God, should chastise him for his own good; that the natural world was a snare and a delusion; that man is essentially a Platonic soul unfortunately enmeshed in a material body; that a sense of humility means a realization of one's presumed essential worthlessness.[4] Sixteenth century Lutheranism was an offshoot of this considerably older tradition, which, one has good reason to believe, was at least as widely understood in the Middle Ages as Thomism. The Thomistic position rejected the concept of intrinsic corruption through the Fall, maintaining that the Fall had not affected the essence of human nature; that man had lost certain super-added graces not due to his essential nature through the Fall; that the

[4] Substantially this account is indicated in Gerald Vann, O.P., *On Being Human, St. Thomas Aquinas and Mr. Aldous Huxley* (London, 1933); G. K. Chesterton, *St. Thomas Aquinas* (London, 1933), pp. 228-229; Etienne Gilson, *Christianity and Philosophy* (New York, 1939), pp. 7-8.

treasury of the Redemption was a compensating factor, and in this sense St. Thomas shares St. Augustine's view of original sin as the *Felix Culpa*; that man has free will, rationality, and autonomy; that the state has divine authority but through the people (St. Thomas Aquinas, like St. Thomas More, believes in representative government, with sovereignty residing in the people); that nature—the material, and psychological side of creation—reflects the glory of God and is good; that man is essentially both body and soul; that the resurrection of the body is an essential orthodox doctrine, and that humility consists in a true sense of what one is—ontologically a brother of Christ.

Wherever islands of Late Augustinian influence have survived among the orthodox—and Late Augustinian influence underwent a far-reaching revival in Jansenism—you find a rejection of the natural world, a tendency to be uninterested in the social mission of the Christian Church, a certain spiritual aloofness, an unconscious racism, and an almost undeviating respect for anything at all that suggests order. This last characteristic in particular explains the sympathy that numerous of the orthodox had for Facism.

In orthodox tradition, you must have justice before you can have order. But such of the orthodox as sympathized with Fascism had the Late Augustinian view of the state as a necessary consequence of original sin.[5] Intrinsically corrupt man must be disciplined. Have order first, then you may get justice. The concept of the state as an expression of the natural law appears in St. Thomas who believes that even in the Garden of Eden man would have lived in a state, because a state is natural to men. In Eden we might well have had traffic laws, town-hall meetings, judicial procedures. Of course, we might have observed them better, but no better than we should now if we freely accepted the channels of grace. Ortho-

[5] St. Thomas Aquinas rejected the pessimistic attitude to the state which culminated in Machiavelli's view of the state as "organized evil." See M. F. X. Millar, S. J., "Don Sturzo's Study of Church and State," *Thought* (December, 1940); Wilfrid Parsons, S. J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty," *Thought*, (September, 1941).

dox doctrine is one of the theological optimism—it, first of all, really believes that man matters; that Christ loves man; that man can reach out to the highest of destinies. You cannot really be orthodox if you do not believe in the function of the intelligence, in liberty of conscience. You cannot really be orthodox if you do not trust people—think of how Christ undiscriminatingly trusts us in the Incarnation. You cannot render God *justice*—which is *true* piety—if you regard yourself, His creation, as worthless. One cannot praise God, the Creator, by belittling the Creation. In brief, one cannot be a Late Augustinian and effectively present orthodoxy. One simply cannot share in the Late Augustinian divorce of the soul from the body, the intelligence from being, essence from existence. The orthodox thinker in his optimism is, in fact, alone today. He is the only person left, in our age of gimmicks and gadgets, of Atom Bombs and H Bombs, *intellectually committed to hope in and for man.*

III.

Another impediment to the ideological effectiveness of orthodoxy is Jansenism. Late Augustinianism, in its Protestant development, became extremist Lutheranism and Calvinism. Insofar as it remained within the Roman Catholic body, it eventually led to Jansenism,—to speak loosely—a Catholic Calvinism.

Under Jansenism, the Church is no longer regarded as truly universal, but as consisting essentially of an elite group with outer circles of marginal probationers. Man is regarded as essentially spiritual, and his material and psychological realities are ignored. Jansenism, like Late Augustinianism, has a paralyzing effect because it is separatist rather than embracive. Like the Late Augustinians the Jansenists could not share what Chesterton called "the great Dominican's exultation in the blaze of being, or the glory of God in all his creatures." Chesterton also pointed out the danger of theological "Platonic Pride" in the possession of intangible and untranslatable

truths within, as if no part of wisdom had root anywhere in the real world.

Rigor and asceticism have to be viewed with reserve if they lead, as in Late Augustianism and Jansenism, to the denial of the rightful meaning and value of the natural order. According to Chesterton a Christian should not even desire death,—although he should not reject it, when it comes. All things have a share of being; strictly speaking there is no vanity of vanities.

Vanity of Vanities may not be a truly Christian cry but a primal sloth masquerading in a spiritual guise difficult to detect. Far different is the truly orthodox love of being. These lines quoted from Chesterton oppose to this pessimism the Christian insistence on all values, not forgetting their hierarchy, their subordination:

> There is one sin: to call the green leaf gray,
> Whereat the sun in heaven shuddereth,
> There is one blasphemy: for death to pray,
> For God alone knoweth the praise of death.
> There is one creed: 'neath no world-terror's wing
> Do apples forget to grow on apple-trees,
> There is one thing is needful—everything—
> The rest is vanity of vanities.[6]

"There is one thing needful—everything" is a pretty inclusive statement. Orthodoxy is inclusive in this way, and it cannot share in the divorce of the natural world from the supernatural world, that ultra-sensory dimension perceivable by a Hamlet and a Kafka as well as a St. Thomas, a divorce repeated in different ways in Cartesianism and Romanticism.

IV.

The philosophy of Descartes, because it affected orthodoxy in many collateral ways, as well as lineal, may well have been the most effective force in emasculating orthodoxy.[7]

[6] G. K. Chesterton, "Ecclesiastes," *Collected Poems* (New York, 1932), p. 310.

[7] In estimating the social force of an idea it must be observed that the idea continues to be effective long after it has been abandoned or rejected by responsible authority. Cartesianism was condemned by the Church, but its habits of thought

Briefly the influence of Cartesianism was in the direction of the separation of religion from what Dawson has called the "active intelligence, the very essence of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty." Descartes believed that all the knowledge that was available to us was in the form of innate ideas. All our knowledge was in the form of these ideas —all we had to do to know them was to make an act of the will. But unfortunately we had no innate idea for Revelation. Revelation, therefore, we could never really know, but only accept it on authority. Religion for Descartes is, therefore, something we should accept but not think about. It is merely a series of steps from divorcing religion from the intelligence to divorcing it from life. Some religiously-minded persons still regard what we call theological mystery as something that we should not explore with our intellects, something that really should not excite us, but rather as an advanced lesson for which we shall be better prepared in the next life, and which we should ignore now. The same type of thinker separates this life from the next, without realizing the organic relationship between the two, and that this life, in one sense, is our next life.

The eighteenth century witnessed theologians actually forced to defend the need for Revelation. To the optimistic eighteenth century philosophers "nature" was a complete demonstration of the existence and goodness of God. Unlike Tennyson, they had not forseen the possibility of a "nature" red in tooth and claw. If everything can be known by innate ideas or by reason, why was a historical Revelation of an otherness ever necessary? Just as in Descartes the leap from the world of innate ideas to that of the world outside of man demands the intervention of God, so that the external world is itself Revelation, so, similarly in Locke, reason is so extended in meaning

could not altogether be escaped. For a modern example, we might note how the Church has condemned Anti-Semitism and the principles of Capitalism in so far as the latter have "jelled." But in broad social perspective not all Catholics are free either from Anti-Semitism or Capitalism. Cartesianism, as part of the secular culture affects the orthodox in so far as they accede to contemporary *mores*.

that there is no otherness radically different from the " nature " before us. This cozy adjustment between man and environment (Descartes, Locke) has, of recent years, been acutely questioned by science itself (the science divorced from the hierarchy of knowledge that Descartes so strongly, if indirectly, encouraged).[8] The optimistic view with which the Deists and the rationalists viewed " nature," the complacency with which science was exalted and historical Revelation expunged, have now reached their denouement. In the words of a contemporary philosopher, a segment of modern science has tended strongly to the concept of a meaningless universe:

> Many scientists take the view that the world is just what it is, and that is the end of all inquiry. There is no reason for its being what it is. Everything might have been quite different, and there would have been no reason for that either.[9]

The ironic effects of the collateral and lineal influence of Cartesianism, and its ultimate offshoot, scientific positivism, upon orthodoxy is to be found in regarding religion as primarily an emotional or devotional expression, rather than an intellectual one. Cartesianism is so much a part of our secular culture, that its influence is particularly strong upon us. The intellect in Cartesian rationalism is intended for things of this world, for " nature " and the other semantic devices that have been substituted for this ambiguous word. Cartesianism naturally allies itself with Late Augustinian and Jansenistic influences in rejecting the intelligence in the service of God. In all three systems, Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, man is an angel of a sort, but he is not an orthodox Christian. A Christian is not a pure spirit who never thinks. A Christian is not, and never will be, a pure spirit, but he should never cease thinking, especially in regard to the Church. Emotions

[8] See in this connection Jacques Maritain, *The Dream of Descartes* (New York, 1944).

[9] Dr. W. T. Stace, " Man Against Darkness," *The Atlantic Monthly* (September, 1948). An extension of these remarks about the analysis that Dr. Stace provides is to be found in my article, " Social Impact of Current Tensions," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (July, 1950).

are essentially part of us, but emotion and emotional power are only truly set in motion by the intelligence. Emotion unfounded in intelligence is one of the most dreadful of calamities —sentimentality. Under Cartesian influence, sentimentality has been delegated to religion; intelligence to science.

Christopher Dawson in *Religion and Culture* has indicated this divorce in these words: "We have a secularized scientific culture which is a body without a soul; while on the other hand religion maintains its separate existence as a soul without a body."

V.

Space prevents any but brief mention of Romanticism, the influence of which upon orthodoxy is so widespread and concealed that it really requires a complete treatment of its own. But I would stress one main point here—the Romantic fatuity of "idealizing" man—frequently again the effort to turn him into a pure spirit, ignoring his psychological and material realities. Romanticism implicitly and explicitly denies the Incarnation. With a deep interior, frequently unconscious, pessimism in regard to man's nature, it attempts to exalt him in terms of the non-human. Setting impossible goals for men, Romanticism not only does not appreciate, but rejects, their ontological reality.

The Romantics stressed the idea of infinite extension. Man should grow into another being—whether angel or devil does not seem at times too important. "Yet are thou still but Faustus and a man" said the hero of Marlowe's play. To be merely a man, to be merely human, seems to the Romantics to be a sign of mediocrity. Apparently exalted, man is actually degraded, because the reality of his being (including his limitations) is denied. Be endlessly something else, be distinct, be absolute, but beware of being human and, therefore, subject to limitations. The Romantic view is in this sense the reverse of that of the Humanist, classical and Christian, who believes in interior control and harmony and in finding God in the contemplation of the spirit within one, and who likewise avoids

extravagant ambition and the desire for expansion for the same reasons. It is especially a viewpoint opposed to that of the Christian Humanist who sees in the Incarnation the central fact of Christian life. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us." To be properly human in the Christlike sense is man's highest honor. To the classical humanist, on the other hand, nothing could seem more absurd than man, whose life is but for a day, in his exalted *hubris* devising a gadget to kill all men. He can infinitely destroy, but remains subject to human limitations himself.

VI.

The rejection of the human is characteristic alike of Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, and Romanticism. It may be partly due to such influences, filtered through various and contradictory channels, that we do not implement as well as we can the tremendous social implications of "the *Word* was made flesh and dwelt amongst us." To be human, to serve God with our limitations, to abide in Him is our true goal. Christ is within us—he is not the ever-receding goal of an infinite extension.

Space does not permit me to show the degree to which not so much orthodoxy, but the orthodox, have in varying degrees been affected by these ideologies and in that degree handicapped in the fulfillment of their mission. But it is obvious we are not sufficiently aware at times of the concreteness, of the *existentialism*, if you like, of the *individuation* of the Incarnation. Partly by our own default, such romantic movements as Nazism and Communism, with their special adaptations of the idea of infinite extension, have threatened in our time the very foundations of civilized life. Communism, for example, has a social, communal *mystique* which is a socially effective travesty of the great social sacrament of the Church, the Eucharist. Communism's psychological appeal is essentially religious. But Cartesian influence has tended to make orthodox religion a private devotional affair rather than a manifestation

of the social and intellectual solidarity of the orthodox body. We have much more than the " answer " to Communism in the solidarity of Christ, but we have ourselves first to awaken to its Transcendent Meaning; we have truly to be guardians of the active intelligence.

Nazism and Communism were dynamic and even demonic ideologies with strong mystical appeals, and the alternative lies in our penetration into the meaning of the Incarnate Word. We do not lose ourselves; we do not dissipate our personality in reaching out to infinity; infinity comes to us. The divorce set up by Romanticism between man and that humaneness which Christ made sacred in the Incarnation has to be bridged.

VII.

It remains to speak of another ideology which has had disturbing effects on the orthodox—the ideology of Capitalism. I consider this basically an economic philosophy derived from romantic concepts, and having a close affinity with Marxist Communism in that it gives man meaning in terms of an infinite extension into the world of things. Man becomes what he possesses. His radical difference from the material world is unrecognized. Popular thinking, I know, presents Capitalism and Communism as polarities.[10] But, if you examine history, you will find a time when Protestantism and Catholicism were presented as polarities. In historical retrospect, they do not seem as vastly different as they once did. I would make a historical analogy here. What Calvin did for Lutheranism in reducing it to a system and coherent theory, Karl Marx did for Capitalism.

[10] François Mauriac stated recently in *Figaro* (his remarks were quoted in the N. Y. *Times* for February 21, 1950): " It is not what separates the United States and the Soviet Union that should frighten us but what they have in common. Their ideological oppositions are perhaps less to be feared by us than their agreement regarding the scale of human values. These two technocracies that think themselves antagonists are dragging humanity in the same direction of dehumanization." We have, of course, reason to hope that neither nationalism is to be completely identified with its prevalent ideology.

Unfortunately for us the semantics of Capitalism are very confusing. Belloc views Capitalism as analogous to a cosmic dice game in which the law of numbers decrees that those who start with large reserves shall abound and those with little shall lose even the little they think they have. Uninterfered with by public controls, wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of the few while most of the citizenry are reduced to a dispossessed proletariat. In a time of crisis the easiest and smartest move for the state is to dispossess the wealthy minority, and then the means of production are transferred to the state. That, according to Belloc, is Marxist Communism. It can take place openly and vulgarly as in Russia, where the change-over was more from a feudal economy than a capitalist economy, or it can take place gradually through taxation and death duties as in England. You will then have a dispossessed proletariat dependent on the welfare state. Belloc's view is that Capitalism destroys property and prepares the cultural climate whence Marxist Communism can take over.

The phrase, "Free Enterprise," is abused like the word, "freedom," because of popular Rousseauistic conceptions of freedom. Freedom in regard to property is frequently misstated. The nineteenth century is the age of unrestricted Capitalism, and many views are fostered in that culture that are not compatible with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy takes a specifically optimistic, though not a sentimental view of man's nature. In view of man's personality, man should be free to manipulate matter, thereby to hold property so that he may *serve the community the better*.[11] Man, though capable of losing his soul, is made to God's image, and in view of his high dignity, is the lord of nature. But his right to ownership is strictly related to the public good. The orthodox concept of

[11] See Eric Gill, "Property and Catholic Morals," *The American Review* (November, 1936). Gerald Vann says in *Awake in Heaven* (New York, 1948), pp. 119-120: "The Church upholds the right to ownership, yes; but not as the term is nowadays understood. No one is absolute owner of anything except God. He may not use his property against the common good; he may not waste it; he may not use it to injure his neighbor; he must use it to help his neighbor when he is in need . . ."

property rejects the thesis that property rights are absolute and should not be interfered with by positive law, an offshoot of the Romantic concept of freedom divorced from law.

A key word in national life is " freedom," and it is a word badly in need of redefinition. The frequent sentimentality and intellectual shortcomings in the use of this word derive from Romanticism. Rousseau reverses the Late Augustinian concept that man's nature is *essentially* corrupted through original sin; he maintains instead that man living *according to nature* (natural law) is entirely good. Where then does evil come from? Evil is the direct result of State and Church law as contradistinct to *natural* law.

Rousseau, in fact, alters the subsequent meaning of natural law. For the orthodox thinker there is an organic hierarchy of law. First is the law of nature which is assumed to be universal and implanted in the heart of man; secondly is supernatural or revealed law which God has directly made known to us; thirdly is the positive law, or the law of the community having legitimate authority. Positive law is responsible to natural and supernatural law. The community can tax me, order me to render military service. It cannot order me to practice limitation of offspring which I may regard as opposed to both the law of nature and revealed law. For Rousseau there is only one law—natural law. But for this very reason it is not the *same* natural law as that of orthodoxy.

Under Capitalism " economic " law—an invention of the nineteenth century—is identified with Rousseau's " natural " law, and the insistence of Rousseau's " natural law " upon freedom " from " control by State or Church is retained.

But orthodoxy does not opose freedom to law. That opposition is a romantic concept of freedom. For orthodoxy, freedom is the fulfillment of the law. You are free when you positively do what you should. For orthodoxy, to quote Milton, " Virtue alone is free."

Individualism, rugged or otherwise, cannot be reconciled with the social and mystical dimensions of orthodoxy. " Individualism " like the phrase " free enterprise " infiltrates our thinking

and causes intellectual havoc. It can be generally more accurately replaced by " anarchism " or " anti-social behavior." It certainly does not mean the uniqueness of human personality. Orthodoxy recognizes the authority of the state, and enjoins its duty of looking after the public welfare. On the other hand, orthodoxy is opposed to socialism, the modern absolutist theory that all rights are vested in the state. It believes that men have rights anterior to those of the state. In the essential sense, however, that orthodoxy is dualistic, recognizing higher laws than economic law identified with Rousseau's natural law, it must part from the Capitalist and Communist ideologies in their emphasis on monistic, all-embracive, economic law. Orthodoxy cannot share in the divorce of economic law from justice and charity. It cannot share in Capitalism's rejection of positive law; it cannot share in Communism's identification of the state with natural-economic law.

Marxist Communism has identified Rousseauistic " natural " law with the state, a curious paradox, but, according to Marxist theory, this identification is merely transitory. The main Marxist thesis is that world history is following a definite pattern of evolution toward a classless and nationless society. This process of evolution should be aided by human agency, though the evolution itself is regarded as basically predetermined. Actually man is not regarded as having any personal immortality, he is basically a portion of cosmic matter directed by the forward sweep of evolution with which, of course, " economic " law derived from " natural " law is identified. The dehumanization of man is thus made complete. Ultimately the state withers away; all men will be naturally good when the classless society, the perfect Rousseauistic environment, has been achieved.

But if this is ever to occur, we can not forget that Capitalism, with its own adaptation of Rousseauistic principles, prepares the way. Here again we have another important divorce to bridge, that between economic law and true natural law, the law of justice, and the law of charity.

VIII.

What are the powerful resources of orthodoxy that we can effectively use after we have purified ourselves from any overt influences of Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, Romanticism, and Capitalism?

We have postulated that orthodoxy is the guardian of the active intelligence. Now we are repeatedly told that the great enemy of orthodoxy today is Marxist Communism. And this statement is, of course, partly true, but I don't think it goes deeply enough. Marxist Communism is a surface disease of which the hidden causes are much deeper. It is primarily these hidden causes with which orthodoxy must deal. The basic modern problem arises from the flight of the intelligence from reality. Secular society today is a master of instrumentalities while its thought is in chaos. The breakdown of tradition, of semantics, is simply enormous. Evelyn Waugh in *Brideshead Revisited* pointed out the deceptive appearance of modern education. People appear so well-informed, so self-assured on the surface, but a little prodding reveals great gaps in intellection that one would never have suspected were there. It is because of this situation that the old polemical, over-rationalistic process to modern problems is ineffective—it is no longer even intelligent in our modern context of disintegration.

What we need is a new emphasis on the real in a new order of experience. The application of scientific discoveries in recent times is forcing us ever nearer that terrible moment when by external evidence we shall be compelled to awaken from our dreams of self-perpetuating progress, and to acknowledge the supremacy and primacy of the supernatural, without denying material and psychological realities, or else forfeit the right of being altogether. We shall lose spiritual being and become of less value than the matter, which, in Marxism, we are supposed to express, or, in orthodoxy, supposed to dominate.

The net effect of such forces as I have described—Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, Romanticism, and Capitalism—has been a mental simplification of our approach

to reality. The multiple stratification of reality has been levelled down by a series of intellectual divorces to such an extent, that even the concept of theological mystery has been largely lost. It is such artists as Kafka, for example, who are suddenly and painfully amazed at the modern loss of the sense of the Other, the radically different, the supernatural. Reality remains what it is and it is pure illusion to cut it down to our size—it is simply an act of intellectual anaesthetization. The Copernican revolution had an unexpected effect in that man subsequently tended to regard himself as a self-possessed person in a self-possessed universe, rather than one dependent in many ways on the supernatural in an ever more mysterious universe. Though medieval man may have believed that the earth was the center of the cosmic system, he did not believe that he was the center of the universe. After Copernicus, though, the earth was no longer regarded as central, man himself tended to become the center. Modern dynamicism, activity, business, committee meetings seldom constitute a dynamicism of true movement, which is, in philosophical language, " becoming," but they represent rather a mechanistic substitute, so well contrived that it will not interfere and rob man of his sense of security and self-possession. Modern man frequently has the sad illusion of " being on the move," when he is in fact more stationary, far more unmoved in the true sense than he has probably ever been. This illusion is frequently modern man's only sense of reality. To him things are real, when they do something, which to him means when they move. Activity and locomotion are made equivalents to one another. I am active only when I move; when I do something I am real, at least to myself.

Such is the contemporary view, and this in part explains the misunderstanding and rejection of mysticism. Fortunately, science itself is developing a sense of reverence and even of helplessness which cuts across our secular culture. In *Life* (October 10, 1949), Dr. Oppenheimer, Head of the Advanced Study Institute at Princeton, is quoted as saying that " the problem of doing justice to the implicit, the imponderable and

the unknown is always with us in science, it is with us in the most trivial affairs, and it is one of the great problems of all forms of art." In the same article the tendency to think of infinity in terms of the diminutive is stressed—not only can you infinitely extend, you can also infinitely subdivide. There is apparent scientific corroboration, at least on one level, for Blake's statement about holding infinity in the palm of your hand.

But here again we are up against the Cartesian divorce. "We have a secularized scientific culture which is a body without a soul; while on the other hand religion maintains its separate existence as a spirit without a body." An ironic comment on this divorce was contained in a news report about Dr. Einstein in *The New York Herald Tribune* for December 27, 1949:

> A later verification, this time of the equation $e = mc^2$, came in the form of the atomic bomb.

The equation is undoubtedly just and magnificent, but the atom bomb touches another order of reality altogether.

"Religion maintains its separate existence as a spirit without a body." If that is so, the influences I have described are still too much with us.

Modern irony resides in the flight of the intelligence from reality. We have objective evil, as in the Nazi concentration camps and in our destruction of Hiroshima, without a corresponding sense of subjective moral responsibility. The Japanese civilians at Hiroshima are thoroughly dead, but not one single person, as far as I know, has had sufficient sense of personal responsibility to come forward and throw ashes on his head. Actually no one feels to blame. Probably many individuals were privately shocked, but here we run into the problem that the isolated individual today is often cut off from any norm of social expression. He is a spectator, rather than an actor. That is part of the process of dehumanization.[12]

[12] To quote Mauriac again, ". . . man is treated as a means and no longer as an end—this is the indispensable condition of the two cultures that face each

It is a platitude to say that this is an age of crisis. It is a fact that everyone admits, and many of us greet with a very curious apathy. The secret of the apathy is deep and concealed. Contemporary society has been so dehumanized and impersonalized, that horror itself is impersonal. It is about as tangible as Los Alamos or the Metropolitan Telephone Company. The concentration camp and Hiroshima, if they occurred, surely never touched us. We had no part in them. Our innocent citizen, like the character in Marlowe's play, committed fornication but " that was in another country." It doesn't count, any more than being accidentally in a parade or pageant counts.

Orthodoxy, to meet its historical opportunity, must be aware of such divorces as I have described, not merely on the theoretical level but on the individual and social level of personal intellectual communication and private action. It must understand what the true nature of evil is, avoiding the Late Augustinian and Jansenist tendencies toward the Manichean concept that evil is a positive force, external to ourselves. Evil as we know is not something positive that you can locate in an idea, a people, a geographical area, and by obliterating that idea, people, or geographical area, remove evil. War theoretically may be fought in self-defense, but it should not be mistaken for a missionary activity. Evil is something we all share in—that is why the only acceptable sacrifice is Christ himself. He is the only one without sin. Out of a sense of self-preservation therefore, we should be discreet in talking about removing evil through force. It can't be done. Nevertheless, orthodoxy, even in a confused condition, is the only great intellectual tradition that still maintains that there is hope for man. But hope has meaning, like all the virtues, when allied to reality. Hope, like all the virtues, is related to the active intelligence.

The virtue of Hope, because it is allied to the real world and to the intelligence that perceives the real world, will prevent us from repeating the old mistakes of divorcing the spirit from

other." He is speaking of Capitalism (U. S. A.) and Marxist Communism (U.S.S.R.).

the body, the transcendent from the individuated, as occurred in Late Augustianism, Janesenism, Cartesianism, and Romanticism. Many men today are unawakened to their own universe. They have eyes but have not been allowed to use them. They have not had the leisure, the basic minimum of economic justice, to permit them to think, to employ that " active intelligence " which is the very essence of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty. If we are blinded by pessimism ourselves, we cannot help in their educative process.

Ultimately, orthodoxy as practiced in the individual person, not merely as a complex of ideas, has the resources of the Christ immanent in history, in the sacramental universe. In this sense, Christianity does not belong to religion (Descartes); Christianity belongs to *life*. Its supernatural dimension is especially pregnant to us at a time when man is obliged to meet a demonic choice, above and beyond the plane of Cartesian rationalism or Romantic irrationalism, either to reach out to being or to annihilate himself.

WILLIAM J. GRACE

44 Morningside Drive,
New York, N. Y.

BOOK REVIEWS

Walls Are Crumbling. By the Rev. John M. Oesterreicher. New York: Devin-Adair, 1952.

This book, sub-titled "Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ," is a study of the religious and philosophical thought—thought in the context of their lives—of Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Paul Landsberg, Max Picard and Edith Stein. It is a profoundly rich book on several different levels.

As spiritual biography, it traces the call of seven gifted souls to Christ. Sometimes there is unhesitating submission to that call, as in Edith Stein; sometimes hesitancy despite conviction, as in Bergson; sometimes an unclear response, as in Husserl; sometimes final infidelity, so far as man can judge, as in Scheler. On this level of spiritual biography the book is a history in miniature of the diverse responses to God open to man.

Walls Are Crumbling is a book of major importance in the history of philosophy. The writings of each of these seven philosophers are separately analyzed and evaluated, for when philosophical positions are proposed, judgment by the competent becomes a duty. The analysis is noteworthy for its completeness, fidelity, detail, penetration. The evaluation is carried on in a spirit of sympathy, balance, and objectivity. Here writes a man with genuine mastery of the philosophers in question. But Father Oesterreicher has such a mastery of Christian theology and philosophy as a whole that while he generously rejoices in the genius of those he presents, he is also ever open to their limitations; the justice of his estimates seems itself a kind of genius. There is no study in English of these philosophers which approaches the flawlessness of this one.

This study of "Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ" is a book of living apologetics: *living*, because it is a study of the claims of Christ and His Church on the person. To each reader, believer or unbeliever, it is an invitation to see the Church anew through the eyes of seven pilgrims from Jerusalem to Rome. *Walls Are Crumbling* is beyond any dispute between conflicting styles of apologetics. Here is the Church, today as she has ever been, exacting in anticipation, loving in embrace, like a chaste woman whose joys are withheld until the sacramental union.

Without one word of preaching the book is a profound, sustained sermon, at least indirectly. It is impossible to see the demands of Christ on these seven late contemporaries and their partial or full response without becoming aware that Christ makes the same demand of total submission to His Love of every man. I have seen the response of these men: what is

my own. No one, Catholic or non-Catholic, will be able to avoid that insistent question, which not the author but the reader asks.

Such are some of the levels of the book as a whole. But each chapter has its own fascination: more accurately, each has several fascinations: intellectual content, biographical data, spiritual odyssey with eternity known to be in the balance. There is the sadness of seeing Bergson die without baptism because of his loyalty, in itself noble, to his fellow-Jews whom he did not wish to appear to desert in their persecution. There is a hierarchy of loyalties, and Bergson did not choose the highest. There is the strange but too easily understood unbalance of Husserl in whom seriousness and frivolity, profundity and banality, co-exist without intra-penetration, so that his response to Christ is ambiguous to the end. There is Reinach consumed with desire for communion with Christ and so eager for baptism that he embraces it at the hands of a minister but without precluding the possibility of eventual Catholicism. There is the horror of seeing Scheler, with his own presentiment of final abandonment, twice converted, twice apostate; and the futility of his final renunciation of the Church, refuted in advance by his own writings. There is Landsberg suffering from the twin weaknesses of the intellectual: weakness of will and inordinate love of " experience." But he had the heroic courage in days of desolation to see and to embrace the one solid reason against suicide: that we must not say " no " to the sufferings sent by a suffering Christ. There is the beauty of Max Picard's analysis of marriage. There is the closing glory of Edith Stein whose answer to God was as simple and as final as Mary's " Be it done unto me according to Thy word."

Each chapter is patterned in the same way. Firstly, an introduction which, by significant detail, characterizes the man and his (or her) thought. Then, biographical data. Thirdly, a lengthy exposition of the religio-philosophical thought leading to the awakening to Christ. Lastly, each one's final relation to the Church.

The style is majestic as befits the subject. Biographical details are given with supreme good taste. But what, above other attributes, characterizes the author's work is balance and interiority. By balance I mean that sureness, that objectivity which appreciates, which sympathizes, but which never excuses error. The author is never satisfied with the *almost* true, or the *equivalently* true; he is exacting, but impersonally so, as a self-effacing spokesman for reality. He is the master-student who does not evade the responsibility of judging.

By interiority I mean that each of these seven studies seems to be written from within the person studied. The thought and the religious situation of each is so presented that author and even reader seem transported into the soul of the man being studied. The author has so effaced himself in revealing the mind and heart of others that it is as if seven Augustines had each written their several *Confessions*.

In his *Preface* Father Oesterreicher speaks of the contribution to Christian thought of these men who discovered Christ. Now Christian thought is, in its sources, various and complex: most perfectly contained in the good news of Christ, yet it stems too from Israel's prophets and Greece's philosophers, from the Fathers, Eastern and Western, from the mediaeval schoolmen. Not only is it possible to speak meaningfully of classical Christian thought; one can go further and judge the work of one's contemporaries in its light. One can say of Maritain, for example, that he *is* in the line of Christian thought and has advanced it. One can say of Sartre that he is a deviation from, and in part a corrupter of, classical Christian thought. Our standard for such judgments is always complex and frequently not fully explicated in our own mind, but always it includes at least these two notes: that the human person has a supra-cosmic dignity; and that the dignity is not self-enclosed but constituted by man's humble relation to God. So understood, one happily seconds the judgment of Father Oesterreicher. Each of these men is in the line of classical Christian thought; each does make a contribution to it.

Of the living tradition to which each of these seven is a contributor St. Thomas Aquinas is the most eminent spokesman. What then is the attitude of this book to Thomism?

Father Oesterreicher is no letter-perfect Thomist who, for example, would scornfully reject Bergson's analysis of time because it does not paraphrase St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. Thomism to him is a fundamental wisdom which, having been absorbed, sets one free to investigate lovingly but responsibly and therefore discriminatingly the truths proposed by our contemporaries. Like Edith Stein, Father Oesterreicher is no either-or Thomist: it is not a question of Plato or Aristotle, Augustine or Thomas, Newman or Maritain. He tests thought by the light of Christian wisdom, and principally by the expression of that wisdom in St. Thomas. By virtue of that very commitment to wisdom he takes truth where he finds it, knowing that it must be ultimately consistent with Thomism and may very well enrich it. He has the spirit of St. Thomas: to assimilate and to order truth wherever found.

As spiritual biography, as philosophy, as living apologetics, as an implicit challenge to every soul, this book has the dimensions of greatness. It is dedicated to John Henry Cardinal Newman and has a foreword by Jacques Maritain. It opens with a genius, Bergson, and closes with a saint, Edith Stein. It is worthy of the company it keeps.

James V. Mullaney

Manhattan College,
New York, N. Y.

Preface to Happiness. Vol. II. A Guidebook to the Summa. By E. F. Smith and L. A. Ryan. New York: Benziger, 1950. Pp. 301 with index. $4.00.

Thanks greatly to the verve and the vision of the late Father Walter Farrell, the movement usually called "theology for laymen" has lit up a new fire in American Catholic life. In the wide background from business men to lay professors, from doctors and lawyers to college freshmen, there now glows a whole spectrum of interest in St. Thomas Aquinas not merely as a required seminary subject but as a living theologian with an assuring message for our times.

In the foreword to the first volume that appeared in his *Companion to the Summa*—it stands as Volume II in the completed set—Father Farrell proposed his four works as "guidebooks," related to the *Summa* as a map to a city and designed to inspire a reading and study of the original. Yet by the gifts of his genius, Father Farrell managed to draw much more than a map and write much more than a guidebook. He wrote a layman's edition of the *Summa*. He wrote for the beginners of our day in the spirit in which St. Thomas wrote for the beginners of a thirteenth-century study of theology. Father Farrell left us a work that can be read and understood without consulting St. Thomas. Unlike a guidebook or a map, the *Companion* is a city in itself, modelled with twentieth-century words and images upon the great thirteenth-century capital which was the original.

One of the important extrinsic effects of the *Companion* was and is to arouse interest in the *Summa*, and it is to enlarge and orient this interest that confreres of St. Thomas and of Father Farrell are bringing out a new series, *A Guidebook to the Summa. Preface to Happiness*, Volume II of the whole series but the first to appear in print, is a welcome addition to the instruments for bringing St. Thomas to the laity. The present volume fully qualifies as a guidebook, a map, a direction-finder. The authors are tooling their series to capture the interest which Father Farrell aroused and to focus it boldly on the pages of St. Thomas. Unlike the *Companion*, the *Guidebook* can hardly be understood without the control of constant references to St. Thomas, and in this respect, the *Guidebook* is a mediator between the *Companion* and the *Summa* itself.

Apart from Father Farrell's *Companion*, *Preface to Happiness* has intrinsic merits that make it a genuine contribution to Catholic learning and Christian culture. The authors are emphatic about their purpose; they want to enkindle in laymen "the habit of thinking theologically," and they insist that such an objective is both desirable and practical. To the arguments they propound to defend their aims they could even have added the twentieth-century call of the Holy See for "the participation of the laity in the work of the hierarchy." To answer this call, the laity needs a proper theological training.

The authors of the *Preface* wisely remark that a habit has parts, that the right order of the parts is essential to the habit, and that the best plan for the habit of theology is charted out in the *Summa*. The nine chapters of the present volume, therefore, parallel the *Prima Secundae*, like Volume II of the *Companion*. The authors have written a useful nine-page general introduction on the nature of theology, the place and order of moral theology, and the distinctive character of Thomist moral science.

Through their more than three hundred pages of writing, the authors have never forgotten that their's is a guidebook, and the result is a careful map to take discerning readers to a destiny in the *Summa* and even to points beyond. Each chapter opens with a pointed introduction to place the given topic in perspective and to weigh its doctrinal and historical importance. Then follows in each chapter a history of the question being treated. Not concerned to drag out dead doctrines with a view to understanding only the predecessors of St. Thomas, the authors push the history of each question squarely up to the living present. Thus, the initial chapter on man's ultimate end opens with the well-known Socratic view on the subject, scans across antiquity and the middle ages, through Eastern philosophy and theology, down the array of modern thinkers, and ends with men like Mussolini and Rosenberg. Not merely the layman but the professional theologian and philosopher will be grateful for these historical summaries. The dates of all the men cited are included in the text.

Following the historical sections of each chapter comes a probing of doctrinal backgrounds for the question in each chapter. This includes references to Sacred Scripture and to the pronouncements of the Teaching Church together with an outline of the philosophical equipment needed in the theological discussion. Then the book guides the reader into St. Thomas. Here the general question of each chapter is broken down into a set of problems, and the problems in turn are split up into special questions. Under each special question, the authors give first the principles of solution which are Sacred Scripture, tradition, the doctrine of the Church, and the theological reason. The compiling of the first three principles involved in each question will be of considerable use to both professional and lay theologian and to both teacher and student. The fourth of the principles escorts the reader into the downtown sections of the *Summa*. In cases where any of the first three principles are missing historically, they are naturally not mentioned.

The fourth principle, the theological reason, tested the ingenuity of the authors even as the other three taxed their scholarship. It is in reference to this fourth principle that *Preface to Happiness*, as a guidebook, must stand or fall. To the credit of the two authors, the book stands with sureness of foot and balance of head. Unless the *Prima Secundae* is already known or being studied in parallel with this book, the reader will not be

able to follow the reasoning in *Preface to Happiness*. He will find, it is true, that the principles in each question are laid out for him in bold type, but such principles, as enunciated and even expounded in the *Guidebook*, remain pedagogical summaries to help the reader find his way through St. Thomas because he has been told the goal to which that way leads. As a result, the discussion of the theological reason in each question is in the manner of hints and helps that will not be understood unless the *Guidebook* is in one hand so that the *Summa* may be open in the other. The *Guidebook* is no more than a skeleton; the *Summa* is and was intended to be the flesh. All students of theology for laymen will be grateful for this combination, and the serious student, in addition to being thankful, will derive a good measure of profit from a teaching book that could make the *Summa* armchair reading.

Each subject within the various chapters is followed by questions, and each chapter as a whole is followed by a section on discussion topics and a studied bibliography containing chapter and page references for books cited. The questions and discussion topics are not of the type to permit the reader the ease of giving back, parrot-like, the material in either the *Guidebook* or the *Summa*. The questions are, in many cases, timely and searching thrusts into contemporary problems, and all of them can test the reader's " habit of thinking theologically." *Preface to Happiness* remains through and through a teaching book, a book for the professional teacher as well as for those who can be " self-taught." As final teaching and learning aids, there is a glossary, textual citation of the principles derived from tradition and from the doctrine of the Church, and a copious index of both name and subjects. If there is any pedagogical aid that the authors have omitted, this reviewer cannot discover it.

This is a book about a book. Unlike the ordinary work in theology or philosophy, it is not intended as a *terminus ad quem*, but more as a *terminus a quo*. It bridges across an important no man's land between manuals and the original St. Thomas and between the professional and lay theologian. The general excellence of this book should recommend it to all who are interested in the cause of theology, priests, teachers, students, adult discussion groups, in short all educated Catholics.

The authors of the *Guidebook* series have recorded a triumph in the matter and form they unite in their present work. There is one typographical error that should be noted by those who already own or will acquire this book possibly for teaching purposes; in footnote 1 on page 16, " *Companion to the Summa* " in line four should read " *Summa Theologica*." Since this footnote sets up the referencing apparatus for the footnotes, a noting of this error may prove helpful to many readers.

VINCENT EDWARD SMITH

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. By Edward J. Carnell. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951. Pp. 250 with index. $3.50.

The American school of neo-orthodox theology has appropriated the term *realism* for its doctrines. This school has been strongly influenced by modern liberalism as well as by the dialectical theology of Karl Barth on the Continent of Europe. Reinhold Niebuhr is at present its most influential representative. Mr. Carnell's book includes a clear presentation of the salient features of Niebuhr's thought and, at the same time, a very acute appraisal of it from the standpoint of early Reformation theology.

The author devotes considerable attention to the anthropological and philosophical views which underlie Niebuhr's Ethics and Theology. Idealism and naturalism are sharply opposed to one another as impossible extremes, and intermediate positions, like that of Aristotle, are almost completely neglected. The anthropology which emerges from this dialectical discussion is strongly tinged with voluntarism. The will is "at the very center of human personality," and theoretical reason is not clearly distinguished from practical reason. (*Human Nature*, pp. 16 and 260) Reason is viewed as a manifestation of freedom, the most fundamental and distinctively human trait. This freedom is almost unlimited and separates man from nature. The theory of natural law is rejected. "It raises ideology to a higher degree of pretension, and is another of the many illustrations in history of the force of sin in the claim of sinlessness." (*Human Destiny*, p. 253) Nevertheless, Niebuhr does admit "certain permanent norms such as monogamy which . . . are maintained not purely by Scriptural authority but by the cumulative experience of the race." (*Human Nature*, pp. 282-3) He has a profound respect for "science," and often uses the supposed results of "science" to justify his sceptical doctrines. But for philosophy itself, especially metaphysics, he has no hope at all. This anti-philosophical philosophy runs through all of Niebuhr's work, and plays a crucial role in the development of his theological dialectic.

Its key concepts are derived from an interpretation of the moral or "existential" experience of men, and the chasm which yawns between the *ought* and the *is*. According to Niebuhr, this chasm is sin, something for which we are responsible, and yet is at the same time inevitable. (*Human Nature*, 250 ff.) It is caused by the persistent refusal of men to remain within their appointed limits. This may happen in two ways. On the one hand, men may hold to their unlimited freedom as an absolute, which leads to anarchy. On the other, they may identify the norm with some imperfect *status quo*, which leads to tyranny. "These twin evils . . . represent the Scylla and Charybdis between which the frail bark of social justice must sail. . . ." (*Human Destiny*, p. 258) The only sound escape from this dilemma of moral experience lies in the recognition of a

transcendent, religious norm *beyond* history but sufficiently *in* history to clarify human possibilities and limitations. This dialectical tension between time and eternity is the heart of Biblical Christianity.

According to Niebuhr, the interpretation of Biblical revelation is confronted by two dialectical extremes, liberalism which remains oblivious to the transcendent references and implications, and orthodoxy which takes them literally and reduces them to bad science and worse metaphysics. The truth is accessible only to an intermediate, dialectical position which takes Biblical concepts as symbols for what transcends all rational insight, and Biblical doctrines as myths. The truth is revealed, though in a confused and uncertain manner, in the inner, moral experience of men. The Bible must be interpreted in the light of this experience rather than *vice versa*. Thus the Jesus of history was a finite and imperfect creature. "It is not possible for any person to be historical and unconditioned at the same time." (*Human Destiny*, pp. 60-1) Christ is an abstract symbol. "Christ is the symbol both of what man ought to be and of what God is beyond man." (*Beyond Tragedy*, p. 23) Any attempt to work out a coherent interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation is condemned as a metaphysical corruption of the purity of faith. "The logical nonsense is not as serious a defect as the fact that the statement tends to reduce Christian faith to metaphysical truths which need not be apprehended inwardly by faith." (*Human Destiny*, p. 61)

Such are the salient features of Niebuhr's dialectical theology. Mr. Carnell is a disciplined philosopher, and his comments are both pertinent and penetrating. Four basic criticisms emerge from this discussion. They may be briefly summarized as follows.

First, philosophical issues are inescapable. To scorn them or to oscillate between contradictory doctrines in a "dialectical" manner is not to solve them. Mr. Carnell subjects this antirationalism to a careful scrutiny throughout the book. His comments on the self-contradictory consequences of Niebuhr's moral relativism (pp. 130 ff. and p. 242) are especially worthy of attention. This relativism is no doubt in part responsible for Niebuhr's defence of the balance of power (cf. pp. 235 ff.) and his generally cynical and opportunistic attitude towards international order. (pp. 238 ff.)

Secondly, Mr. Carnell calls attention to the many philosophical and theological difficulties attaching to Niebuhr's subjectivist or existential epistemology of "inner experience" and "feeling." (cf. especially pp. 195 ff.) This has its roots in the neglect of intentionality, and the resulting subjectivism which is still so influential in contemporary philosophy. But if rational insight is discarded as untrustworthy and as a manifestation of intellectual pride, it is hard to see how Niebuhr's elevation of "feeling" as an inerrant guide can be consistently exempted from the same charges. Not only does this faculty play the most decisive role in deciding philo-

sophical issues but in deciding theological issues as well. Even the Bible must be interpreted in the light of the moral experience of men. This reduction of revelation would seem to be peculiarly open to the charge of idolizing a mode of human action, which Niebuhr vehemently urges against rationalism of every kind. Are we then to infer that it is only the *rational* faculties of men that are subject to criticism? (cf. pp. 173, 195-6)

Thirdly, Mr. Carnell acutely calls our attention to the many doctrines and attitudes which Niebuhr shares with that liberalism or modernism to which he is supposedly most bitterly opposed. He scorns philosophy and metaphysics. He maintains that the Bible must be interpreted in the light of an experience available to all men, though in his case this is an inner, moral experience. He agrees with the modernist that "science" has now undermined the orthodox interpretation of the Bible. As Mr. Carnell remarks: "It never occurs to Niebuhr that this obsequious devotion to science may itself be part of an unwarranted liberal optimism which has trailed along in our bourgeois culture." (p. 174) His constant employment of the terms *symbol* and *myth* in connection with religious dogma casts a mist of obscurity over the whole dialectical theology. This may be an advantage in arguing with contemporary modernists and atheists, but it does not lead to precision and clarity.

Finally, Mr. Carnell carefully examines Niebuhr's vague and seemingly conflicting statements about the Incarnation. He clearly shows several crucial confusions involved in this symbolic approach, and even raises the question as to whether Niebuhr's assumed belief in the Incarnation can be reconciled with his existential and symbolic premisses. (pp. 144-5, and 154-6) On the one hand we are presented with a "a relative historic Jesus," and on the other with the myth of "an absolute transcendent Christ." Since metaphysics and Christology are rejected as sterile rationalism, we are never given any light as to how the two are to be brought together. Time and eternity are radically opposed. They are somehow in dialectical tension. But no light is shed on how this can be even possible. We are left not with a mystery, but rather with a contradiction. It is no wonder that Carnell concludes that "Niebuhr's 'mythical' interpretation of the Christian dogmatic tradition forces him to do away with the Incarnation." (145)

This book is written by a disciplined mind. Its thought is sharp and clear. It offers the reader an adequate summary, and a very cogent criticism of an influential, contemporary school of theology. A wide audience could profit from its reading.

JOHN WILD

Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.

Praelectiones Iuris Matrimonii. By Th. M. Vlaming. (4th edition by L. Bender, O.P.) Bussum: Paulus Brand, 1950. Pp. 594 with index. $6.85.

The fourth edition of the respected work on Matrimony by Vlaming brings to the moral theologian and the canonist a complete and recent study in this very important field. The third edition was first published in 1919, shortly after the promulgation of the Code and was widely used. Vlaming himself died in 1935.

Obviously, much legislation, many subsequent decisions and interpretations, as well as commentaries, have appeared in the meantime. Fr. Bender set about to preserve the contribution of his fellow Hollander and to incorporate into the work the various corrections and additions which the intervening years made necessary and useful. While preserving the original structure and division into twelve parts, Fr. Bender has improved many chapters and articles by means of change in form or by an entirely new development. Intended primarily as an international or general manual, with Roman students in view, this work leaves out particular civil and ecclesiastical legislation, especially the heavy Dutch emphasis of the original author. The new edition has many mechanical features to recommend it over its predecessor. The former two volume work has been brought out in a single but ample volume. The choice of type fonts, paper and general make-up offers a far easier and more pleasing medium for study and reference. The wording of the subtitles in the alphabetical index has been simplified.

Some of the particular contributions of the latest editor can be singled out. In the first place, he has more extensively and systematically developed the chapter on the sacrament of matrimony, as well as devoted a whole chapter of three articles to the ends of marriage, concerning which, since Vlaming's time, there has been some confusion. With succinct clarity Fr. Bender states and explains the intrinsic ends of this institution and the role of voluntary or personal ends (*fines operantis*). More prominence is given to the properties of unity and indissolubility, explaining the difficulties and objections involved in this admittedly intricate question. The divisions of matrimony are fairly wholly original in this edition—especially the notion that the constitutive element of an invalid marriage is the mutual external act which is the manifestation of matrimonial consent.

Fr. Bender (pp. 150-153) supports the opinion that the "cautiones," even if given falsely or insincerely, are true promises and thus do not affect the validity of the dispensation from the impediment of mixed religion. This opinion would appear to be far less tenable in view of the Rota decision in the Albany case. (The Jurist, IX [Jan. 1949], 50-64).

There is a very interesting discussion (pp. 458-462) on the morality of

artificial insemination. Here Fr. Bender disagrees in particular with the opinion favored by Merkelbach.

An entirely new addition is the appendix on Civil Marriage, unusual in its length (pp. 554-563) and original in much of its theological thought and development. It contains "most difficult and intricate questions," among which two are noteworthy here.

The first is the author's insistence upon matrimony as an unique species. Only one specific contract has been instituted by God in nature, which is at the same time a cause and a sign of grace for those men whom it can affect, namely, the baptized. Thus, the bond of marriage, as instituted by God or nature, is one thing. Nature has left the formalities surrounding the assuming of or entrance into this bond, the celebration of this contract, to the legitimate determination of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, each in its own area of competency. These are the prescribed formalities, the accidental solemnities, which do not institute but presuppose matrimony already existing as an institution, and which regulate the valid celebration or inauguration of the contract in view to the common good,—the State for the unbaptized, the Church for all the baptized. He describes civil marriage as matrimony established by nature celebrated in the form prescribed by civil law. By this he insists that civil marriage is not opposed to the natural bond but rather distinguished against the spiritual or supernatural bond. Thus the natural bond remains intact with its inseparable obligations and effects, to which are joined the *purely civil* effects, i. e. those which depend solely on civil law.

Modern legislators intend to touch not only these merely civil effects, e. g. property rights, etc., but also the bond and its natural properties, i. e. *all* its civil effects. From this fact together with the results of his analysis of the natural and sacramental character of matrimony, Fr. Bender investigates the morality of the various civil acts pertaining to marriage: the legislator in establishing a form of marriage or a divorce law, the catholic judge rendering a divorce decree, the spouse seeking civil marriage or divorce, the lawyer's action in a civil divorce case, the witnesses of a civil marriage.

As a second point, attention should be drawn to the teaching exposed here on the Catholic judge. Fr. Bender discusses the vexing question of the lawfulness of granting a decree of civil divorce. He employs the words of the Sovereign Pontiff to the Catholic Jurists of Italy (Nov. 6, 1949) to the effect that such an act of a judge is not intrinsically evil and may be lawful for the gravest reasons. In his search for the theological reasons explicative of the papal teaching on this long-controverted point, Fr. Bender rejects the opinions of Capello and Duynstee and offers his own solution on the basis of the instrumental character of the judge. The Catholic judge intends to exercise his office in conformity with divine norms. These,

however, deny him competence to sever the matrimonial bond with its inseparable natural obligations. Knowing this, and being but the intellectual instrument in this juridical act of applying the law in a particular case, the Catholic judge therefore intends only the purely civil effects of his sentence. This explanation by Fr. Bender of the Pontiff's words justifies the presence of the elements necessary for the application of the principle of the indirect voluntary. Although *de facto* the judicial sentence does create the observance in practice of the total effects desired by the legislator, this is entirely outside the intention of the judge. With similar argumentation Fr. Bender establishes as lawful in certain circumstances the petition of a spouse for a civil divorce.

In his *Prologomena* Vlaming declared his purpose was to collect into one tract all that future priests need to know about marriage, including not only the prescriptions of the law, but also what pertains to the doctrine of the faith, to moral and pastoral theology, and to sacred liturgy. Through the recent labors of Fr. Bender this fourth edition has certainly realized that purpose in our day. Professors of the tract *de Matrimonio* will find this volume of inestimable value in helping in the understanding of the often complex matter treated, and in the preparation of lectures which will be more convincing due to the cogency of the arguments and reasons proposed here. This book can be strongly recommended to all who are in the market for a complete, up-to-date and readable manual in the broad field of matrimony.

NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D.C.

Early Medieval Philosophy. By GEORGE BOSWORTH BURCH. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. Pp. 150 with index. $2.50.

The title of this book could easily lead one to believe that it does much more than "describe the doctrines of five outstanding philosophers" of the early Middle Ages. Professor Burch admits in a very brief preface that ". . . he cannot hope that there will be complete agreement as to which philosophers of the period are the most interesting or significant." We can infer then that the five medieval scholars who, in his opinion, most eminently qualify according to these criteria of significance and interest are the ones of whom he writes. He also tells the reader that his book is based entirely on the sources, most of these being found in Migne's *Patrologia Latina.*

The book is divided into five chapters and a brief conclusion with

bibliography and notes for each chapter. A chapter is devoted to each of the following men: John Scotus Erigena, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Isaac of Stella.

Professor Burch contends that John Scotus Erigena ". . . was not so much the first medieval as the last ancient philosopher . . ." (page 30) Ancient philosophy is distinguished from medieval insofar as the former was a search for truth whereas the latter was not. " Medieval philosophy no longer searched for truth, for it already possessed truth in the dogma of the Church; it was the attempt to understand that truth and explain how it is known." (*Ibid.*) According to Professor Burch, the real medieval philosophy begins in the eleventh century with Anselm of Canterbury.

The center of interest for medieval as well as for modern philosophers is the knowledge problem. For the medieval thinkers, Professor Burch points out, ". . . the truth about the being of nature was given by Christianity, just as for modern philosophers it is given by science." (page 31) The reader should then conclude that about all that remained for medieval thinkers to discuss was how they knew the truth that they already possessed, whether it was able to be known by reason or must be held by faith. The professor tells us that ". . . a controversy over this question heralded the dawn of medieval philosophy in the eleventh century." (*Ibid.*)

Professor Burch's study of John Scotus Erigena is adequately and fairly presented. The professor is at pains to understand the latter's pantheism, and does much to help dispel the cloud that has hung over this ninth century philosopher. That John Scotus confused Gregory of Nazianze with Gregory of Nyssa is the contention of the author who says that this occurred through the writings of the latter Gregory's commentator, Maximus. If true, this is an interesting fact, but it is not substantiated in any way by Professor Burch.

In his chapter on St. Anselm of Canterbury the professor gives due credit to St. Thomas Aquinas for having distinguished between philosophy and theology. It seems that a central problem of medieval speculation could have been more accurately portrayed in terms of various attempts to make this distinction rather than with the veiled assumption that Anselm of Canterbury initiated the epistemological discussion that is so prominent in contemporary philosophy.

After some preliminary remarks about the life of St. Anselm, Professor Burch presents brief analyses of the *Monologion*, the *Proslogion* and the *Cur Deus Homo*. The " ontological argument " for the existence of God is objectively explained in detail, and the criticism of St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and Hegel is noted.

The chapter on Peter Abelard, who is one of the most interesting and brilliant medieval thinkers, is relatively lengthy. This chapter begins with a discussion of the problem of universals, which is briefly traced back to

Porphyry and his presentation of the problem. The extreme realism of William of Champeaux is dutifully explained as well as his "indifference theory." Abelard's pre-eminence as a dialectician is noted in brief accounts of his stormy career as a student and a teacher. Abelard's own answer to the problem of universals, as well as his criticism of other theories, seems to be accurately presented.

A good half of this chapter is devoted to Abelard's theology, under which heading are discussed Abelard's life, his views on faith and understanding, the Trinity and ethics. In the actual discussion of Abelard's theological views the reader can gain a fairly clear idea of Abelard's rationalism and of his excessive devotion to logic. The chapter is concluded with a comparison of Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux which may leave some readers with the impression that the latter's unremitting hostility toward the former was entirely unjustified.

Evidently, Professor Burch has made a special study of St. Bernard of Clairvaux who is cast in the role of a zealous reformer, a talented scholar and a brilliant orator. In many ways, Bernard is a foil for Abelard representing the monastic as against the scholastic spirit. The Professor briefly discusses the monastic spirit of this period and speaks of Bernard's mysticism which he describes in terms of eleven steps which the soul uses in ascending to perfection.

The final chapter on Isaac of Stella indicated some rather original research on the part of Professor Burch. Isaac seems to have been neglected by some other historians, and his name is not even listed in such relatively complete histories as those of Frederick Copleston and William Turner. If Isaac of Stella effected a "remarkable synthesis of scholasticism and monasticism," as Professor Burch tells us, this would seem to be a rather serious omission. The published works of Isaac are to be found in Migne's *Latin Patrology*, and these consist of fifty-four sermons and two essays on *The Soul* and on *The Office of the Mass*. Professor Burch presents a brief analysis of Isaac's philosophy under the headings of Ontology, Cosmology and Psychology. This analysis reveals a rather devout thinker who seems to have an unusually good understanding of the relationship between faith and reason and of the philosophy of the period. Without doubt, many readers will want to make a personal examination of Isaac of Stella's sermons and measure his importance accordingly.

In the opinion of this reviewer the book might have been more objectively written as five separate essays on early medieval thinking. Where Professor Burch fulfills his original intention of basing his work "entirely on the sources," the reader cannot but pay tribute to his scholarly research. However, when he strives for continuity and to exemplify the unity of philosophical experience he is guilty of oversimplification and betrays some prejudice or at least compromises the truth in favor of dramatic detail. One

instance of oversimplification has already been noted in his pivotal assertion that ". . . medieval philosophy no longer searched for truth . . ." There are several instances of prejudice. Abelard is portrayed almost too sympathetically; it is quite possible that he was egoistic and difficult to get along with, that he had a quarrelsome nature and was unsparing of his own adversaries. It is difficult to believe that Abelard's difficulties with the monks of St. Gildas and St. Denis were all caused because these monks were evil and he was good.

The reader will find that Professor Burch's short volume on early medieval philosophy makes interesting reading. One would find it difficult to choose other men in the early medieval period whose lives were more interesting. However, this volume might well give beginners a wrong impression of medieval philosophy.

R. E. Porreco

Catholic University,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Nature of Law. By Thomas E. Davitt S.J. St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1951. Pp. 274 with index. $4.00.

"This book is a historical introduction to a problem." Thus, in the opening sentence of the introduction, does the author announce the purpose, the scope, and the limitations of his work. The problem is the problem of the nature of law in its relation to the philosophy of intellect and will from which every theory of law necessarily proceeds. The history is the history of those theories of law which arose during the great fertile period of Christian jurisprudence from the 13th to the early 17th century. Father Davitt recounts the history and places the problem by analyzing the legal writings of certain key figures of that period in order to extract from those writings the theory of law which each writer professed, the source of that theory in the same writer's psychology of intellect and will, and the natural effect of that theory in his notion of obligation. Finally, he shows the effect of this theory of law and obligation upon the same writer's views on the controversial question of penal laws.

Upon that simple, but very solid, foundation the entire work is built. The writers are divided into two groups, those who hold for the primacy of the intellect and those who hold for the primacy of the will in the concept of law. In each analysis of a particular writer Father Davitt is careful to point out how an error or a truth in one area of thought leads to a corresponding error or truth in another subordinate or consequent area of thought. For example, the concept of the primacy of the will as a faculty leads to the conclusion that command or imperium is essentially an act of the will. Since law is the act of command, or imperium, this leads to the conclusion that law is essentially a thing of the will. From this we can conclude that the source of obligation in law is the will of the legislator, not the relation between end and means perceived by the intellect. Finally, this same emphasis upon will in law causes these jurists to argue for the existence of purely penal laws, which are specified as penal by the will of the legislator.

In treating of those who hold to a voluntaristic theory of the faculties, of command, of law, of obligation, and of penal law, the author examines Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Ockham, Biel, de Castro, and Suarez. As for the adherents of an intellectualistic or rational theory of faculty supremacy, command, law, obligation, penalty—he examines St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Cajetan, Dominic Soto, Medina, and St. Robert Bellarmine. The work is thus no more, and yet no less, than it purports to be—a

history, and an introduction to a problem. Yet the orderly manner of treatment, the careful way in which the internal relationships in the thought of a given writer are worked out, the depth of analysis, make it an extremely valuable introduction to a problem.

Furthermore, it must be said to the author's credit that he is not content with the easy role of the historicist who stands off in detachment from the very real clash of opinions implicit in the contradictory positions he is examining. Father Davitt casts his lot with the rational theory of law and considers the future of legal theory to rest in a full working out of the principles of the Thomistic analysis.

If there is one source of dissatisfaction with the work, it is the treatment of penal law. Father Davitt obviously intended that the most practical and pertinent application of the voluntaristic or rational theories he describes would be in deciding the question of the existence of purely penal laws. But while he comes to the conclusion that the rational or intellectual theory of law which he favors necessarily excludes the possibility of laws which are penal only, he does not really prove, nor does he adequately answer the objections which he himself raises against it. It must be said, however, that the formulation of the question, and the statement of the principles on which a solution depends, are both clearly presented. And it may well be that the failure we have noted is not a failure at all, but merely an imperfection intrinsic to a work which is concerned with " an introduction to a problem," and which is content to indicate the main lines on which a solution of the problem of the penal law must be worked out.

Whatever be the limitations of a method which does not reach the full maturity of criticism, the quality of the work as a whole cannot be questioned, nor can its depth and accuracy of statement. It is consoling to find someone who is seriously attempting to reveal the psychological and metaphysical roots of legal theory. It is even more consoling to be able to recommend to students of the law a study of legal antecedents which is not only serious but successful.

Essays on Logic and Language. Edited with introduction by A. G. N. Flew. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 213. $3.75.

Words and their Use. By Stephen Ullmann. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 108 with bibliography. $2.75.

The first of these books is a collection of essays illustrating and highlighting the growth of the linguistic movement in philosophy, largely as it has been taking place in the universities of England during the past few decades. All of the articles included are reprints from British philosophical journals, so selected as " to be immediately readable by and intelligible to

the layman." The thesis maintained throughout the book is that most, if not all, philosophical problems are problems about language, and that these problems will be seen to vanish if a proper use of words is made in their systematic restatement.

The second book is a brief introduction to semantics in the "Man and Society Series." It too is addressed to the layman, but at a less sophisticated level than *Logic and Language*. The author's avowed intention is "to make people more word-conscious"; in so doing he touches on the problem of meaning, the interpretation of word-behavior and changes in vocabulary, and the shortcomings of language. Viewed philosophically, however, the work amounts to a mild, almost innocuous, endorsement of the linguistic movement publicized in the first book.

In *Logic and Language*, Antony Flew succeeds in his plan of presenting the key essays that have been the outgrowth of Prof. Wittgenstein's school at Oxford. His contributors include, among others, Gilbert Ryle, J. N. Findlay, Margaret Macdonald, G. A. Paul, and John Wisdom, and the problems they discuss reach into all the domains of traditional philosophy. Prof. Ryle's article, entitled "Systematically Misleading Expressions," touches some logical difficulties about predication; his main concern is to show that the apparent subject terms in many simple propositions are really concealed predicative expressions, and formal propriety demands that such propositions be restated as composite propositions. An important consequence of such restatement would be to show that the metaphysician's problems about "being," existence" and "reality" are largely illusory. Some of Ryle's perplexity, it seems to this reviewer, would be dispelled by a clear understanding of the scholastic doctrine on *suppositio* and the *individuum vagum*. Prof. Findlay launches into a discussion of statements involving time, and raises questions as to the legitimacy of using the term "now" when referring to events that take place over a period of time. He also considers St. Augustine's puzzles about time in the eleventh book of the *Confessions* and Zeno's paradoxes. Apparently oblivious of Aristotelian solutions to such problems, Findlay looks for an answer in various impulses underlying linguistic behavior. In so doing he makes a considerable dent in the traditional science of cosmology. G. A. Paul follows a similar pattern; he would eliminate much of rational psychology by his answer to: "Is there a Problem about Sense-Data?" Mr. Hart and Miss Macdonald invade the field of moral philosophy in talking about "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" and "The Language of Political Theory," respectively, while Mr. Wisdom completes the cycle with a practical negation of natural theology in his article, flippantly entitled "Gods." Beyond these, there are: Flew's "Introduction," a somewhat long-winded and subjective foreword that adequately sets the stage for what follows; and three articles that are more properly concerned with

logic than the others—one by Paul Edwards on induction, another by Miss Macdonald on analogy, and a third by F. Waisemann on verifiability.

All the articles are self-contained and intelligible, except possibly Mr. Paul's article, which presupposes a detailed knowledge of the term " sense-datum " and its use by contemporary philosophers, and Dr. Waisemann's, which was originally part of a symposium and presupposes the discussion prior to it. The latter author uses a few technical terms from symbolic logic, but he is the only offender in this regard; all the others, true to the editor's boast, " write in plain untechnical and unsymbolic English."

Space does not permit, nor do the arguments warrant, a detailed rebuttal of the philosophical theories propounded in these articles. All the writers appear to suffer from undue reverence for the success of empiriological science; they take their point of departure from a subjective appraisal of language use, and then uniformly apply a dialectic that permits no other verification than statements concerned with material objects. To the scholastic philosopher, the resulting treatment of philosophical problems cannot appear as other than impressionist and, to say the least, shallow. It is true that the manner of stating philosophical propositions is an important consideration, and the philosopher should always be alert to the question, " Can you say that? ", no matter what his field of interest may be. Yet by the very nature of things, the statement must follow the thought, and talking can never take the place of thinking. Now it seems that these authors would much rather talk about difficulties than think about them, and in their talking they ignore, consciously or otherwise, centuries of profound thought in the established traditions. Apart from this, more than a little nationalism rears its proud head in their essays; the impression is created that if Aristotle knew " Basic English," mankind would have been spared much intellectual anguish. A suspicion of the ultimate foolishness of this attitude may have dawned on some proponents of the linguistic movement, for Waismann avers (p. 137): ". . . I must warn you that I can't see any ground whatever for renouncing one of the most fundamental rights of man, the right of talking nonsense." But if people must talk nonsense, surely they have not the right to expect to be taken seriously.

Dr. Ullmann's book, on the other hand, does not deserve such harsh appraisal. *Words and their Use* is written in an engaging style, and furnishes much revealing information about philology and its utility as an adjunct to logic. Purged of the influences of Morris and Korzybski, it would make good supplementary reading as an introduction to semantic studies. Still it is related to *Logic and Language* as shadow to substance; close inspection shows neither to be of profound philosophical import.

The Virtues (in General). By St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. J. P. Reid. O.P. Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. 207. Paper $2.00, cloth $3.00.

We welcome another Providence College publication making available in English a previously untranslated work of St. Thomas, the Disputed Question on the "Virtues in General." The translator gives an introduction to the Disputed Questions in general, and to this one in particular, giving its historical and doctrinal significance. The moral life, and the place in it of the virtues, are briefly set forth. The translation itself is well done and readable, with footnotes on such words as "ratio" etc. which are left untranslated at times. The text is preceded by a useful general outline, and followed by synoptic summaries of each article which should prove particularly useful to students. Appendix II gives about fifty pages of notes, many of which are quotations from S. Thomas or from some modern writer, in explanation of difficult points. St. Thomas' determination of the "subjects" of the virtues is seen as one of his major contributions. We might add that another contribution is the Thomistic division of moral science into a general and special branch. N. 33 (p. 152) mentions the effects of corporal dispositions on the virtues, but no mention is made of the psychic dispositions of which we learn so much from modern psychology. N. 43 (p. 159) discusses the theological value of the doctrine of infused moral virtues. It would have been well to say something on this point of the modern debates based on historical and doctrinal investigations if only for the sake of completeness (cf. de Vooght, *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.* [1933], 1, pp. 232-242). There is a good summary of the teaching on the increase of the virtues (p. 167) without, however, any references to the commentators or to the fairly abundant modern literature on this question. Some attention also should have been given to the nature of the habits (habitus) with some bibliography (e.g. the works of Satolli, Roton, P. Bernard in his translation of the section of the *Summa* on the Virtues in the 'Révue des Jeunes' edition), as well as to the somewhat forgotten distinction between habits and dispositions (cf. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. Laurent [Rome, 1939], pp. 147-154) which has recently been emphasized by J. M. Ramirez, O.P. (*Studia Anselmiana*, Vol. 7-8, pp. 121 ff.).

These remarks do not detract from the value of this translation, which may well be recommended for even Latin readers of St. Thomas, but which will be especially useful to students who read the Angelic Doctor only in English. We look forward to more translations of this sort from Providence College.

Love and Friendship. St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's Ethics, bks. VIII-IX. Trans. PIERRE CONWAY, O.P. Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. 148. $2.50.

An English translation by Fr. Pierre Conway, O.P. of St. Thomas' Commentary on that section of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics dealing with friendship is welcomed for three reasons: 1) It will make available and stimulate interest in the Thomistic Commentaries on Aristotle, books in which many questions, treated briefly in the *Summa*, are examined in more detail. 2) English reading students of St. Thomas will be presented with the Angelic Doctor's teaching on friendship, a subject rarely treated in an entirely satisfactory way by ascetic writers, stressing only the case of "particular friendships," and not at all, usually, by moralists. To the first of these, St. Thomas declares: "Friends are necessary in all conditions of life"; and to the other, "it pertains to moral philosophy to treat of friendship." (Book VIII, ch. I) 3) The Thomistic doctrine on charity as a strict friendship with God can be better appreciated by an understanding of just what the "Doctor communis" means by friendship.

A brief introduction by the translator on the general moral teaching of St. Thomas and Aristotle is well done though rather brief. The place of friendship is shown as a "practical necessity" of human happiness in virtue of man's social nature and as an elective habitus based on virtue. (cf. n. 2, p. 121) The necessity and virtuous basis of true friendship can be stressed to counter-balance any exaggeration of some spiritual writers. It would have been well, for those readers unacquainted with Thomistic moral thought, to have added a few references to books of a general character (e.g., those of P. Sertillanges and M. Gilson on St. Thomas' moral philosophy), as well as to works of a more specific character (e.g., that of P. Simonin on Love, in *Arch. d'Hist. Doct. et Litt. du Moyen Age* [1931], VI, 174-277; and to the chapter in the general work of Sertillanges on Friendship).

The English of the translation is uniformly good, and more readable than that of some other current translations of St. Thomas. Fr. Conway deserves praise for this, for it is difficult to render Scholastic Latin into easy and understandable English.

The notes, given in the rear of the book, are useful and well done. It is good to see a recognition of the primacy of the common good (n. 3, p. 122), and of the value of the passions "to live a complete and unified life *as a man*." (n. 4) One could hope for a note on similitude as the fundamental cause of love, occasioned by the mention of this matter in Chap. I, Book VIII (p. 4). Also, with regard to the love of father and son, there is no reference to the interesting passage in Chap. 12, Book VIII (p. 49, and n. 1705 in the Spiazzi-Marietti Latin edition) which gives some Aristotelian

basis for the principle of the relation of part and whole, explaining why the common good is loved more than the merely individual good. (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, I-II, q. 109, a. 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 3) Rightly maintaining the impossibility of a strict friendship with God without grace, Fr. Conway does not mention the fact of an imperfect and analogical friendship of man with God on the merely natural plane. (cf. S. Thomas, I *ad Cor.*, c. 13, lect. 14)

Another note (n. 18) mentions " communicatio " as a basis of friendship and describes it as " an active unity based upon some common ground." If we take the " common ground " as refering to some formal similitude, or " communicatio in forma " (emphasized almost exclusively as the basis of friendship by Fr. Keller, O.P. in " De virtute caritatis ut amicitia quaedam divina," *Xenia Thomistica*, II, 233-279), then Fr. Conway would be combining this with the active union of lives, the " convivere " (stressed unduly, perhaps, by P. Coconnier, O.P., " La Charité d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Rév. Thom.*, XII, 611-660; XIII, 5-30; XIV, 1-17). Thus, the author would see no difficulty in reconciling the two opposing schools of thought on this matter. With this, we are in full agreement, for neither the basic formal similitude nor the active living-together can be considered exclusively as the causes of friendship, just as neither " bonum " nor " similitudo " can be considered exclusively as the causes of love. One should, however, stress that the " communicatio in forma " is the more fundamental basis of friendship, " secundum ordinem naturae."

Note 34 (p. 129) discusses man's self-love. This might be supplemented by mentioning the fact that, in Thomistic doctrine, the " amor amicitiae " and the " amor concupiscentiae " are but two aspects of the same act of love, and that the form of love man has for himself is technically an " amor amicitiae seu benevolentiae."

In the second paragraph of note 41 (p. 131), Fr. Conway seems to imply that the problems raised by Kant, at least in Ethics, are " pseudo-problems." This can hardly be correct, any more than can the critical problem of Kant be called a pseudo-problem. To say also that for Kant all knowledge is subjective, without the necessary qualifications, is an exaggeration. For both the philosopher of Königsberg and the Angelic Doctor, knowledge has both its subjective and objective components.

In closing, we may recommend this volume to a wide public, and especially to both clerical and lay students of St. Thomas for whom a better knowledge of friendship could not but be advantageous.

The Spirit of Politics and the Future of Freedom. By Ross J. S. Hoffman. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp. 98. $2.50.

This book, which is the amplified text of the Gabriel Richard Lecture, is an interesting, stimulating and challenging analysis of the state of freedom today and its chances for survival. The author believes that one of the most significant characteristics of the modern political scene is the decline of freedom. "Hence the danger to freedom, which to men who have known it is the best of earthly values, is real and enormous." Liberty is threatened not merely by Soviet Communism but also by the socialization of democracy.

The present challenge to freedom is the outgrowth of older, unsolved difficulties. Before the first World War it was a question of "how to place the liberal democratic state in the service of improving society." By 1930 the western world was faced with a new phase of the problem. "Liberal democracy appeared to be breaking down before the task of overcoming the great economic depression." The scope of political power was enlarged to enable it to cope with the economic depression. This period witnessed the rise of European Fascism and the American New Deal when it seemed everywhere necessary to fashion "new instruments of government to enforce social justice and ward off the danger of Bolshevism." The author finds that the problem has now reached its third and crucial stage. How are we to control the monster machines of public power which were raised up to solve the problems of our generation? How is the giant, renovated state to be "mastered and made organically instrumental to the real needs and permanent interests of society"? Are we to be the wards or slaves of public power or its master?

In order to help preserve freedom, Professor Hoffman urges a change in the spirit of politics. To bring this about, men must rediscover the "essential truths of the nature and destiny of man and make these truths again the criterion to which all political actions are referred." The second requisite for a change in the spirit of politics is the awareness that the underlying principles of good political society are Divine Providence and the universal moral law. "Nothing less than a knowledge of these realities can empty us of presumption and implant that humility that is the beginning of wisdom." Professor Hoffman's philosophy might be summed up in the words of Judge Jerome Frank with whom he agrees, "I cannot understand how any decent man can refuse today to adopt, as the basis of modern civilization, the fundamental principles of the Natural Law relative to human conduct as stated by Thomas Aquinas."

In general, the author is to be commended for both originality and brevity in his survey of a complex question. The threat to freedom is analyzed historically and philosophically. Especially noteworthy is the

manner in which this threat is integrated into the general historical setting of western civilization. The chapter on pragmatism in American life is a good example of the Professor's originality in handling his subject. This study contains a good deal of valuable material which merits further discussion and investigation.

Manuale Philosophiae. By Ioannes Di Napoli. Rome: Marietti, 1950. Vol. I Introductio Generalis—Logica—Cosmologia, pp. 347; Vol. II Psychologia—Gnoseologia—Ontologia, pp. 581.

New sets of manuals in philosophy for use in seminaries appear periodically. Few of them go beyond their first printing. Giovanni Di Napoli's endeavor may have a happier fate. The author plans a four volume set, two of which have already been published. These two will be sufficient for some judgment of the set.

Since Fr. Di Napoli taught seminarians, he is qualified to write for the specialized audience. Hence, as to the method of procedure, he is guided almost exclusively by pedagogical considerations. As to the philosophical content, Di Napoli is professedly Thomistic. The result is two volumes, beautifully printed, each page well blocked and clear to a point of unequalled perfection. For the price of clarity of thought, however, it is often necessary to drop difficult problems altogether or else give only the most perfunctory notions about them.

By comparison to such manuals as Hugon, Gredt, and Maquart, Di Napoli has achieved brevity and conciseness that surpasses any of them. In both volumes he concludes each chapter with summaries and a bibliography. This latter is, by far, one of the best features of the books. They afford valuable references for students with better than average ability.

Certainly the author has shown more originality and imagination in the composition of his volumes than has been seen for quite some time. Some objections, however, may be made. Cosmology, for example, has been divided into *somatologia* and *biologia*. In doing this, Di Napoli shifts the relation of cosmology to psychology in the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept almost beyond reconciliation. Another difficulty arises in his understanding, or at least in his presentation, of metaphysics. Critica is called *gnoseologia*, the part dealing with being is termed *ontologia*, and the section dealing with God is *theologia rationalis*. Now this division may seem traditional enough, but in the way it is set forth, it results in the unity of the science of metaphysics being confused and practically denied.

Probably the author intends the teacher to smooth out the apparent errors which arise from the dictates of pedagogy. The chances are, however, that the students will not be the least disturbed. Moreover, they will

welcome, along with the professor, the abundant new material from modern sciences which has been introduced.

Rarely has a set of manuals been composed that makes philosophy seem so easy. In that lies the greatest weakness of the new books. Frequently they border on a popularization and sometimes an oversimplification of difficult and profound problems. Yet one may venture the guess that these shortcomings will not weigh too much against the new volumes. They may challenge others to overcome such defects while retaining Di Napoli's improvements.

A History of Philosophy, Vol. II: *Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus*. By Frederick Copleston, S.J. Westminster: Newman, 1950. Pp. 624 with index. $4.50.

This book is the second of several volumes dealing with the history of philosophy. As stated in the preface of the first volume on the history of ancient philosophy, Father Copleston's chief motive in writing a complete history of philosophy is to supply "Catholic ecclesiastical seminaries with a work that should be somewhat more detailed and of wider scope than the text-books commonly in use and which at the same time should endeavour to exhibit the logical development and inter-connection of philosophical systems." Adhering to his two objectives, the author tells us in an illuminating introduction to this present volume that he has revised his original plan of covering the entire development of medieval philosophy ("understanding by medieval philosophy the philosophic thought and systems which were elaborated between the Carolingian renaissance in the last part of the eighth century A.D. and the end of the fourteenth century") in favor of devoting two volumes to this period.

The present volume is divided into five parts with a concluding review and appendices which include a short but adequate general bibliography and special bibliographies for each chapter. The first part deals with pre-medieval influences, the first chapter of this part covering the patristic period. The next six chapters, comprising some forty-odd pages, are devoted to a study of the life and teachings of St. Augustine. Father Copleston gives detailed attention to the writings of Augustine discussing many of his theological controversies and works. As he points out, Augustine, in common with the Fathers and early Christian writers, did not make such a clear distinction betwen philosophy and theology, and very often philosophical discussions are found in theological works.

A short separate chapter is devoted to the Pseudo-Dionysius, and it is pleasing to note that Boethius whose importance was often neglected by other writers is given due emphasis. About twenty-three pages on John

Scotus Eriugena and a short chapter on the Carolingian Renaissance make up the second part of the book. The author has availed himself of rather recent research on John Scotus and other medieval writers and corrects many false impressions about these men encouraged by previous historians.

Part three of this volume covers the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. Here, as elsewhere throughout the work, the author aims more at bringing out " the logical development and inter-connection of philosophical systems " than at producing separate and isolated analyses of the different philosophers of this period whose activities were outstanding. This part begins with a discussion of the problem of universals and in about twenty pages deals with such men as Roscelin, St. Peter Damian, William of Champeaux, Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, John of Salisbury as well as many minor thinkers of this period. By comparison Bishop William Turner's history, which is widely used in Catholic seminaries, gives more detailed information about these men and their writings. The third part of this book also includes chapters on St. Anselm of Canterbury, the School of Chartres, the School of St. Victor and a very short chapter on Amalric of Bene and David of Dinant. Father Copleston, true to his initial objectives, acquaints the student with the relative importance of the various thinkers and shows how they fit into the general pattern of medieval philosophy.

Part four, dealing with Islamic and Jewish philosophy and the various translations of the works of Aristotle, lacks detail, but provides the reader with an accurate view of the important influence of the Moslem and Jewish writers on medieval thought of the thirteenth century. The reader will find Father Copleston's brief analysis of the attitude of Dante towards Averroes, Avicenna and Siger of Brabant interesting. The four pages devoted to Jewish philosophy seem quite adequate in view of the stated objective of the author.

The fifth part includes more than half of this volume and deals with the thirteenth century. To St. Thomas Aquinas and his philosophical system are allotted eleven chapters covering more than a hundred pages. From Father Copleston's analysis the intelligent reader can get a fairly good notion of the Thomistic synthesis. The author has, moreover, availed himself of recent research on St. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. His study of the latter philosopher, which covers almost seventy pages of this volume, corrects many former misconceptions which have been fostered by some older histories of philosophy.

That Father Copleston has done a great service for students of medieval philosophy is unquestionable. He has written an authoritative, well-documented history which the reader can trust. Although his work is far from being a " popularization," it is not ponderous and has an easy style which makes for pleasant reading. As the result of first impressions, this reviewer

had some misgivings about the success of this history as a text-book for the reason that certain discussions seemed too erudite for beginners and presupposed a rather thorough knowledge of philosophy. Actually, however, the history was primarily intended for Catholic seminarians whose curriculum usually extends over the whole field of philosophy, and who could be expected to have a basic understanding of philosophy as well as its history.

It is hoped that Father Copleston's *History of Medieval Philosophy* will be given a trial in the classroom and not be just another work that graduate students and teachers can profitably consult.

Heloise and Abelard. By Etienne Gilson. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951. Pp. 209. $3.00.

The greatest love story the world has ever known, as the romance between Heloise and Abelard has been called, has been told in many ages, many languages, and from many points of view. Here we have the philosopher and historian delving into the facts in the case itself and the culture of the age in which it happened. With this combination of the abilities of M. Gilson and the purpose he had in mind, namely, to tell the accurate story from the letters written by Heloise and Abelard, one stands a fair chance of getting the true picture of this " great love story."

Using as his main source, the correspondence which passed between the lovers, the author shows forth the history of each after their marriage. In depicting their lives, it becomes clear that Abelard was the more spiritual in his repentance, whereas it is doubtful if Heloise ever repented their illicit love, because, to her, there was nothing to repent. In her soul of souls she could not convince herself—if indeed she ever tried—nor could Abelard convince her that her eternal salvation rested upon her repentance.

There is one important practical point made crystal clear in M. Gilson's treatment of the correspondence, the supreme difference between masculine and feminine personality. It rings frequently enough through the letters to be called a refrain. The man sees life and love from one point of view; the woman, from another entirely different point of view. This might even be called " the moral of the story " if there were no doubt as to the authenticity of the letters. Heloise is the soul of dedication, the altruist, capable of daily martyrdom; Abelard too often sees the world and their love from his personal point of view. While there is no question as to the theological correctness of Abelard's analysis of their deed, the psychological reaction is depicted so clearly from these two points of view, that it might be well for modern apostles of " equality for the sexes " to see in Heloise and Abelard a contradiction to their own preachments. " Male and female

He created them," and this maleness and femaleness goes so deeply into the nature of the human being that modern education and employment opportunities and votes for woman cannot equalize their natures.

M. Gilson spends some little time in establishing the authenticity of the letters and also gives some space to refuting contradictory interpretations. His brief essay accomplishes its task well, that of the history, the philosophy, and the theology of the episodic careers of Abelard and Heloise.

The Pillar of Fire. By KARL STERN. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951. Pp. 310 with index. $3.50.

The roads to Rome are many and varied. In recent years that traversed by numerous intellectuals has been the very direct but steep way laid down by Saint Thomas with the *Summa Theologica* serving as a handy road map. Karl Stern is one intellectual who arrived at his destination over a different route. As a matter of fact Doctor Stern beat his own trail mostly though wild and untraveled country, with only his heart for a compass and divine grace as the magnetic pole. Unlike previous intellectuals who have found their way into the Church, Doctor Stern's conversion was not primarily intellectual; unlike many scientists who have arrived there, he received a minimum of help from his scientific studies. None of the usual intellectual aids served him as a preamble to Faith as history served Newman; philosophy, Bergson; the theology of Saint Thomas, countless others. All were drawn to the Church of Christ in spite of themselves but they knew why they were drawn (even Bergson who could not make the final step because of racial loyalty). Doctor Stern was drawn by a powerful unseen force that was as mysterious as it was powerful.

Pillar of Fire, the account of that battle with God, is all the more fascinating because of that mystery. Taken as a whole, it is not the best of the accounts on conversion, for a good part of the book has nothing to do with the conversion, being merely a routine and prolix account of an ordinary childhood. There is no restless search for truth in adolescence and young manhood that is characteristic of most intellectual converts. After a youthful gesture towards orthodoxy, caused rather by racial pride than by hunger for truth, Karl Stern settled comfortably, and rather smugly, into dialectical materialism. Not until the persecution of the German Jews by the Nazis did Stern see through the error of dialectical materialism and begin to hunger for God. His first reaction was to seek Him in Judaism and once more he turned to orthodoxy, this time in deadly earnest. Realizing at length, by feeling rather than by reason, that Orthodox Judaism was a beautiful relic rather than a living faith, he was compelled to enter the Church. It would not be correct to say that he left Orthodox Judaism

because Karl Stern feels he never left it (and indeed he is right), but he did take (after a long internal battle) the step into the Catholic Church. What convictions led him to make that final step Doctor Stern never does make clear in the book because it is not clear to himself. The reasons he gives are mystical rather than intellectual. Here is no well reasoned *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* of a Newman, nor the brilliant apologetic work of a Chesterton; not even the intellectually satisfying spiritual travelogues of a Lunn or a Moody or a Stoddard. Here is an account of the action of Divine Grace on the human heart, an action that is shrouded in mystery, an action that took place without the intellectual preamble to Faith experienced by them, It was eminently fitting that Karl Stern (who knew Maritain and the Dominicans) should have been received into the Church by a Franciscan.

Doctor Stern's book is well worth reading. Even those who have little taste for the prolixity of the first part of the book will find the second half where the "spiritual voyage" advertised on the dust cover begins, fascinating.

Poems of Saint John of the Cross. Spanish text with translation. By Roy Campbell. New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. Pp. 98. $2.75.

Saint John of the Cross has admirably blended the exactness of a theologian and the warmth and love of a mystic in the twenty-two works that comprise his poetic production. His poems are highly concentrated literary gems; their stanzas compress within their framework substantial mystical ideas. These twofold qualities are not easily discoverable among poets or scholars. As is evident, the poetic and mystical experience of Saint John was not destined to be confined to the Spanish speaking world. Attempts were made to translate it into other languages. Several English translations have been published: by Audrey Bell, by David Lewis and by E. Allison Peers. The latter, a renowned authority on Spanish mystical literature, elaborated two different translations: one merely rhythmical and the other metrical with a rhyme scheme corresponding to the original. Now, there has appeared this new translation whose aim is to preserve the utmost conformity with the original, while presenting the poems in modern English verse. The translator-poet has tried to arouse in English readers an esthetic response equivalent to that experienced by the Spanish reader. This, of course, called for a bilingual poetic mastery of a high order. Mr. Roy Campbell shows manifold evidence of possessing these required creative abilities.

His poems, when read without reference to the Spanish, give the impression, and strongly so, of original creations. However, when comparisons

are made with the Spanish by a bilingual reader, it must be admitted that even though the borrowed thoughts and emotions are not often diluted or modified in the process of translation, yet the esthetic impression is not the same. These poems do not have that Latin musicality and vocalic fulness which makes Spanish poetry a delight to the ear.

More critical readers will find slight flaws in the translation; they may object to phrases slightly over-realistic in tone which seem out of place in outbursts of mystical love; fault may be found with the choice of words here and there, as, for instance: "They asked me for a ditty" (p. 81) referring to a hymn of Sion. However, the shortcomings brought to light by the constructive criticism of scholars will not take away the fact that the average reader will find the translations a thorough joy, an opportunity of sharing in the mystical experiences of a saintly poet. This enriching experience should lead the reader of the poems to the explanatory prose writings of the Saint, and through them to the Supreme Beauty and Love which is God.

Unless Some Man Show Me. By A. Jones. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951. Pp. 173. $2.50.

"These pages are written for the average person." These words form the opening sentence in the forward to this book and are perhaps the least intelligible, unless we are to understand that the average Englishman is quite a scholar indeed. After four opening chapters on inspiration and literary forms, Father Jones collects some of the knottiest problems from the Old Testament, and applies to them the best of the latest solutions provided by Catholic scholars. He shows a good sense of judgment in the choice of solutions and a vast store of knowledge in their discussion. This last is attested to by frequent references to *Revue Biblique, Biblica*, works by Bea, Lagrange, Skinner, DeVaux, and others.

However, he is to be especially praised for the "literary form" that is the vehicle for his presentation. With a keen sense of humor, that will bring many a chuckle, he disposes of the critics' charges against the supposed attitude of the Church to science and the harmony of the latter with the Bible. Yet it is this same "literary form" that at times leaves the reader wondering just what Father Jones is getting at. Clarity of thought, it seems, is being sacrificed for the clever phrase. Although it does provide the sauce that makes the meat of such problems as the Canticle of Canticles, the Book of Jonas, and the first three chapters of Genesis palatable, it would require more than an "average" stomach to digest the author's solution to a difficulty like the tree of knowledge of good and evil. All in all, nonetheless, this is a book worth reading—even study.

History of Russian Philosophy. By N. O. Lossky, New York: Internat. Univers. Press, 1951. Pp. 416 with index. $10.00.

The author, now teaching philosophy at the Russian Orthodox Seminary in New York, was, until exiled by the Bolshevists, professor of Philosophy at the University of St. Petersburg. Born in 1870, he has witnessed much of the development of philosophy in his country and contributed notably to it himself. His work fills an often felt lacuna; the West is but little acquainted with the men and ideas representative of the Russian world, that is, prior to the domination by Communism. To-day, the philosophical tradition of Russia is alive with the emigrés in various places.

A history of philosophy is essentially in the form of reports, and to report on these again is hardly feasible. But out of the diverse currents of philosophical thought analyzed, appraised, and sometimes criticized, an over-all picture merges which one may try to outline.

Although there have been materialistic and positivistic thinkers, the majority of Russian philosophers remains rooted in or, at least, closely related to the religious tradition of Russian Orthodoxy. Not a few men found the way back to the faith after having gone astray in their younger years and have built up their philosophies of their mature age in accord with the teachings of their faith.

To understand the spirit of Russian philosophy, one has to take account of this close relation and of the peculiarities of the Russian religious sentiment. The influences which shaped Russian philosophy are, however, not only those of religious orthodox doctrine and, naturally, the impact of Western philosophies, but certain other ideas stemming from the East, though not strictly from the Eastern Church. Still within the framework of the latter, one may place the notions derived either directly from Neo-Platonism or indirectly through Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus Confessor, and others. Apart from this, there is a definite trace in some writers of the Gnosis. Professor Lossky does not stress this last point, but his summary of the ideas, e. g., of Father Pavel Florensky, reveals much of this influence. Especially, the preoccupation of more than one thinker with the idea of "Sophia" is strongly reminiscent of gnostic speculation.

Thus, the whole "intellectual climate" of Russian philosophy differs in a remarkable manner from that of the West. No wonder that Western ideas were often subjected to fargoing transformations and that a particular influence fell to such ideas as show some resemblance to either Neo-Platonism or to mysticism. Both the acquaintance with and the importance of medieval philosophy, especially its Aristotelian branch, seems to have been almost null, compared with the recognition of Eriugena, Eckehart, and of later writers such as Jacob Boehme. This renders also intelligible the interest in Schelling, the peculiar interpretation of Hegel, and the insignificant role played by Kantian and Neo-Kantian ideas.

Brief though the characterizations of many authors are, they furnish a clear picture of Russian philosophy. They also reveal the intimate relation of speculative thought with not only religious meditation but national and cultural aims. There seems to be a strong and lively consciousness, pervading the minds of almost all writers, of the peculiarities of Russian mentality as set over against that of the West.

So far as one may venture to form an opinion without acquaintance with the primary sources, Professor Lossky seems to be right when he points out that one characteristic feature is " a keen sense of reality," giving rise to a definite intuitionist trend of which the author himself is the most outstanding representative. Most of these philosophers are, in epistemology, realists. Another remarkable feature is the tendency towards a complete integration of all sides of human life; therefore the preoccupation with ethics which for many is the primary problem. The third basic characteristic, already referred to, is the preservation of the connection of philosophy and faith.

To name the chapters into which the book is divided seems unnecessary; this would amount to a mere enumeration of names most of which are unknown to the readers. The book should be read by everyone concerned with the fundamental problems of philosophy and interested in the unity of the human mind. Through it one comes to know a mentality different from that one is accustomed to view as typical of the speculative philosopher and one sees an approach presenting novel features.

Rewarding though the study of this work will prove, the reader may regret certain defects. One is that it does not become clear always whether a work referred to in the text is available in translation. All titles are given, with very few exceptions, in English. The place of publication is not always indicated. There is no bibliography and references usually are in the text, not in footnotes. Another piece of information one might wish to see added concerns the literature used by and known to the Russian writers, especially as regards the Eastern sources mentioned above.

These are, however, slight imperfections. To judge from the chapters on better known authors, the summary given of the views of the various thinkers appears to be complete. At least, one gets the impression of a comprehensive presentation. Thus, for instance, the author manages to outline and criticize the contemporary philosophy of " dialectic materialism " in 32 pages in a perfectly satisfactory manner. On the whole, one is grateful to Professor Lossky for this valuable work.

John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor. By F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 320. $4.50.

In this collection of letters, most of which were exchanged between John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (later Mrs. John Stuart Mill), Professor Hayek has refrained from interpretation, any attempt at which, he says, ". . . would almost inevitably have interfered with the impartial presentation of the documents." Since this lack of interpretation allows the reader to indulge in one of his own, he may not be inclined to agree with the jacket blurb that this correspondence "gives a significant and charming glimpse of intellectual life in Victorian England." Instead the reader may be urged to contend that though the glimpse given is significant, for it is based on a certain amount of newly discovered correspondence, the glimpse is far from charming.

There is a certain rampant rationalism dominant throughout these letters, which may have been daring and radical a hundred years ago, but today sounds considerably trite if not trivial. The positivism, the agnosticism, and the utilitarianism espoused and expressed by these two thinkers of the Victorian era have since been found to be horribly insufficient to achieve the good society. The moral estheticism or eclecticism, thrusting aside all religious implications, which Mr. Mill and Mrs. Taylor considered necessary to promote freedom and progress has been proven to achieve nothing but social chaos. The really significant revelation of these letters is a picture of two thinkers—inquiring, sincere, distrustful of the sacrosanct values of the past, confident of the ultimate triumph of the natural man over the presumed idiocies of society—whose minds are at bay.

Too, there is an unintentional and perhaps more interesting revelation to be discerned in these letters, that of the personalities involved. In Mill's *Autobiography*, Mrs. Taylor is acclaimed extravagantly for her aid in formulating his thought. Many of his contemporaries, particularly Carlyle, and many others since have been of the opinion that she merely echoed rather than inspired that thought. Professor Hayek's work is supposed to belie this opinion. Yet even a casual reading of his book, which is said to provide direct evidence to the contrary, does not disclose any effective impact on Mrs. Taylor's part as far as Mill's mind is concerned. It could be possible, of course, that both were in such mental accord that the differences in their thought can not be distinguished.

Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor is shown to be not as altruistic as the logic of her philosophy would demand; she has the typical, Victorian *grande dame* attitude toward servants and the poorer classes; she makes some calculating observations regarding the discovery of gold in California that might not agree with that utilitarian premise of the greatest happiness for the greatest number; she can be querulous and shrewish, too, when she is balked. Then, though this is hardly pertinent, one wonders, if she was as brilliant as she

was supposed to be, why she ever indulged in some of the baffling syntax to which she was addicted.

John Stuart Mill, whom Harriet Taylor considered to be so noble and generous, hardly emerges as such in some of these letters, betraying instead an irritating smugness at times, particularly when abroad, mingling with those he probably termed the "natives." His behavior toward his own family appears to be inexcusably churlish. His conceit is occasionally appalling, a conceit shared by Harriet; they both agreed that their thought was too sublime to be appreciated by the masses. There is a tragic irony also in his doting earnestness about his "thought a day"; one wonders how any man of intellectual pretensions, particularly a man like Mill, could be so mesmerized by some of the platitudes he voiced.

This correspondence has, though, a sociological value, disclosing, as it does, the Mill-Taylor attitude toward religion, marriage, divorce, politics and economics; Mrs. Taylor's sublime contempt for all the sanctions of her world, her retaliation against anyone who presumed to censure her conduct or question her platonic friendship with Mill; Mill's interest in poetry, art and music, his evaluation of the continental nations; the background of a segment of Victorian society which is hardly known. For such information is *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor* worth the reading.

D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence. By William Tiverton. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 139. $3.00.

The enigma of D. H. Lawrence is again assayed in this slim volume by Father Tiverton, a member of an Anglican religious order. The task to which the author has committed himself is an enormous one; though Lawrence is considered one of the outstanding literary figures of the 20th century, he was a man of baffling personality, chaotic ideas and repulsive attitudes. Lawrence himself constantly quested for an absolute in life, something which proved as elusive as the evaluation which Father Tiverton tries to achieve in this criticism. Yet the effort and the probing which this latest search into the labyrinthine character of Lawrence involved, do deserve notice.

The author does reveal in a terse manner a portrait of Lawrence as a man, as an artist, and as a thinker, while he tries to fit this three-dimensional picture within a Christian frame. Etched though this picture is, with an array of citations from Lawrence's prose and poetry, comments from his friends and enemies, arguments culled from renowned thinkers, even St. Thomas Aquinas, the figure is about as clear and impressive as one of Lawrence's own self portraits; Lawrence was also a painter with a rugged primitivism dominant in his work.

Lawrence the man is shown to be the victim of an extremely unhappy childhood, the son of a drunken, cruel father and an inhibited mother. Though he was lionized by women, loved perhaps by a few, notably Frieda von Richthofen whom he spirited away from her husband, he appeared to be continually frustrated, travelling to the far corners of the earth in a ceaselessly futile quest for happiness. To further his unhappy doom tuberculosis beset him during the latter part of his life. Even the prohibitions imposed upon his books, which made him notorious, proved extremely irritating; he labored under the delusion that he was somewhat of a savior fated to redeem mankind through an esoteric and somewhat unintelligible evangel. As a man he emerges as a pitiable person.

Lawrence's artistry is perhaps best considered by Father Tiverton; this aspect of his life is judged by the concrete evidence of his works and admits of little if any argument. Lawrence was a powerful but erratic writer, capable of an arresting lyricism, an intensity of feeling, deft description (particularly of nature), and smarting satire. But he was also prone to forego the artistically logical demands of his work in favor of ranting, irresponsible attacks against his real or presumed enemies, and jeremiads against any system of society which he loathed.

Lawrence's thought processes perhaps defy analysis, yet Father Tiverton attempts to discern within them some system or consistency. This feature of his criticism may be difficult to accept; Lawrence was too contradictory to be examined by any frame of reference. For instance, though many of his own novels were outrageously prurient, he said vehemently of Joyce's *Ulysses*, "The last part of it is the dirtiest, most indecent, obscene thing ever written." While he acknowledged himself to be a pantheist, he also insisted that the problem of existence demanded that man find God. Though he was somewhat of an advocate of polygamy, he emphasized the necessity of monogamy to stabilize civilization. Such are too few examples of his contradictory thought. Undaunted though, Father Tiverton examines all of Lawrence's pronouncements, paying reverent due to any trace of genuine religious feeling which they contain. Father Tiverton is to be commended for his effort and his industry more so than for the result; though his book is interesting, it is hardly convincing.

They Lived The Faith. By Thomas P. Neill. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951. Pp. 388 with index. $4.50.

Mr. Neill was prompted to the writing of this collection of sketches of 19th century Catholic lay leaders by two considerations: first because the subjects of these sketches have been almost totally ignored by secular historians. Second, because they have been largely neglected by Catholic historians also, who are prone, says Mr. Neill, to emphasize the contribution

of Churchmen: "of Gibbons, Manning, Newman, Dupanloup and Von Kettler." The second statement is about as correct as saying that Cardinal O'Connell is better known to Catholics of the twentieth century than Al Smith, and the author needs no such weak excuse for presenting a fine book. Mr. Neill's study of the thirteen Catholic lay leaders is an excellent piece of work. Written in a popular, easy-to-read style it makes no display of the solid, painstaking scholarship upon which it is based. Its one serious fault is a tendency to repetition that can be easily discounted.

The work is divided into three parts: I. Political adjustment as represented by the battles of Daniel O'Connell, Count Charles de Montelambert, Ludwig Windthorst and Garcia Moreno; II. Social adjustment as shown by the lives and works of Pauline Jaricot, Frédéric Ozanam and Albert de Mun. III. Intellectual action as demonstrated by Joseph de Maistre, Joseph Görres, Donoso Cortés, Orestes Brownson, Louis Veuillot and Wilfred Ward.

Out of Bondage. By ELIZABETH BENTLEY. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951. Pp. 305. $3.50.

The burden of this tale of espionage is already well known to those who read the newspapers. To it Miss Bentley adds some facts about her background, including why she became a Communist, an agent for a foreign government, and a traitor to her own. This is no learned treatise on dialectical materialism, concerning which the author knows very little; nor is it an exposé of the overall strategy of the Communist Party, of which she is equally ignorant. But it is a gripping cloak and dagger tale that is better than most novels on a similar subject. The writer handles her material with the skill of a good novelist, and if her work were to be judged as a novel, its greatest weakness would be its improbability.

Before she turns her hand to further writing either of fact or of fiction Miss Bentley should, for the honor of Vassar, polish her literary style. The use of cliché and the repetition of favorite words and phrases are glaring faults. Not once in the course of this history does she go normally to bed. She always crawls there. And she never laughs except hysterically.

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